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setting the Scene 
Chapter one 
Introduction 
The history of development aid in South Africa has been quite 
different from that experienced by most other 'developing' 
countries. From the 1950s to the mid-1980s South Africa 
remained largely as a spectator to the global aid-giving 
process. There were two major reasons for this. 
First, in a bid to persuade the Pretoria Government to 
initiate reforms, the international community imposed a series 
of aid-sanctions against South Africa. And second, South 
Africa by virtue of its per capita income (not its wealth 
distribution) is, by 'developing' countries standards, 
considered to be a weal thy country with ample resources to 
improve the lot of its people, (in a post-apartheid situation, 
however, it is likely that development agencies will be more 
concerned with wealth distribution). 
During this period of effective isolation in which South 
Africa remained on the margins of the "global development 
industry" its population was not, 
development intervention. Far from it. 
however, immune from 
In the space that was 
created by the non-participation of international development 
agencies other forms of development intervention took root. 
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Black people in South Africa have been the targets or 
victims - of massive development intervention by successive 
South African governments. And in more recent years urbanised 
Africans in particular have been the targets of increasing 
levels of development intervention, much of which has been 
funded and directed through bilateral aid programmes initiated 
by western governments. 
It is with those kinds of development intervention that this 
thesis is concerned. Research, conducted during 1989 and 1990, 
examined a slice of development activity occurring in an 
African urban area during what is becoming a period of 
transition from South Africa's effective isolation to the 
beginning of its reincorporation into the world "development 
system". 
It is likely that the 1990s will be South Africa's 
"development decade". Its role as both a donor (in the 
southern African region) and recipient of development aid is 
set to grow. But in this transition from one era to the next 
many important issues need to be addressed. Any future South 
African government, and indeed all the protagonists in the 
development process, will be obliged - as the Namibians were -
to devise policies to manage the increasing flow of 
development aid and the powerful presence of development 
agencies. 
Some of the problems that face future planners will be rooted 
in the country's previous experience of development 
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intervention. This thesis makes a small contribution to any 
future debate about the transition by highlighting and 
discussing some of the problems associated with the past 
funding and administration of one area of development 
intervention. An intervention that was dominant in previous 
decades and is likely to remain an important part of any 
future national plan. 
Though my focus, which centres on two community-based, 
manufacturing projects (defined here as community development 
initiatives), is fairly narrow, my analysis draws in many of 
the protagonists involved in the development process: donors, 
recipients and facilitators that assist in the provision of 
aid-. Furthermore by selecting such projects ( and their 
members) as the core of the study I have been able to place a 
specific development intervention in its historical, regional 
and material context. 
The kind of development activity discussed falls under the 
rubric of urban community development ( a term discussed more 
fully below) which, in this context, has two aspects. The 
first relates to community development initiatives funded and 
implemented by the South African state. These initiatives must 
be seen in terms of the state's use of the rhetoric and 
practice of conventional development to see through its 
programmes of segregation and later apartheid. These 
programmes which were justified by the notion of an internal 
First and Third World, characterised by large-scale 
relocations of people and moulded by a racial ideology, 
invariably created conflict between state and people. 
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The second aspect concerns community development intervention 
pursued by external (i.e. non-South African government) donors 
(mainly foreign governments and foreign and domestic non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)) without any involvement of 
the South African state and with the stated intention of 
combatting apartheid and assisting its 'victims'. The amount 
of aid entering South Africa for this purpose has, as I show 
in Chapter Ten, substantially increased during the previous 
decade, and its administration has often been a cause of 
tension in South Africa's international relations. 
I have two major objectives in this thesis. The first is to 
examine the consequences of the sort of community development 
interventions I have described. The second is to examine the 
motivations and administrative procedures of agencies involved 
in such interventions. In so doing I aim to show the 
complexities in which urban community development aid is given 
and received. 
In this analysis, however, I also attempt not to lose sight of 
the people, the township residents, who are the targets of 
such aid. I am confident in arguing that to a large extent the 
subjects of such intervention have been caught in a maelstrom 
of activity which substantially limits their scope for 
autonomous action. But one must be careful to avoid 
replicating the past mistake of casting people as "victims", 
so repressed by their "culture of poverty" that they are 
unable to navigate their way out this maelstrom. 
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Structure 
In discussing the consequences of intervention there are two 
related sets of effects. These are tied to the geographical 
area of my research, the African informal settlements around 
Old Crossroads, and to a particular period in history which 
covers the years before and after the violent events of 1985 
and 1986, which Josette Cole (1987) has called 'the Crossroads 
crisis'. 
The first set of consequences concerns the effects of central 
government and security forces attempts, between 1975 and 
1985, to control the Crossroads informal settlement (and its 
satellite camps) and to restructure the local political 
terrain partly through community development intervention. The 
direct effects are related to the continuing material 
deprivation· in the settlements, political fragmentation, and 
forms of political leadership and orga~isation which dominated 
the lives of the settlements' residents. 
In Part Two of the thesis I discuss these issues in relation 
to a general discussion about the historical processes which 
led to the creation and shaping of informal settlements around 
South Africa's major cities. The work of Simkins (1983), 
Hindson (1987), Graaff (1987), and West and Oliver-Evans 
(1990) has been useful in understanding the broad processes, 
in particular state practices, which have contributed to the 
shaping of urban settlements in South Africa. Lipton (1986), 
Greenberg (1987) and Mabin's (1989) work has provided a very 
useful framework for analysis through which one can understand 
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those processes in terms of their likely impact on people who 
live in urban settlements. 
The second set of consequences concerns the effects of 
community development intervention as pursued by donors other 
than the South African government during the immediate post-
Crossroads crisis years. In my discussion of state activities 
I examine the creation and co-option of leaders in informal 
settlements as a means of assisting the state in its bid to 
control the urbanward movement and settlement of Africans. The 
theme of leadership continues in Part Three of the thesis 
where I examine the strategies adopted by two former residents 
of Old Crossroads who were seen by 'progressive' organisations 
and donors of community development assistance to be in 
opposition to the government-supported leadership and 
therefore appropriate recipients of assistance. 
Confronted with the many problems which beset the townships in 
the post-crisis era, Sam Nkonyeni and Nomathemba Matiwana 
pursued a course of action which was applauded in 
'progressive' circles and promoted by the donor community as 
the most suitable way to tackle those problems. Nkonyeni, 
Matiwana and many others put time, effort and what little 
resources they had into establishing 'democratically-
organised', community-based, productive 'projects' operating 
with the principles of self-help. 
With the assistance of friends and contacts in 'liberal' 
organisations Nkonyeni and Matiwana 
invited members to join, and applied 
secured properties, 
for funding. In Part 
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Three of the thesis I describe the progress of Philippi 
Enterprises and the Spiritual Churches Development Centre in 
terms of their activities and income, the relationship between 
the projects and outside. agencies, and the attitudes of their 
members towards the projects. 
Many of the problems associated with small-scale ventures of 
this nature a lack of understanding of basic business 
principles; ideological confusion; poor accountability; 
corruption; lack of resources and training; poor choice of 
product or type of activity undertaken; shoddy workmanship; 
inappropriate funding; undue dependence on funding; 
unreasonably high expectations (Manuel, 1989:68, Wilson and 
Ramphele, 1989:289-299, Roberts, 1989:9-10) - were writ large 
in Philippi Enterprises and the Spiritual Churches Development 
Centre. 
Through my involvement with these two projects I was able to 
pursue the second of my objectives: to examine the motivations 
and administrative procedures of agencies involved in 
community development. This task - at least as far as the 
involvement of foreign governments was concerned - was made 
easier by virtue of the fact that during my research I was, 
through marital association, granted full access to embassy 
and consular staff responsible for the administration of their 
governments' community development schemes. I was also 
assisted by the fact that the Spiritual Churches and Philippi 
projects attracted support from a wide range of donors, many 
of whom I was able to watch at work and later interview their 
representatives. 
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This access was important because as Whiteside (1991) and 
Rarnphele (forthcoming) have noted very little has been written 
about this sort of development intervention in South Africa. 
The reasons for this paucity of information can be found in 
South Africa's peculiar history with regard to aid-giving. It 
is appropriate in the introduction to this thesis to explain 
that background which describes an era of development 
intervention that is corning to a close. 
South Africa's effective isolation from the global aid-giving 
process has created something of a space in which unorthodox 
development has taken root. This has had a number of direct 
and indirect consequences, some of which are intangible and 
difficult to quantify and have more to do with the creation of 
an environment in which certain kinds of development have 
proceeded more or less unchecked. In~ sense, then, what I am 
concerned with are the unintended consequences of aid-
sanctions, the most important of which are as follows: 
(1) south Africa lacks a thoroughgoing debate about 
development issues; 
(2) It lacks a body of development expertise; 
(3) There is a legacy of distrust between the 
protagonists in the development process; 
(4) There does not exist a structure in which serious 
development aid can be effectively disbursed, 
monitored and assessed; 
(5) Certain donors will have to reconsider their 
development objectives and motivations which 
previously treated recipients of aid only as 
"victims" and which has led to a form of 
11 welfarisrn 11 ; 
(6) The recipients of aid have been excluded from the 
development process and urgently need to be 
educated, and community structures strengthened to 
allow them greater control over that process. 
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How has this situation evolved? An important consequence of 
South Africa's exclusion from the international development 
system has been its non-participation in certain multilateral 
agencies. In line with. foreign governments' aid-sanctions 
against South Africa, bilateral donors would not give 
assistance to the South African central government, local 
government, the 'homelands' or any institution connected with 
these bodies. 
As most international aid is given on a government-to-
government basis this arrangement severely restricted the flow 
of aid to South Africa. Most NGOs, like international 
charities, followed the lead of multilateral agencies and 
individual governments in agreeing not to work with the South 
African government. some charity and church organisations 
(e.g. Save the Children Fund, Oxfam and World Vision), 
however, have maintained a presence in.south Africa - albeit a 
minimal one disbursing aid only through non-government 
channels. 
Despite these restrictions, aid-flow to South Africa (from 
external sources) rapidly increased during the mid- to late-
1980s. Accompanying this increase in external funding has been 
a series of announcements by the South African government 
committing it to a previously unseen programme of social 
upliftment, ( in particular the creation of the Independent 
Development Trust (IDT). 
As I explain in Chapter Ten, external funding entering South 
Africa emanates from a number of sources. Firstly there is 
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bilateral aid which is given by governments to organisations 
and individuals within South Africa. Most of this aid is 
administered through diplomatic off ices of foreign countries 
scattered throughout South Africa or through representatives 
of official aid departments (e.g. the USAID office in 
Pretoria). 
Secondly there is multilateral aid currently dominated by the 
European Community (EC) which channels a large portion of its 
aid through the troubled Kagiso Trust (see Danger in 'South', 
March 1991). Thirdly there is aid administered by NGOs and 
charities which have received institutional (i.e. Foundation 
Funds) and individual money from western countries. Lastly 
there is aid which has its source in corporate social 
responsibility programmes. 
For a number of reasons estimating th~ amount of aid entering 
South Africa is extremely difficult. Firstly, the South 
African state has been hostile to overseas aid, particularly 
that which was seen to support autonomous community structures 
which it regarded as a potential threat. Secondly, the sort of 
donors which have been involved in development work have shown 
considerable reluctance to disclose the extent of their 
financial commitment. Thirdly, there has never been a central 
registry to record aid received. And lastly because of the 
kind of development intervention pursued and the nature of its 
administration some donors are genuinely unaware of the amount 
spent on particular projects. 
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In Part Four of this thesis I discuss these issues more fully 
and attempt to quantify the amount of official aid entering 
South Africa. 
One of the conclusions of this thesis is that a great deal of 
aid which has entered South Africa has been used largely for 
political purposes rather than for conventional development 
objectives. The nature of development assistance given in 
South Africa is quite different from that given in other 
'developing' countries. Elsewhere the lion's share of aid is 
consumed by large and expensive "project aid" schemes which 
aim to strengthen countries' economic and social 
infrastructure (Whiteside, 1991, cf. Ferguson, 1990) through 
capital projects; or structural adjustment programmes which 
aim to II stabilise" host economies (UK Parliamentary Report, 
1991:24). 
Such "project aid" which is normally administered through the 
recipient government, in line with its national priorities, 
has not been a feature of aid-giving in South Africa. Instead 
what has taken its place is a form of aid which has been 
described as "unorthodox" (UK Parliamentary Report, 1991:44), 
"unconventional" (Sinclair, 1986:75) and "often clandestine" 
(information from Professor Bill Davies, 20 April 1991). 
As I see them the main features of such "unorthodox" aid which 
has replaced conventional programmes, and which provides the 
context within which my analysis of the Spiritual Churches 
Development Centre and Philippi Enterprises projects is set, 
are as follows. First, as Whiteside (1991) has said, 'much aid 
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has been given despite rather than because of the government' 
(1991:9). Second, the government and most public organisations 
have been excluded from the identification of projects and the 
allocation and expenditure of funds. And third, aid is often 
administered by non-aid trained personnel working outside of a 
development environment. 
As a result of this South Africans, 
experienced inferior development. 
in a number of ways, have 
First, the sort of 
administrative arrangements demanded by government aid 
agencies (like the British Overseas Development Administration 
(ODA) or USAID) whereby aid is disbursed and its effectiveness 
assessed have not been applied in the South African instance. 
Development excellence would appear to have been overlooked in 
favour of political expediency. 
Second, donor agencies in South Africa do not co-operate with 
one another, preferring instead to pursue and protect 
autonomous strategies. As a result the wheel is continually 
being reinvented and work and errors unnecessarily duplicated. 
Third, agencies operating in South Africa 
administer their aid in the following ways: 
amounts of money have been spread thinly 
have tended to 
relatively small 
for the maximum 
effect (which makes any assessment notoriously difficult); any 
discernible policy is geared towards "welfarism" (Manuel, 
1989:55); payments tend to be received by those who know best 
how to play the system (Manuel, 1991) ; aid has tended to 
support "struggle" organisations - rather than viable projects 
- with little accountability (see Danger on the Kagiso Trust 
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in 'South', March 1991); aid has tended to perpetuate and 
legitimate incompetent and corrupt behaviour by tolerating it 
as the 'people's approach' (Ramphele, forthcoming). 
These then are the issues with which I am concerned in this 
thesis. My findings are presented in a way that reflects my 
attempts at understanding a particular form of development 
intervention at a particular time and the consequences of that 
intervention. 
In Chapter Two I describe my initial contacts with both 
funders and recipients of community development assistance. My 
witnessing of both the reactions of official observers to a 
foreign government's involvement in "township diplomacy", and 
the relationship between donor and recipient spurred the 
initial interest to pursue research in this field. Chapter 
Three describes the fieldwork methods used to collect 
information about the activities of both donors and two 
community-based projects which were recipients of donors' aid. 
Chapters Four and Five introduce an historical dimension in 
exploring urbanisation in South Africa but more specifically 
in the western Cape in order to understand more fully the 
context within which urban community development programmes 
are pursued. These chapters examine national and local forces 
which have helped to shape urban informal settlements. They 
consider actions by the state and other agencies in a 
situation of material deprivation which creates political 
struggles. 
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Out of those political struggles emerged new forms of 
organisation and new leaders such as Sam Nkonyeni and 
Nomathemba Matiwana who are discussd in Chapters Six to Nine. 
Nkonyeni and Matiwana are pseudonyms adopted to protect the 
identity of the real project leaders both of whom are still 
involved in community politics. Chapter Six traces the 
emergence of Nkonyeni and Matiwana during the immediate post-
Crossroads crisis era and records their founding community 
development projects. Chapters Seven and Eight map the 
progress of these projects in terms of performance and 
internal and external relationships. Chapter Nine describes 
the events which marked an important stage in the history of 
the Spiritual Churches project: a stage at which members of 
the project came to understand their dependency as a result of 
which new strategies were devised to widen their options for 
action. 
Chapters Ten and Eleven examine the role of major donors in 
urban community development. Chapter Ten assesses the extent 
and nature of foreign governments' involvement in "community 
diplomacy". In this chapter, there is for the first time, an 
attempt at estimating the amount of official development aid 
entering South Africa. Chapter Eleven looks at the role of 
business in recent South African history to assess why 
corporate social responsibility, of which community 
development support has been a part, is becoming increasingly 
important. Chapter 12 is my conclusion. 
1. 
Chapter Two 
The Researcher's Introduction to Community 
Development Projects 
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My first excursion into the African townships around Cape Town 
occurred in November 1988 when I was invited to join a 
"township tour" conducted by a representative of the British 
Consulate in Cape Town. My fellow passengers were all from 
Britain and held positions in government departments. Such 
tours I later learned were frequent and timed to coincide with 
official overseas visits to South Africa which tended to take 
place during Europe's harshest winter months. During the week 
of my tour the consulate official repeated the journey four 
times. 
The diplomat-guide knew the route well and skillfully led our 
party into the heart of the Cape Flats African townships. One 
sensed a certain nervousness on the part of first-time 
visitors as the combi turned off the main road and headed for 
the Guguletu hostels. Conversation centred on recent news 
footage of township violence and those passengers closest to 
the windows discreetly checked the door locks. Obviously used 
to such unease the diplomat assured us that the townships were 
calm and that it was quite safe for us to wind the windows 
down and that we should make an effort to look relaxed. 
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To the obvious relief of the passengers the single-sex hostels 
soon gave way to an attractive private estate of white-walled 
houses dominated by elaborate burglar bars. Clearly more 
confident in these surroundings, which one passenger commented 
were not too disimilar to an English newtown, the tension 
inside the vehicle eased. Windows were wound down, ties 
loosened and one or two even waved at rather bemused-looking 
school children. Questions were asked and answered: "What 
tribe do these people belong to?", "Who controls this area, 
the ANC, PAC?", Are those Casspirs?" 
Once out of the estate our guide announced that we were 
approaching the cemetery and would soon arrive at the first of 
the squatter camps. The mention of Crossroads and KTC 
increased the tempo of the group's conversation as passengers 
spoke of the violence of 1985 and 1986 which received 
extensive overseas media coverage .. The sight of crowded 
graves, some marked by simple twig crosses others by ornate 
stone angels, caused our guide to remark that apartheid 
planning even follows one to the cemetry: this one being for 
blacks alone. His observation was met with thoughtful nods. 
A Foreign Office official asked the diplomat if their 
government had any practical involvement in either the hostels 
or in the provision of black housing. Our guide responded 
positively listing expenditure in millions of Rand on shack 
upgrading, the underwriting of low-cost mortgages and 
assistance in the provision of emergency housing. He enthused 
about: 
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"the embassy's excellent relations with the Hostel 
Dwellers Association which is campaigning for a comprehensive 
programme of improvement. Our government is discussing funding 
for the HDA". 
As the view of the c.emetery was lost behind a line of 
stressed-looking gum trees we gained our first glimpse of the 
corrugated iron shacks we had come to expect. our vehicle 
skirted around the shacks of Nyanga Extension. 
"To the English eye" the diplomat said "shack-settlements 
often conjure up the peculiarly English institution of 
allotments·. But these tin shacks do not house rusted tools or 
bags of potting compost, nor are they Sunday afternoon places 
of refuge away from the family. In South Africa these shacks 
are homes to millions of people. They are often described as 
solutions to a housing crisis. They are illegal or informal 
settlements. Elsewhere they are called favelas, bidonvilles or 
bandas de miseria". 
Our guide provided a commentary to what we were seeing. 
"Squatter communities exist around the world" we were 
told, "some of us may have seen them elsewhere in Africa, the 
Middle East, India and Latin America .. Shack-settlements are a 
symptom of poverty. Massive urbanisation has been accompanied 
as you can see by large-scale unemployment, suitable land for 
building and standard housing is scarce and out of reach of 
low-income families. Throughout the Third World the proportion 
of the population which lives in urban centres is bound to 
continue rising. It seems that neither the governments of 
those countries nor the international community have found a 
way of adequately managing this spectacular urban growth". 
Between deft turns of the steering wheel, to avoid children 
and pot holes that would easily engulf a small truck, our 
diplomat-guide's assessment turned more specifically to South 
Africa. 
"Whilst the characteristics of squatter settlements are 
common to all countries high-density, mainly illegal 
occupation, seemingly disorderly construction with inadequate 
scrap materials on land which lacks basic services - apartheid 
has", he insisted, "played a crucial role in directing the 
course and nature of urbanisation". 
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"South Africa is as I am sure you've already been told 
experiencing a high rate of population growth coupled with an 
economy in decline. There have for a long time been major 
problems in urban management and totally inadequate rural 
development. Betweem 1950 and 1980 influx control measures did 
check urbanisation outside the homelands. But since 1980 with 
the easing of such controls the rate of urbanisation has been 
dramatic: I think half of all Africans now live in 
metropolitan areas. Most 1 i ve under the sort of conditions 
which we are now seeing. Apartheid sought not only to separate 
races but to reserve the best land for white development. It's 
this sort of land, beside the motorway, directly under the 
flightpath into DF Malan international airport and circling an 
industrial estate, which the planners did not want". 
With the other passengers I listened with concentration and 
appreciated his knowledge. Through the windows one could see 
the crisis in urban management. It was mid-morning on a 
blistering, dusty summer's day. Poverty I thought is difficult 
to describe. One could see its physical manifestations, one 
could see inequality simply by driving as we had done from the 
white suburbs to the Cape Flats, but one could not see how 
poverty is created and nor could one see the damage it 
inflicted on those who must endure it.· 
From the outside the squatter settlements appeared filthy, 
congested and depressing. We saw women foraging among 
carcasses rejected by the abbatoir and dumped, our guide told 
us, each day at the township's edge. We saw men gathered at 
road intersections looking hopefully at passing bakkies for a 
days work. Children, many naked, played unattended in the dirt 
and dust. Rubbish and scrap was strewn between the precarious 
shacks. Sewage spilled into mud gulleys creating a terrible 
stench. 
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Our impression from the minibus could only be described 
through unpleasant adjectives. Our concern was with the 
aesthetic, the immediate image. 
The bus negotiated the treacherous roads to KTC, named we were 
told after a shop on the site, along Mahobe Drive past the 
romantically named Cathedral and Dune sites. Our guide pointed 
to clumps of shacks and identified community leaders, Siphika, 
Hoza, Dodwana, Toise and Gweliza. The names were strange but 
engaging. Behind us were rows of green army tents apparently 
erected to be a temporary emergency measure to house refugees 
from the Crossroads fighting. Quite obviously the emergency 
remained. 
To the uninitiated one squatter site seemed to merge with the 
next in a sprawl of shacks. KTC, however, was different. Its 
shacks stood back from the road, the. space between them was 
more generous, and each was daubed with the letter "M" and a 
white three digit number. Our guide manoeuvred the vehicle 
over a makeshift kerb and parked in an area separating the 
shacks from the road. The "M" he informed us stood for the: 
"Masincedane Committee which is attempting to administer 
the area and at the same time protect its occupants from 
hostile outsiders". 
Reassuring us that a fragile ceasefire had been arranged 
between rival leaders and their supporters, our guide invited 
us to accompany him into the maze of shacks where we had an 
appointment to pay a courtesy call on the community's leader. 
We picked our way across the hardened mud track to a wide path 
23 
running between two shacks that appeared to be constructed 
solely of plyboard advertising hoardings. From a distance such 
constructions appeared precarious; close to however they were 
far more substantial than I had expected. 
We came to a halt in a clearing surrounded by boldly numbered 
shacks and dominated by an overturned shipping container 
emblazoned with a company logo. The diplomat knocked hard on 
the side of the container and waited. Two middle-aged African 
men appeared from the cavernous box and looked unrecognisingly 
at our group. In English, our guide introduced himself as a 
representative from the embassy and his passengers as visitors 
from overseas. 
Clumsily we exchanged a contorted handshake - which our guide 
later informed us was known, in his circles, as the 
"strugglers shake" and the diplomat walked around the 
container patting it protectively as one would a cherished 
car. He asked if we could look inside. The men nodded and 
invited us in. 
The container was bare save for two chairs. We looked around 
impressed with the space. After a lengthy and slightly 
uncomfortable pause one of the men began to speak in slow and 
cautious English: 
"Our community is very pleased with this gift from your 
government. We are honoured by your visit. Today this place 
looks empty. Tomorrow when the television arrives it will be 
full. And the next day also when we have the church choir 
singing. And at the weekend many people will come for the 
beauty contest and the childrens' football matches. This place 
helps us to come together as the Masincedane. When we are 
together we can protect our community". 
24 
He paused. The diplomat smiled in acceptance of the thanks. 
Now with greater confidence in his voice he continued: 
"But gentlemen you can see that we still need so much 
more. Our community does not have a school or a church. Our 
mothers must carry their children to work or else the children 
run around. We need more chairs and tables, toys, a stove, 
pots and saucepans. But more than that we need teachers for 
the school, for our school so our children do not have to go 
to the Bantu school. 
We need money to pay our teachers, to pay the women to 
look after the creche, to pay the old man who will look after 
the building". 
For the first time he raised his eyes from the floor and 
looked directly at each of us and finally at the diplomat who 
responded: 
"You know our government is keen to help you in any way 
we can. We feel strongly that communities like this will only 
be able to develop through their own efforts but where 
possible we will assist in that development. 
It is sad but my hands are tied. I only have a small 
amount of money and I can only give this money for specific 
i terns, 1 ike this container. I am sorry but I cannot pay the 
wages of your teachers. But let me know what equipment you 
need and I'll see where help can be given". 
The exchange had a rehearsed air to it. At that moment I felt 
that both sides had gone through this ritual on more than one 
occasion and that the outcome was familiar. Once again we 
shook hands with our hosts (this time less clumsily) and filed 
through the container's doorway squinting at the sun. 
Our guide, commenting on the excellent work the two men had 
done for the community, led us, not towards the waiting combi, 
but further into the shacks. Our presence became known and 
children appeared from between the houses. They ran up to us 
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smiling and talking in Xhosa. In no time I had two children on 
either arm pulling me down, encouraging me to swing them 
around. 
With children clinging we approached another clearing. This 
time there was no upturned metal box but a small wicket fence 
enclosing an area in which boards of timber were stacked in a 
teepee arrangement. The air was aromatic with the smell of 
wood shaving. This, our guide informed us was one of their 
(the government's) great success stories. 
We walked around stroking the finely grained timber and 
admired two circular saws which sat idle. Beyond the stacks of 
timber stood a log-cabin style building with an oval sign 
supported by two chains proclaiming this to be the "Coffin 
Cooperative". our guide emerged from the cabin accompanied by 
a young, smartly dressed and permane~tly smiling man who was 
introduced as Mr Nofamele. 
"Oh yes we are doing very well" he announced confidently, 
"there is much demand for our coffins. You see here we are 
painting them any colour that people ask for. We have handles 
and hinges, brass or metal. We even line them with silk in a 
colour to match the outside. In fact" he said "you have come 
at the wrong time. I must go out and see someone who wants a 
very special coffin. My assistant is out visiting as well, 
that is why the machines are not working. But we have so much 
work". 
our guide said he would not detain Mr Nofamele any longer and 
led us through the gap in the fence into the small crowd of 
children who waited patiently for our return. Mr Nofamele 
closed the log cabin door, waved cheerily and strode off. 
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Our encounter with Mr Nofamele enlivened the group's spirit. 
More questions were directed at the diplomat: "How many of 
these projects does the government sponsor?" , "How much would 
you expect to donate to .each?", "What other activities do you 
support?" Clearly knowledgeable and with abundant enthusiasm 
for his work the diplomat answered each of our questions in 
turn. 
He referred to the children who had, by now, lost interest in 
us and had returned to their previous games. Small clumps of 
boys were sitting by the road - much as their fathers do -
waving at passing cars 
"It is the intention of the government", he assured us, 
"to work alongside township-based groups which are seeking to 
help children. Where possible funds will be provided for 
creches, parks, play-grounds, pre-schools and playgroups. The 
embassy already works alongside NGOs involved in education 
like the Early Learning Resource Unit and Grassroots Educare 
Trust. We provide equipment and some money". 
The cornbi was airless and stiflingly hot as we jolted over the 
kerbstone and swung back the way we'd come. Our next call, we 
were told, was in the more established township of Nyanga 
where we were due to visit one of the pre-schools supported by 
the government. The journey to Nyanga, along the Klipfontein 
Road was quick. In a few minutes our driver parked the cornbi 
in front of a brick-built house in the grounds of a Catholic 
church. 
The house was an ordinary four-room matchbox design favoured 
by the government in the 1950s. As we entered the room, the 
teacher waved her arms in the air and instructed the children 
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to be quiet. Almost immediately the two dozen or more children 
who were sitting on the carpeted floor fell silent and, 
staring widely, turned to us. We walked to the front of the 
class and greeted the teacher. The diplomat announced us as 
visitors from Europe and said that we had come to see the good 
work she was doing. The teacher smiled broadly and pointed to 
the children as example enough. 
Our guide enquired about the stove and pots his government had 
bought for the project. The teacher led us, tracked by 3 o 
pairs of eyes, to a tiny lean-to extension which she informed 
us had recently been added to the house. This was the steam-
filled kitchen in which potato and vegetable soup was prepared 
each day for the children. In turn we lifted the lid from the 
aluminium pot and agreed that the soup smelled good. Sensing 
our obvious perspiring discomfort in the cramped kitchen the 
teacher guided us back into the main classroom. 
"Before you leave the children will sing you a song" she said 
ushering them to their feet. A particularly small child, no 
more than four or five, joined the teacher in front of the 
class and began singing. Though sung mainly in Xhosa one could 
sense that this song was no nursery rhyme. Certain words and 
names, "Mandela", "Amandla", "Freedom" were celebrated with 
gusto, chanted rather than sung and accompanied by a toyi toyi 
and much punching of the air. The diplomat smiled throughout 
but shuffled uncomfortably. 
The song 
places. 
came to an end. The children returned to their 
The diplomat looked at his watch and noted that it 
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was nearly lunchtime. He embraced the teacher and thanked her, 
on our behalf, for her time. The children waved frantically as 
we left. 
Just one more call, our guide informed us, before we would 
return to Cape Town. He reversed the combi into the church 
grounds and headed along the Landsdowne Road past two garages, 
a disused cement works and a row of wholesale shops before 
turning ri~ht at a sign marked the Philippi Industrial Estate. 
Nothing was said about the visit to the school as we bumped 
our way along the Industrial Estate's badly potted mud road. 
We approached a long warehouse type building sandwiched on one 
side by a garage workshop and on the other by a factory almost 
obscured by piles of brightly coloured drums. The diplomat 
parked the combi in front of the warehouse's main doors and 
told us that this was a project of w~ich he was particularly 
proud. It was called the Spiritual Churches Development Centre 
and had been running he said since 1987. The woman we were to 
meet was the project's coordinator, Nomathemba Matiwana. 
The smell that greeted us as we walked into the project was a 
familiar mix of boiled potatoes and wood shavings. The noise 
was deafening. Two men were hammering nails through planks of 
wood into a frame on the floor to create a new floor over the 
existing cement base. We nodded to the men who continued 
working and walked the full length of the warehouse to a small 
off ice tucked in the corner. On seeing us approach a large, 
middle-aged woman peered at us through her cracked glasses. 
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On recognising our host she cried out a long "Hello. And how 
are you?" There was genuine pleasure in her greeting. 
Matiwana shook hands with each of us in turn. She was careful 
to learn our names and where we came from. 
"Now you are here II she said "it is important that you 
meet all our members. I will get them together". 
She clapped her hands loudly at which the hammering and 
sanding ceased. She called to the women in the sewing room 
which we could see through the partition window ran parallel 
to the main workshop. In a few minutes we were all seated in 
a circular arrangement on wooden benches and plastic chairs. 
There were twenty-five people present. The two carpenters who 
were preparing the floor were joined by two others in blue 
overalls and all four sat to our right. To my left was our 
guide and the four other visitors. To their left sat 
Nomathemba Matiwana, an elderly man in a black hat and a dark 
suit and thirteen women formed the rest of the circle. Two of 
the women had babies strapped to their backs with blankets. 
Two others were quite elderly. 
The man in the black hat rose slowly to his feet, bowed his 
head and gently spoke a prayer. The women began to sing but 
unlike the earlier song of protest theirs was a mellifluous, 
harmonised hymn. As the final words drifted into the corners 
of the room Nomathemba Matiwana stood and addressed the 
meeting. 
"Today we have very special visitors from Europe who have 
come to see the work we are doing at our project. We began 
this Centre in 1987 to help our people who suffered in the 
fighting. We wanted to help those . who had no jobs, no money 
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and no skills. We wanted to help the children who were left 
homeless. Our children drink because they see no hope. We 
wanted to help the old people who would not be employed in the 
City. 
We are still struggling. We could not pay our teacher so 
the school is not working. We do not even pay ourselves wages 
for the work we are doing. We make quilts, everyone says they 
are good, we make furniture, cheap enough for the townships, 
we make solid bricks, sturdy boxes: but we cannot sell these 
things. What we need is money to pay people to show us how to 
make things and how to sell them. We need transport so we can 
take our things to Cape Town, Claremont and Strand on 
Saturdays. 
The Spiritual Centre can not succeed on its own. We need 
help. We need everyone to work together. Some people pretend 
they are our friends but always they want something else. 
The embassy has helped us from the very beginning. We 
need their help now". 
Matiwana's address was listened to in silence. The deep 
concern which she obviously felt could be heard in her voice 
and seen on her face. The diplomat responded: 
"Mrs Matiwana you know it is always a pleasure for me to 
come here. We have known each other for a long time. I know 
how hard you and all the members of the centre have worked to 
make this a success and I will try and.help wherever I can". 
The man in the black hat cleared his throat and spoke in 
Xhosa. Matiwana translated: 
"Old-man Sidwell says the old people come to this project 
because it is the only place they can come. There are hundreds 
more sitting alone in the townships who would also like to 
come but can't. Will the embassy buy us a combi so we can 
collect these old people and give them a home?" 
One of the elderly women from the sewing room spoke: Mrs 
Matiwana again translated: 
" Christine says she makes beautiful quilted rugs and 
bags. The students at the University like them and would buy 
them but we cannot take them there to sell. A combi would help 
us to do this". 
31 
The diplomat responded: 
"I know about your problems. I know how important 
transport is but my budget will not allow me to buy you a 
combi. I will buy you machines and material but I cannot buy a 
combi". 
The smell of soup drifted across the room. I thought back to 
the meeting in KTC. Once again this barter between donor and 
client was not, I guessed, taking place for the first time. 
There was a brief moment of silence before Nomathemba Matiwana 
declared it to be lunchtime. The meeting broke up. We declined 
the offer of lunch, shook hands with Mrs Matiwana and old-man 
Sidwell and picked our way to the door around hammers and 
planks of wood. 
2. A Foundation for Research 
Once back in a Cape Town restaurant discussion over lunch was 
bouyant with enthusiasm for the sort of diplomacy we had all 
just witnessed. The visitors expressed how impressed they were 
to see the access embassy staff enj eyed to ordinary township 
residents. 
"Back home" one commented "it was generally perceived 
that British policy was deeply resented by many Africans and 
many would think that representatives of the country would be 
far from welcome visitors to the townships. In fact as I now 
see this couldn't be further from the truth". 
"It is likely that our understanding of the situation in 
South Africa is that much sharper because we have some 
grassroots knowledge through the administration of aid 
schemes. And the sort of intervention we are practicing is 
precisely that which aid experts in England are arguing is the 
way forward. That is small-scale, community-based schemes 
which address specific needs. We do not appear", he continued, 
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"to be imposing our will upon the people rather we are 
reacting to needs". 
As lunch drew to a close the visitors summed-up their 
impression of the British mission's involvement in South 
Africa. They had seen embassy staff at work in situations 
other than township development and believed that the mission 
was exercising: 
"a discreet and constructive influence with all sections 
of South African political life. By bringing together diverse 
groups at, receptions and dinners they had helped to promote 
understanding and tolerance. By bringing constitutional and 
other experts into the country they had helped to shape the 
debate". 
But from their comments it was clear that they were most 
impressed with the 
"pioneering and sympathetic manner in which embassy staff 
had forged close and long-lasting links with communities in 
the townships, squatter camps and rural areas. That a real 
effort was being made to keep in touch with those who suffered 
the day-to-day deprivations caused by apartheid, and 
furthermore to help them overcome their hardships". 
For me the "township tour" advertising community diplomacy 
raised many more questions than it answered. I was asked to go 
on the tour because I had a close personal connection with the 
embassy (my wife is a British diplomat) and because we had 
only recently arrived in South Africa from Britain. My fellow 
tourists were all returning to London the following day; I was 
to stay behind for three years. Having recently graduated in 
Social Anthropology I was keen to undertake graduate research 
at the University of Cape Town. What I had seen and heard 
during the tour provided me with a basis upon which I could 
devise a research project. My focus would be both the 
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recipients of aid (small-scale, township-based projects) and 
major funders, such as foreign embassies. 
The following day I returned to the Philippi Industrial Estate 
and spoke at length with the project's coordinator, Nomathemba 
Matiwana and other members. Mrs Matiwana in turn introduced me 
to Sam Nkonyeni who ran a project called Philippi Enterprises 
in an adjoining warehouse. I inf armed them that it was my 
intention to undertake post-graduate research into small-
scale, self-help type groups which had received funding from 
overseas governments and other sources. We discussed how my 
research should be conducted. Matiwana and Nkonyeni agreed to 
discuss my proposal with the members of their organisations. 
A few days later I again visited the projects and permission 
for research was granted. There were however two conditions. 
First that I become actively involve..d with the work of the 
projects. And second that my research must be of some benefit 
to them. I discuss the first of those conditions in the 
section below on methods; the second, and more problematic 
condition, is discussed in Chapter Three. 
The choice of the Spiritual Churches Development Centre and 
Philippi projects as the immediate units of study proved to be 
a good one. First, the projects received financial and other 
support from individual funding organisations covering the 
whole range of donors involved in community development 
programmes in the African townships. Sources of assistance 
were as follows: 
Sources of Funding 
American Government 





Catholic Welfare Bureau (CWB) 
German Government 
Get Ahead Foundation 
London Parish Churches 
Jews for Justice 





Simukai Rural Co-operative (Harare) 
Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) 
Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT) 
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southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) 
Spiritual Churches Research and Theological Institute (SCRTI) 
Unemployed Workers Movement (UWM) 
Western Province Council of Churches (WPCC) 
Second, through the projects I was able to gain first-hand 
knowledge of the procedures adopted by embassies and 
consulates, business social responsibility offices, church 
bodies, charities, service organisations and unions, in the 
field of assistance to small-scale, self-help initiatives 
which fall under the rubric of community development. Having 
learned the procedures and administrative arrangements I was 
able to approach representatives of those organisations to 
learn more about the motivations to become involved in such 
programmes and their aims in doing so. 
Third, during my period of study the two projects followed 
quite different trajectories. At the time of writing this 
thesis the Spiritual Churches project continued to operate 
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with a similar complement of staff performing more or less the 
same functions at they were two years previously. A core of 
about a dozen members had remained at the project and donors 
at least in the immediate future looked set to continue their 
funding. 
Indeed the project was adopted by the British Embassy as the 
model of a successful self-help community development project. 
During the past two years members of the Spiritual Churches 
Centre received visits from the British Foreign Secretary, two 
Ministers for Development, a House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Cammi ttee (which recently made important recommendations to 
the British Parliament on future foreign policy towards South 
Africa and other states of the region) and numerous Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA) and Foreign Office officials. 
The project has featured in two newspaper articles ('Argus' , 
21 December and 'Cape Times', 22 December 1990) and the 
donation of a combi to the project in 1990 by the Foreign 
Secretary was included by the SABC in their evening news 
programme. 
The history of Philippi Enterprises has been less glamorous. 
Riven by internal dissension, accusations of corruption, a 
rapid turn-over of staff, the withdrawal of donor support, and 
by the burden of debt the project was f creed, in February 
1990, to vacate its premises on the industrial estate and at 
the time of writing this thesis existed only in name. 
Broadly-speaking, the Spiritual Churches Centre and Philippi 
Enterprises provided ideal types of community development 
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projects which were useful for comparison. Whilst the 
characteristics shown below are generalisations - and require 
far closer analysis before any general hypotheses can be 
advanced to explain success or failure - they help to build-up 
a composite picture of projects which emerged out of similar 
circumstances but which evolved quite differently: 
spiritual 




open to outsiders 
fluid organisation 
good communications 
control by members 










reluctant donor support 
Clear differences in internal structure were apparent early in 
my fieldwork. Alone, however, such structural differences can 
not account for the success or failure of development 
projects. Riddell (1987) has shown the development process to 
be immensely complex and unpredictable. Moore (1990) has 
advised that successful research into development must be 
rigorous with disciplinary emphasis on context and 
contextualisation through which one will be able to assess the 
development process holistically. Elsewhere, Ferguson (1990) 
has cautioned us to take into account the unintended 
consequences of development intervention. And in so doing one 
must heed Colson (1982) and Sandbrook's (1982) advice to look 
closely at the motives of the development community. 
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And lastly, the history of the projects, their members and 
coordinators, were deeply rooted in the events that took place 
in crossroads and surrounding areas during the 1980s. My 
analysis of the proj~cts would, therefore, need to be 
undertaken in a broad framework which takes full account of 
the processes of urbanisation and the struggles which take 
place for access to resources in informal settlements. 
Small-scale projects such as Philippi Enterprises and the 
Spiritual Churches Centre provided therefore a point of entry 
into research about a specific aspect of urban development 
intervention in a rapidly changing society. 
2. Community Development in South Africa 
My concern in this thesis is not so much with what community 
development is, but rather the ways in which community 
development provides opportunities for players, active in 
informal settlements, to pursue particular objectives. I refer 
specifically to the actions of the state, township leaders, 
and donor organisations that give assistance to community 
development projects and organisations, including foreign 
governments. 
I discuss two levels of community development. The first is 
government-directed community 
must be seen in the context 
development programmes which 
of successive South African 
government development strategies since the 1950s (for a 
discussion of this see Fischer ( 1988)) . The second level is 
non-government-directed community development programmes which 
are formulated and/or assisted by South African and 
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international NGOs and service organisations, and foreign 
governments on a unilateral basis, without any direct 
mediation by the south African state. Of course these two 
levels cannot be completely separated. Some NGOs, most notably 
Anglo American and De Beers Chairman's Fund and the Urban 
Foundation, have pursued community development initiatives in 
both the Republic and the 'homelands' in partnership with 
government departments. Other NGOs and funders which try to 
distance themselves actively from the government are often 
forced through circumstances to work with local and central 
government structures. In principle, however, the funders of 
the two community development projects discussed in this 
thesis chose to operate independently of the South African 
government. 
In order to discuss this more fully it is useful to begin with 
a broad definition of community development and to contrast 
the ideal with the reality in South African urban areas. The 
following comes from a 1986 United Nations Institute Report 
and is representative of what is currently meant by community 
development: 
"Community development is the process by which the 
efforts of the people themselves are united with those of the 
government to improve the economic, social and cultural 
condition of communities, and their integration into the 
framework of national development" (1986:100). 
Current thinking about community development favours the idea 
that the poor are the best experts in their own circumstances 
and that the role of outside agencies should be limited to 
assisting the disadvantaged to develop themselves (see Salmen, 
1987 and Ridell, 1987). Community development operates with 
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the notion that there are identifiable communities with 
particular conditions and that policies must be modified to 
suit those conditions (UN Report, 1986:100). 
The ideal of empowerment, which Ramphele defines as 'a process 
aimed at shifting the perceptions of subordinate people, 
enabling them to assume greater control over their own lives' 
(Ramphele, forthcoming), informs much of the original thinking 
behind community development strategies. For this reason 
policies which aim to achieve the development of communities 
and their integration into a national framework define 'risk 
groups' such as women, children, youth, disabled and other 
discriminated and disadvantaged groups for whom specific 
programmes are designed to ameliorate their situation. 
Community development typically involves the formulation and 
implementation of programmes in the areas of literacy, health 
and nutrition, employment and income-generation, emergency 
relief, resettlement and rehabilitation and physical 
infrastructural work at a local rather than national level. 
The UN Report stresses the necessity to incorporate into these 
strategies the idea of co-operative and self-help initiatives 
as a means by which communities are able to promote their own 
well-being (1986:100-104). 
There are, however, as Sandbrook (1982) has pointed out severe 
limitations on community development initiatives which seek to 
advance local participation ( 1982: 240-242) . Thornton and 
Ramphele (1989) have argued that successive south African 
governments have siezed the international popularity of 
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community development to 'justify long-standing policies of 
divide and rule' (1988:32). Elsewhere Reynolds (1981) has 







been adopted, as 
underwrite individual 
a means of 
and group 
security within the development process, thereby extending 
freedom, initiative and democracy (1981:1-3). Such intentions 
however would not appear to have greatly influenced the 
drafting and implementation of State-led community development 
programmes in South Africa. 
Both 'community' and 'development' are terms which, Sharp 
( 1988) believes, have been used to construct a conventional 
representation of South African society. Community in South 
African political discourse has been used as a euphemism for 
race (hence the 'Coloured Community', 'White Community', etc.) 
and when coupled with development is used to designate the 
targets or victims of government planned community 
development programmes. State-led community development has 
been a cornerstone of the implementation of apartheid's aim of 
the separate development of identifiable and bounded racial or 
ethnic communities. 
It is not my aim in this thesis to expand on the mechanics of 
community development but rather I trace the ways in which 
community development in a South African urban African setting 
has been a political activity. In part Two, against the 
backdrop of the events before and after the Crossroads 
conf 1 ict, I examine the ways in which community development 
became a part of the rhetoric and actual practice of the 
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government and local security forces in their attempts to 
control the Old Crossroads informal settlement and to 
restructure the political terrain. I attempt to understand how 
and why Crossroads, once a symbol of resistance, in 1986 came 
to align itself with the South African state to assist in the 
destruction of its neighbouring squatter communities. 
The government used the strategy of community development as a 
means to assist them in sanctioning the emergence of a group 
of leaders in Old Crossroads - headed by Johnson Ngxobongwana 
which could be coopted into a pragmatic alliance with 
agencies of the state. Ngxobongwana was able to use the 
resources provided through both government-funded and 
privately-funded community development schemes in Old 
Crossroads to help secure his position in the settlement. 
It is commonly argued in development literature that 
development intervention often serves to create a stratum of 
unrepresentative leaders (Sandbrook, 1982: 240). Thornton and 
Ramphele have argued that this is precisely what occurred in 
Old Crossroads where intervention by outside agencies 
central and local government, 'progressive organisations' and 
private funding agencies assisted in the creation of 
township leadership structures which were usually in the hands 
of men and dominated by the educated and relatively wealthy 
(1988:31). 
In Part Three of this thesis I show how community development 
as a political activity continued to be useful for the 
advancement of the interests of governmental and non-
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governmental organisations, after the conflict peaked in 1986. 
I describe the way in which Sam Nkonyeni, a former ally of 
Ngxobongwana, was, because of his actions in Old Crossroads, 
styled by 'progressive . organisations' and other funders of 
community development projects as an 'alternative' and 
'popular' leader. Through this characterisation he was 
consequently targetted by donor agencies, as a suitable 
recipient of development aid. 
In Part Four, I discuss some of the factors which motivate 
organisations to become funders of community development and 
the advantages which accrue to them from doing so. It is 
argued that whilst funders of community development programmes 
may adopt the sort of rhetoric contained in the UN definition 
the major motivating factors for their involvement in such 




1. Fieldwork Methods 
To my knowledge this fieldwork-based sociological study of 
community development projects in the African townships is the 
first of its kind. The thesis benefits from the unique 
opportunity I was given, through my every-day contacts with 
the foreign diplomatic corps in South Africa, to study both 
provider and recipient of aid. My fieldwork methods needed to 
accommodate both areas of interrelated research. Methods used 
for collecting data from the projects themselves, and 
organisations involved with those projects, were, by 
necessity, quite different from the methods used to collect 
information about the donors. 
Project-based research 
My involvement with the Spiritual Churches Development Centre 
and Philippi Enterprises extended over a period of eighteen 
months. During the first ten months of research my involvement 
with each project was more or less continuous. Every day I 
travelled to the projects and spent two or three hours at 
each. 
In order to satisfy the 
conditions to research, 
first 
which 
of Nkonyeni and 
demanded that I 
Matiwana's 
had some 
practical involvement in the day-to-day work of the projects, 
I acted as a driver taking the carpenters to building sites in 
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the Mitchell's Plain area, buying and collecting equipment 
from town and transporting project members and their produce 
to markets. I arranged for the projects to sell their produce 
at local fetes and on university campuses. 
I assisted the projects in drawing-up funding proposal 
letters. This occasionally extended to meeting and telephoning 
would-be funders: al though I avoided this where possible. In 
addition I helped project members to organise their accounts 
and draw up budgets. 
My fieldwork methods were both formal and informal. Formal 
methods to collect data included semi-structured interviews 
with project members, a questionnaire which I completed during 
those interviews, joint discussions and direct observation. 
Most of my informants spoke English. For those who did not I 
employed a Xhosa-speaking social science undergraduate who was 
familiar with the area and acted as an interpreter. I 
conducted a series of in-depth interviews with Nomathemba 
Matiwana and Sam Nkonyeni who were my key informants. 
Interviews were organised around a series of previously 
selected topics. Initial questions, which were designed to 
build up a profile of the project's members, remained 
constant. These were questions relating to age, gender, 
education, skills acquired, residence, size of family, income 
and previous experience. In order to allow some flexibility in 
the exchange, later questions were adapted to individuals. To 
some extent I allowed the informant to direct the course of 
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our conversation. In this way relevant and interesting, 
unanticipated issues were raised and an easier relationship 
was built up between interviewer and interviewee. 
Whilst all the members of the Spiritual Churches project were 
willing to be interviewed individually and as a group, a few 
members of the Philippi project either refused outright to be 
interviewed or constantly put me off claiming pressure of 
work. I believe they were reluctant to be interviewed for two 
reasons. First because, as I describe in Chapter Six, the 
Philippi project suffered internal dissension which led to 
some groups (e.g. the mechanics) distancing themselves from 
others (e.g. the labourers). One way of achieving this was by 
not cooperating with me. And secondly, during my period of 
research at Philippi Enterprises Sam Nkonyeni became 
increasingly isolated and unpopular. Because my initial 
contact with the project was made th~ough Nkonyeni I was, in 
some eyes, seen to be too closely associated with him and his 
style of leadership. 
I do not, however, feel that my failure to interview every 
single member of the project invalidates my research or its 
findings. 
Less formal questions as part of the interview related to the 
respondents perception of the project and its work. I enquired 
about their motives for joining the project, and whether they 
enjoyed the work, whether they thought it preferable to 
employment in the formal sector. I also enquired about their 





recruitment, and so 
of cooperativism as 
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to do with pricing, 
on. I tried to assess 
opposed to a purely 
profit-oriented business operation. I also asked about their 
future plans. 
The length of the interview was affected by the time available 
to individual workers. For example, the women working in the 
brick-pressing section of Philippi Enterprises, who tended to 
be the least educated, were the least able to express 
themselves in English. The ones who undertook the most severe 
manual labour had very little time to talk, whilst the 
administrative staff often allowed our discussions to continue 
for an hour or more. 
Most quantitative data required for this thesis was collected 
through interviews and discussions. Periods of direct 
observation, however, were also extremely valuable. Simply 
being in a project and watching its members at work provided 
many insights. I came to understand the rhythm of the day 
which, at the Spiritual Churches project, was punctuated by 
hymn singing and prayer services, by the visits of strangers 
and the calling of extraordinary meetings to resolve pressing 
problems. 
Library-based research was also conducted in order to 
understand the wider historical context in which the projects 
were created and in which community development assistance is 
given and received. 
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I did, however, encounter a number of obstacles to research 
which arose directly out of my association with the University 
of Cape Town (UCT). It was my impression that, in very broad 
terms, there was a feeling within certain sections of the 
townships that UCT's research involvement there was not all 
together constructive. This perception was further affected by 
a commonly stated belief that certain areas of township 
activities are over-researched. This perception is 
particularly evident among community-based groups. 
There was, as I explain throughout this thesis, a general 
mistrust felt towards 'outsiders' by members of community-
based groups. In her assessment of the Crossroads crises, 
Josette Cole has argued that, during negotiations to decide 
the settlement's future, intervention by outside agencies and 
individuals - some of whom were attached to UCT - may have 
helped to exacerbate the divisions and tensions within the 
community (Cole, 1987:31-35). 
Christine Glover has come to the defence of outside agencies 
by arguing that it was almost impossible for outsiders to get 
beyond the factions and interest groups which controlled 
access to the settlement. The state had, as I later describe, 
singled out and legitimised a group of leaders through whom 
agencies were obliged to communicate. Achieving consensus and 
building relationships of trust in such an environment, 
therefore, she argues was virtually impossible (Glover, 
1987: 20-22) . 
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In the post-Crossroads era such mistrust continued to mar 
relations between community groups and what were often 
described to me as "obtrusive agencies". Members of both 
Philippi Enterprises and the Spiritual Churches Centre 
expressed to me their concern that outsiders became involved 
in community groups either to further their own interests 
(university qualifications, political credence) or to impose 
their "will upon the people". The Spiritual Churches 
Development Centre's encounter with the Unemployed Workers 
Movement described in Chapter Eight illustrates their point. 
I entered the Spiritual Churches project at a time in which 
the reputation of UCT had been badly tarnished by the actions 
of·a post-graduate social science student. I was informed that 
in May/June 1988 the student, whom I shall call Andrew 
Lorimar, obtained funding in excess of Rl00,000 for an 
organisation he created to act as a liaison between funders 
and recipients of community development assistance. 
Lorimar had secured the involvement of a number of prominent 
community figures including Nomathemba Matiwana, who agreed 
to act as the organisation's accountant. In return for her 
involvement Matiwana was assured by Lorimar that the members 
of the Spiritual Churches project would receive "substantial" 
financial assistance and "help with transport". 
During an interview in January 1989 Matiwana told me that she 
was asked to attend only one meeting with Lorimar at which she 
and a colleague voiced concerns over the allocation of money. 
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"We felt" she said "that Lorimar wanted to pay his staff 
too much money. We told him not to pay the fieldworkers until 
they had found projects which wanted their help. That was the 
last time I saw Lorimar. Recently someone has said that they 
had seen him in Johannesburg with the combi. And now I hear 
that he has gone overseas. We thought we could trust Andrew. 
He said he had come from the University and understood the 
problems we had in talking with funders. But he didn't help. 
Our project didn't receive any of the money he promised us". 
Lorimar's activities made it extremely difficult for me to 
build-up a relationship of trust with members of the project. 
Before embarking on post-graduate research I held rather 
romantic notions about the nature of the relationship between 
researcher and informants. In both the Spiritual Churches and 
Philippi Enterprises, however, I had to work extremely hard 
for information. Members of the Spiritual Churches project 
made it clear that if I wanted to talk to them I would have to 
give something in return. This often meant that interviews 
were conducted in my car on the way to markets or shops, or by 
the machines cutting and selecting material. My attempts to do 
what Stimson (1986) has called simply 'looking' were frowned 
upon and I was accused of getting in the way. 
Throughout 1989 my problems were further compounded as other 
UCT departments became aware of the projects and sent groups 
of students to conduct mini-research exercises. And in the 
latter half of 1989 the UCT-based Southern African Labour 
Development Research Unit (SALDRU) placed a team in the 
Spiritual Churches project to conduct a series of seminars. 
Even though I was already undertaking research in the project 
I was not consulted about SALDRU' s intentions. The first I 
knew of their involvement was when a SALDRU team member 
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appeared at the project at a time when I was conducting 
interviews. 
After discussion I agreed to suspend my research for a six 
week period, but SALDRU' s involvement was not, both parties 
have informed me, "successful". Members of the project 
complained that they were unsure about why SALDRU was there at 
all and what the Unit's fieldworkers were trying to teach 
them. "It's the same as ever," Matiwana said, "they come to 
us but they never give us anything. We are no better off when 
they leave". A SALDRU fieldworker told me that he felt the 
members of the group were not willing to learn: "Their minds 
are closed to new ideas. They cannot go on the way they are 
but they seem unable to change" (interview with SALDRU 
fieldworker, April 1990). 
When I returned to the Spiritual Chur7hes project any rapport 
I had built-up with the project's members prior to SALDRU' s 
involvement had been lost. Understandably, members of the 
projects did not differentiate between departments in the 
university. Whether one represented Social Anthropology, 
Social Work or the Department of Economics, one's involvement 
was prejudged as being out of touch or of little use to the 
community. There would seem to be an urgent need for the 
University to coordinate research undertaken by different 
departments in order to assess and perhaps exert some control 
over the nature of research, and to prevent duplication. 
51 
Donor research 
More formal fieldwork methods used to collect data on the 
history and day-to-day working of the Spiritual Churches and 
Philippi projects were not suited to research about the 
motives of donors and their administrative procedures. 
Information from representatives of donors was collected 
largely through unstructured interviews and informal contact 
at social and semi-official engagements. 
with the British Consulate and my own 
My wife's 
status as 




access to mission staff who were responsible for administering 
their government's schemes in South Africa. 
My dual status as a university researcher and a former member 
of the corps was well known. Some information was given in 
confidence which I have respected. On _many occasions, however, 
I found diplomatic staff very keen to discuss their programmes 
openly in the context of overall foreign policy and in terms 
of practical usefulness. 
Specific information about individual government's project 
involvement was more difficult to come by. Governments, with 
the exception of the British, have in the past been unwilling 
to disclose publicly the extent of their aid involvement in 
South Africa. Furthermore missions have shown an unwillingness 
to disclose any assessment of the effectiveness of their 
development schemes. There are two reasons for this. Either no 
evaluations are undertaken at all, or they are undertaken 
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purely for internal reasons. Evidence would suggest that the 
former is the most likely explanation. 
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Part TWO 




In this chapter, in order to place in context the projects and 
their members, I describe some of the processes which 
contributed to the extent and shape of urbanisation in South 
Africa. writers on urbanisation like Simkins (1983), Graaff 
(1987) and Mabin (1989) agree that state action has been 
successful in "containing" or "displacing" urbanward movement 
and further that political factors were central in shaping the 
current state of urbanisation. This chapter therefore examines 
state practice in relation to urbanisation and the creation of 
informal (that is unplanned or unauthorised) settlements on 
the peripheries of major labour markets. 
In Chapter Five I attempt to analyse the broad patterns of 
change which have been described in this chapter in terms of 
the impact those changes have had on the lives of people in 
the Crossroads informal settlement, with a particular focus on 
political struggles. Whilst it is clear that state policy has 
been the dominant factor in regulating and shaping 
urbanisation it is also clear that such policies have only 
been partly effective. 
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Wilson (forthcoming) has argued that the recent abolition of 
legislation restricting access to land on the basis of race or 
"ethnicity" can be seen . as the removal of the scaffolding of 
apartheid leaving a solid edifice in place. Such reforms will 
have little short-term effect on the material conditions which 
dominate the lives of people living in informal settlements 
and it is likely that restrictive legislation remaining on the 
statute books will, as Hindson (1987) and Schoomber and Davis 
(1986) argues that, continue to operate in the place influx 
control measures. 
But more importantly Mabin (1989) argues that as the old urban 
regime (characterised by centralised application of influx 
control) broke down, material constraints emerged as the chief 
control on urbanward movement. With the increasing 
concentration of people in informal settlements during the 
1970s and 1980s the results of such material constraints 
became evident. Within these constraints people, individually 
and collectively, are forced to struggle for access to the 
benefits of urban life. 
The state, according to Mabin, 
constraints as a form of 
saw the potential in material 
effective control on urban 
populations. The "new urban policy" therefore, Mabin argues, 
sought to reinforce those constraints as controls "not only on 
urbanward movement, but, through their use in fragmenting 
populations, as political controls" (1987:21). 
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It is in the context of material constraints, a fragmented 
population, and state partisan intervention to implement a new 
strategy of control, that the struggle for Crossroads took 
place. 
2. crossroads: The Creation of an Urban Informal settlement 
The election of a National Party government to power in 1948 
did not result in a radical transformation of South African 
society. Processes which led to the legal formation of racial 
categories as the basis of apartheid underpinned by informal 
(political and economic) and formal (state) structures had 
been in place for many decades. In 1858 the constitution of 
the then South African Republic declared that "the people 
desire to permit no equality between coloured people and the 
white inhabitants, either in church or state". Prior to and 
beyond 1948, successive governments have heeded this sentiment 
in their bid to manage the people of South Africa through a 
system which integrated the African majority through economic 
necessity, but formally excluded or disassociated them from 
the nation (Lipton, 1986:366; Greenberg, 1987). 
Since the first "black spot" 
(Matiwana and Walters, 1986) 
removals in Cape Town in 1901 
continuing attempts to control 
the movement of the African population have been only partly 
successful. Residential segregation and the principle that 
"natives" were only permitted into white municipial areas for 
labour purposes has been enshrined in a battery of legislation 
since the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923. Subsequent 
legislation, including recent acts relating to documentation, 
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squatting and citizenship continued to operate in a context of 
"orderly urbanisation" (modern day influx control) which has 
at its heart the issue of mobility (West and Oliver-Evans, 
1990) . 
Then as now, bids to control the movement of labour and the 
protection of "white land" have required a substantial 
bureaucratic machine and the large-scale exercise of coercion. 
Ever-increasing rates of African urbanisation (see Simkins, 
forthcoming) and resultant squatter settlements on the edges 
of major cities serve to remind, however, that the often 
haphazard state labour control mechanisms have failed in their 
ultimate bid to exert absolute centralised control. 
In illustrating the creation of the Crossroads settlement I 
shall describe some of the forces which have operated at a 
national-level to incorporate Africans into the South African 
political economy as a distinctive category of "squatters", or 
as Greenberg (1987) describes them, "barely employed illegals 
on the margins of the cities" (1987:13). The appearance of the 
squatter settlement at Crossroads in 1975 will, therefore, be 
explored in the context of broad historical processes of 
labour controls - which, according to Greenberg, provide the 
specific material context in which Africans have come to 
experience state and society - though not to the exclusion of 
more conventional push-pull factors. I shall then examine the 
creation of Crossroads in a more regional context since the 
Western Cape is, in many ways, a distinct region. I shall look 
for example at the effects on urbanisation and housing of the 
Coloured Labour Preference Area (CLPA) policy which is one of 
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the distinguishing features of recent western Cape society and 
politics. 
National-Level Policy 
It is commonly argued that throughout this century the nature 
of state labour control has been shaped by the conflicting 
demands of various economic interest groups (Hindson, 
19 8 6: 8 7) . successive governments have responded to the 
lobbying of powerful mining, agricultural and industrial 
sectors with measures designed to meet the demands for labour 
but also to meet the demands of the white electorate within a 
framework of "separate development". That is not to say, 
however, that apartheid can simply be explained as the outcome 
of capitalism or racism. Its origins, as Lipton (1986) 
explains, 
interests 
'lie in a complex interaction between class 
(of white labour as well as of section of capital) 
and racism/ethnicity, reinforced by psychological ideological 
and security factors' (1986:365). 
Turn of the century legal constraints on the African majority 
in the shape of passes, vagrancy laws, and master and servants 
laws laid the rudimentary foundations of apartheid (Wilson and 
Ramphele, 1989:204). Proceeding decades and the growth of 
agriculture brought state restrictions on African landholding, 
squatting and sharecropping. The Native Land Act of 1913, for 
example, was designed to give impetus to the system of migrant 
labour through securing a stable supply of labour for industry 
and to strip land from the independent African peasantry in 
the countryside. At the same time attempts were made to 
forcibly relocate squatters in the urban areas to newly-formed 
townships (such as Ndabeni in Cape Town). A pattern emerged, 
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however, whereby a majority of the illegal African urban 
population remained in informal settlements beyond the 
immediate control of the local authority. 
During the inter-war years South Africa experienced steady 
growth of a manufacturing and commercial economy accompanied 
by large-scale African urbanisation. Further state measures in 
the form of a system of reserves was introduced to create 
separate African locations and the removal of the redundant 
(superfluous) African population to the rural areas. The 
significant Urban Areas Act of 1923 marked a move to control 
the flow of Africans partly out of a concern to protect the 
"white man's land" and also to shelter white labour from black 
competition. Pass and influx control laws were thus refined, 
extended to women (in 1956) and backed by intensified police 
action. Further legislation witnessed the state taking a 
greater involvement in the laboµr process with the 
establishment of labour bureaux in the urban and "tribal" 
areas to direct and control contract labour and bar workers 
from permanent residence in white areas. 
Influx control was an ongoing policy designed to "control the 
movement, settlement and location of black people throughout 
South Africa" (Bernstein, 1985:85). Evidence of rates of 
urbanisation would suggest that influx control measures within 
overall state policy have never worked effectively to control 
the flow of Africans to major cities in pursuit of work and 
improved life chances. By 1948 it was already clear to the 
newly-elected Nationalist government that large settlements of 






conflict. In response to this, throughout the 
Nationalist government formulated policy to 
the reserve system inherited from previous 
The interest in creating bantustans was twofold. Firstly, if 
Africans were to be kept out of the towns as far as possible 
they would have to be accommodated (and reproduced) somewhere. 
And secondly, it was also becoming clear to the government in 
light of increasing opposition from home and overseas, that 
white domination could not be maintained by force and coercion 
alone (Lipton, 1986:75). Restricted African urbanisation, 
therefore, was a central requirement of the Nationalist's 
policy and much of the increasingly elaborate structures of 
government that were set up under the bantustan system, and 
many of the removals of African people, have had this as their 
ultimate goal. 
The migrant labour system was reworked into what was intended 
to be a sophisticated and all-embracing method of labour 
allocation. A network of state labour bureaux was established 
to control the numbers of people allowed to enter the urban 
areas for job purposes and to direct labour into those 
geographical areas and economic sectors most in need of it. In 
1964 the powers of the labour bureaux were extended beyond 
rural workseekers to cover the employment of all African 
workers in the urban areas, whether permanent residents or 
migrants. In 1968, with the establishment of labour bureaux in 
the bantustans the control over who was to leave the rural 
areas and go to town was thus to be exercised at the point of 
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supply. At the same time it became compulsory for migrant 
workers who had jobs, to return to their "place of origin" at 
least once a year to ensure that their ties to the bantustans 
would not be broken. 
Through the bantustan system the state certainly exerted 
significant control at a macro-level over the broad shifts in 
the distribution of labour. There are, however, clear limits 
to state power and variation at the local-level has exposed a 
differential impact of state labour policies (Posel, 1986) , 
and confusion amongst 
regulations (see for 
administration of the 
petty officials administering the 
example Humphries, 1989 
CLPA policy). The bantustan 
on the 
system 
failed to perform its historical functions in South Africa's 
political economy, and yet, according to Greenberg and 
Giliomee, it remains necessary, "to segment the black 
majority, to create areas of privilege (i.e. legal settlements 
in urban areas) and rights, and to foster collaboration" 
(1985:69). 
As discussed above, for more than a century a central policy 
of successive South African governments has been to limit the 
permanent movement of Africans to urban areas. Mechanisms 
designed to check the movement of labour, such as the hated 
pass law books imposed in 1952, were enforced more or less 
stringently in times of economic expansion or decline. At 
least 250,000 Africans were prosecuted annually under the pass 
laws, at one point rising to 650,000 or 10% of the working-age 
population (Greenberg, 1987a:2). The bantustan system 
buttressed migrant labour and provided the ideological 
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cornerstone for the policy of "separate development''· In 
addition to the pass laws the state used two further 
mechanisms to control the movement of Africans: limitations on 
housing construction: and the outright destruction of black 
communities. 
Forced removals have occurred mainly out of provisions of the 
Group Areas Act of 1950 which seeks to keep 'races' separate 
in their residential and social spheres and has led directly 
to the removal of well over 750,000 people (Wilson and 
Ramphele, 1989: 217): and the years 1960-1982 saw 3. 5 million 
Africans forcibly removed from "black spots" and resettled in 
designated African areas (1987a:2). The impact of Group Areas 
removals and deliberate freezes on the building of housing for 
Africans can best be described through actual experiences. The 
emergence of the Crossroads squatter problem was an inevitable 
result of attempts by successive Sout~ African governments to 
control the flow of Africans into the western Cape Province 
and to restrict those who were living there. In order to 
understand the events of Crossroads it is necessary to firstly 
locate the area within the western Cape region which has in 
many ways a unique history in South Africa. 
Regional Policy: The Western Cape 
Though the western Cape has a poor history of cohesive African 
political organisation - due perhaps to a historic lack of 
permanence - the government has struggled in this region more 
than anywhere else in the country to limit African influx and 
"protect" the position of local labour (Cole, 1987). Thousands 
of African people were endorsed every year out of the western 
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Cape in an attempt to implement the extremely strict Coloured 
Labour Preference Area (CLPA) policy which was specific to the 
region. 
The CLPA policy was designed to regulate labour-market 
competition between African and "Coloured" people by giving 
preferential employment and land rights to the latter ( after 
whites), and resettling the former in rural homelands. 
Ostensibly the policy claimed to protect economic interests in 
the Cape and aimed to ensure that industry drew heavily on an 
African workforce comprised primarily of contract migrant 
labour. The CLPA policy has had profound implications for the 
African population in the Cape which should be seen in 
conjunction with the implementation of Group Areas and influx 
control. 
In terms of the Group Areas Act land for housing within the 
greater Cape Town area has been divided between the white, 
"Coloured" and African population groups. Distribution has 
resulted in an adequate surplus of land for white housing, and 
severe shortages for both Coloured and African housing. The 
crisis in African housing was further intensified firstly, by 
a stipulation within the Act that circling any land used for 
Africans, and that 'buffer strips' must be set aside as 
policeable spaces between 'race' groups (Glover, 1987:4). 
Secondly, and more profoundly, influx control measures tied in 
with the CLPA policy would seek not only to restrict the 
numbers of Africans in the Western Cape, but also to decrease 
their numbers by 5% per annum. 
63 
The scheme to remove Africans from the western Cape was 
introduced by W. H. Eisel en whose plan involved an imaginary 
line running roughly north to south through the Cape Province, 
from the western side of which all blacks were to be removed. 
The western Cape was to be closed-off in order for it to 
remain the 'natural home' of the 'Coloured' people. Cape 
Town's City Council's Manager spelled out government policy, 
'The policy of this government is to reduce the number of 
African families living in the western Cape the labour 
needs of the peninsula are to be met by migratory labour ... 
those who have the right to stay will be allowed to remain, 
the rest will go home' (quoted in Cole, 1986:25). 
In the mid to late 50s work began on clearing squatter 
settlements. Some 5000 Africans were removed from "Black 
Spots" into the 
'Coloureds' were 
newly created Nyanga 





subjected to rigorous screening tests to discover who were 
legally entitled to remain in the Cape and to work there. As 
Leach (1989) noted, during this period only 750 of the 2,500 
families tested qualified. At least 1,200 families were 
ordered to separate, husbands to go to the single-sex hostels, 
wives and children to the homelands. By 1960 most squatter 
camps had been demolished and the 'legals' were resettled in 
the townships (1989:166-167). 
A variety of controls were utilised to achieve Eiselen's plan. 
In 1966 the government announced an absolute freeze on the 
development of Black housing and a restriction on hostel 
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accommodation that could be built for migrant labour. Controls 
were imposed in the workplace whereby employers were required 
to obtain permits to employ Africans, and were subject to 
large fines if they employed 'illegals'. Pass law controls 
were rigidly enforced, rising from 8,434 offences in 1962 to 
15,367 in 1967. As Glover (1987) has noted, the most stringent 
controls were placed on women 'in order to avoid Black 
families becoming the norm in the western Cape' (1987:4). 
Officials ,regarded families as a key index of how stable and 
permanent the urban African population was becoming and for 
this reason were anxious to limit the numbers of women in the 
urban areas and confine them to the rural bantustans as much 
as possible. 
In terms of this legislation, two categories of Africans 
developed: 'illegals' who were not entitled to be in the area; 
and 'legals' who had become entitled to the right either 
through their birth in Cape Town, working for the same 
employer continuously for ten years (or several employers for 
fifteen years), or being on a yearly work contract. The 
regional Cape economy boomed during the early 1970s, and from 
the period 1968-1974 the number of contract workers increased 
by 56.3% and by the end of 1974 there were an estimated 90,000 
'illegals' who would stay once the boom was over. As the city 
expanded more workers were drawn into it but between 1972 and 
1980 not a single house for African occupation had been built. 
There was no shelter for the wives and children of migrant 
workers who crept into the city unauthorised to join their 
men. Squatter shacks mushroomed, not only in backyards but in 
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vacant lots: one of those was Crossroads (Wilson and Ramphele, 
1989:215). 
The CLPA policy was therefore, as Humphries ( 1989) recently 
noted, undercut by the expanding regional economy with an 
ensuing shortage of 'Coloured' labour. But in addition the 
policy as part of regulated influx control proved unworkable 
at the municipal and divisional council level. The policy did 
not achieve its aims of protecting economic interests in the 
area or preserving a 'racial' balance. Though as Humphries 
suggests, if the real value of the policy was its symbolic 
political significance in the white arena then the stated aims 
were little more than rhetoric (1989:179). For those who were 
forced to enter the area illegally, however, the appalling 
social consequences of the policy were only too real. 
In theory the distinction between 'legal' and 'illegal' 
Africans in urban areas was supposed to be clear-cut. 'Legals' 
were people with jobs and formal housing, while 'illegals' had 
neither jobs nor housing and were therefore vagrants. Squatter 
communities emerged on a large scale when this clarity of 
definition blurred. The freeze on the development of family 
housing for Africans, coupled with the effects of the Group 
Areas Act soon meant that there were 'legals' with jobs but 
without housing. In 1975 the newly established Bantu 
Administration Board (BAAB) decided to allow these legally-
resident Africans to occupy temporarily a site bounded by 
Lansdowne Road, Mahobe Drive, and Klipfontein Road, east of 
Nyanga township. 
66 
Most of the original settlers of Crossroads had lived in Cape 
Town for over ten years. An estimated 30% had lived in an 
average of two or three other squatter settlements, and a 
significant percentage had lived in the surrounding African 
townships prior to moving to Crossroads (Robb, 'The Argus' 18 
August 1978). Of the male population, 50% were employed either 
as contract workers or permanent workers in the peninsula. 
Only 9.3% of the women in the community had legal rights to be 
in Cape Town. By the middle of April 1975 over 7000 Africans 
were reported to be living in the area, in an estimated 1027 
shacks (Cole, 1987:12). 
By 1986 it was estimated that the population of Crossroads had 
grown to 160,000 people of whom 22,000 were classified 
'legal'. During the years 1975-1986 Crossroads became a severe 
embarrassment. to the government as it became an international 
symbol of opposition to apartheid but more significantly as a 
powerful symbol of opposition to influx control and the 
classification of Africans into 'legal' and 'illegals' 
(insiders and outsiders). In spite of, or perhaps even 
because, of the fact that Crossroads fell under the glare of 
world publicity, the government remained adamant that the 
people of Crossroads could not remain on that site. 
A decade of negotiations swung between 'liberal' compromises, 
repression, promises and blatant tactics of divide and rule. 
During the early 1980s with the clearance of squatters from 
Hout Bay, Killarney and Table View and the creation of 'KTC' 
it was clear that the phenomenon of squatting was here to 
stay. In 1982 the hastily prepared Orderly Movement and 
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Settlement of Black Persons Bill, which as an extension to the 
Riekert Proposals of 1979 attempted to decrease the mobility 
and access of Africans to the urban areas and white farms, was 
withdrawn after an international outcry. As a consequence, 
pass raids intensified throughout the country but with 
particular emphasis on the Cape. The Surplus People's Project 
reported that during 1982 pass raid fines resulted in the 
collection of R52,000 per month (1985:58). 
Shocked by the aerial view 
settlements around Cape Town, 
announced in 1983 the building 
of the expanding African 
State President P W Botha 
of Khayelitsha. Propaganda 
papers were dropped over Crossroads advertising "a beautiful 
township on the False Bay coast! 11 where 'legals' would be 
accommodated in 'core houses' and 'illegals' offered 'site and 
service' provisions. By 1984 the official estimate of the 
'illegal' African population in the <;ape peninsula had grown 
to 70-100,000 people (Cole, 1987:95-97). In September of that 
year the National Party announced reform (the scrapping of the 
CLPA policy and granting 99-year leasehold to 'legal' 
Africans) and repression (the repatriation of 100,000 
'illegals') . Country-wide violence and resistance led to the 
imposition of the State of Emergency in July 1985 over one 
third of the country and extended to the Cape Town area in 
October 1985. 
World attention turned to Crossroads where resistance was 
particularly militant. The international media disclosed 
police brutality and reported on the atrocious living 
conditions within the settlement. Days of unrest resulted 
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mainly in the deaths of youths. The infamous 'necklace' was 
used as a method of killing people suspected of being sell-
outs. BBC news showed a film of what appeared to be an active 
alliance between members of the South African Police (SAP) and 
South African Defence Force (SADF) and the 'witdoeke' in 
Crossroads against the 'comrades'. 
On May 17 the destruction of the satellite camps of the 
Crossroads complex and nearby 'KTC' began as a prelude to the 
forced removal of 70,000 people. Cole sums up the significance 
of the May-June events as follows: in less than a month the 
'witdoeke' with the uncontested support of members of the SAP 
and SADF, had removed not only the most consistently resistant 
squatters in the Cape Peninsula but also, and perhaps more 
crucially, the support-bases for UDF-affiliated organisations 
operating in the area' (1987). 
conclusion 
The lives of Crossroads' residents, some of whom later became 
involved in the sorts of self-help projects I discuss in this 
thesis, were dominated by the search for a permanent home and 
place of work. Their experiences were characterised by 
attempts to formulate opposition to repressive measure which 
had their source largely in state action. Strategies were 
devised and leaders emerged to tackle immediate problems 
arising out of the material conditions which prevailed in the 
townships. In the following chapter I discuss the sorts of 
leadership and political organisation which arose out of the 
Crossroads crisis and link them to the subsequent emergence 
of community-based self-help projects. 
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Chapter Five 
Leadership and organisation 
1. Introduction 
The informal settlement at Crossroads was, in the eyes of the 
government, a human shunting yard from where formerly 
scattered squatter communities could be centralised before 
relocation to Khayelitsha. The squatters themselves had a 
different idea. For them, Crossroads represented a permanent 
solution to their housing needs. By necessity a form of 
community developed through a collective will to repel 
attempts at removal. Initially, resistance was chanelled 
through community organisations which grew to meet the 
challenge of changing local conditions. These organisations in 
the form of committees evolved in a reasonably democratic way 
and set about opposing police raids and meeting the needs of 
the community with genuine popular support. 
2. Leadership 
Patterns of leadership emerged with clear distinctions between 
men, women and the youth. As Glover explains tasks were 
apportioned: women were responsible for initiating contact 
with outside parties (organisations such as the Black Sash, 
Western Province Council of Churches, and individuals); whilst 
men concentrated on internal issues such as the collection of 
funds for the payment of fines. As the months progressed and 
the stakes increased, these divisions proved critically 
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divisive. To the outside world, Crossroads presented a united 
face to the worst excesses of apartheid, yet internally 
politics was seen to shift away from community-oriented 
problems to a concern with the exercise of control over the 
settlement's political economy. 
Women who, according to Cole {1987} and to a lesser extent 
Glover ( 1987), were at the forefront of resistance rapidly 
became ma~ginalised by the more powerful and exclusivist Men's 
Committees. Accusations of power usurpation, the 
misappropriation of community funds, and patronage increased 
tensions and deepened divisions within the community. Below I 
explore a variety of factors which may have contributed to the 
organisation and structure of power relations which emerged in 
Crossroads and played such a crucial role in the events which 
culminated in the violence of May-June 1986. 
First there is the issue of the perceived reinvention of 
'traditional' structures of authority grafted onto and adapted 
to the urban setting by those who seek power, and which is 
accepted {and legitimated) by those who seek direction. Cole, 
for example, argues that 'In the struggle to adapt to a 
rapidly changing social environment people chose 
familiar structures' {1987:19) which tended to conform to what 
Boonzaier and Spiegel have called 'the colonial office of 
headman' {1988:51). 
Glover pursues this argument further by saying that men, women 
and youth fulfill their 'traditional' roles in the urban 
setting in other ways. Men, for example, continue to act as 
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'family and community autocrats'; whilst women are contained 
within the non-political domestic sphere. This enables Glover 
to see later events as challenges to the 'traditional mode of 
operating'. The youth ,were formerly expected to take a 
subservient role but immersion in the urban environment gave 
them the 'modern' confidence to confront the elders and 
through an alliance with women to acquire 
decision-making role. And furthermore the 
an independent 
rise of the 
'witdoeke'. or 'fathers' is clearly interpreted as a violent, 
reactionary backlash by elder men in an attempt to regain lost 
authority through reigning-in the unruly youth and women 
(1987:5-8). 
Glover's dualism is perhaps too rigid. Recourse to 'tradition' 
as an explanation for behaviour certainly has an emotional 
attraction but there is strong evidence to suggest that 
leaders in Crossroads and ordinary r.esidents appealed to an 
image of the past to give legitimacy to current practices. 
Surveys show that the majority of the original settlers of 
Crossroads had been living or working in Cape Town for a 
number of years. Significant male leaders were 'legal' ex-
township residents who were involved in business and had an 
eye to community political structures. They were men who 
interpreted the circumstances of the time, manipulated the 
opportunities and devised courses of action: much in the same 
way as all leaders do. 
Second, the apparent ease with which a tight caucus of leaders 
emerged in Crossroads as the controlling power, may be 
understood in terms of the context of the control of Africans 
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in general. African experience of the South African state and 
society, but also of 'progressive organisations', has been 
characterised by the removal of decision-making and choice. 
Choices in housing, work, education, mobility and the right of 
expression have been tightly controlled and administered by 
bureaucrats in a non-consultative and non-participatory 
system. African experience, therefore, has been one of 
exclusion and control and never more so than during the 1980s. 
This may, in part, explain why Crossroads residents were so 
willing to place their faith in the men (and women) who had 
the initial courage and ability to confront the situation of 
threatened eviction. The early stages of resistance demanded 
some form of organisation for achieving collective goals. 
Quite rightly organisations were seen to be more powerful than 
individuals. The scope for misuse of organisational authority 
was not, at that stage, contemplated. 
Third, Johnson Ngxobongwana et al were able to draw upon a 
pool of support which was quite simply - at this stage 
politically non-aligned. It is often assumed that Cape-based 
Africans, if not "traditional" or rural, must be Africanist or 
Charterist. But political labelling of this kind, particularly 
in squatter settlements where support for mass-based movements 
is often transcient, ambiguous and reluctant, is notoriously 
difficult. In Crossroads the position was highly fluid and the 
interplay of groups (aligned in opposition to the government) 
and the squatters left plenty of room for confusion. 
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As Perlman (1976) discovered in the shanty-towns of Rio de 
Janeiro, squatters tend to adopt individualistic and 
opportunistic strategies in contrast to the accepted positions 
of established organisations. In Crossroads the stratification 
which arose out of the township residents' and progressive 
organisations' distrust of squatters lead to antagonisms and 
gave rise to a concentration of power. Ngxobongwana, whose 
hunger for power was suitably clothed in socially and UDF-
approved rhetoric, exploited this situation to full effect. 
Fourth, leadership within an organisational framework received 
external, as well as internal, legitimation. The formation of 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, for example, 
signalled a move towards 'consensus' or 'participatory 
in which leaders were supposedly representatives 
for relaying community decisions, rather than 




messengers and democracy through mass participation became 
increasingly elusive as decision-making shifted to caucuses of 
strategists rather than the community. 
This process occurred in Crossroads where UDF-affiliated 
groups continued to embrace and give sustenance to Johnson 
Ngxobongwana as a 'popular leader' seemingly blind to his 
increasingly autocratic and corrupt style of rule (Cole, 
1987: 85) . Similarly, white liberal helpers who acted as go-
betweens and legal advisors in the negotiations also served to 
give legitimacy to male leaders by virtue of affording 
privileged access to information to certain groups. In their 
defence representatives of the Urban Foundation claim that the 
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environment was almost impossible to operate in and getting 
beyond the 'leadership clique' was a considerable challenge to 
the ingenuity of any outside agency (Glover, 1987:20-22). 
Significant, of course, is the continuing involvement of the 
state, in particular local security forces, in actively 
propping-up a favourable leadership in Crossroads. As we have 
seen, influx control measures had failed to control African 
urbanisation and in the absence of imposing and maintaining 
any other effective means of control the state sought new ties 
of political clientship. An autocratic controlling power in 
Crossroads made the strategic task of cooption far easier 
since Ngxobongwana and fellow committee members became, in 
effect, extensions of the white regional administration moving 
events towards the goals of the state. Outside agencies, be 
they so called 'progressive' or representatives of capital, 
inadvertantly, or consciously assisted the state in this 
process. 
3. organisational control 
Cole analysed the creation of leadership structures in 
Crossroads as the wrenching of women's legitimate power by a 
corrupt alliance of reactionary forces. Christine Glover who 
was working in Crossroads throughout 1985 and 1986 has, in 
conversation, criticised Cole's romanticisation of the 
significance of the Women's Committee and sees this tendency 
arising out of the fact that her involvement in Crossroads had 
been to focus a study on women to the exclusion of wider 
processes. Certainly Cole's study presents a rather monolithic 
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picture of women's experiences of and reaction to the material 
conditions of poverty and repression. 
The women of Crossroads were divided, and 'progressive' 
organisations representing women ( such as the United Women's 
Organisation (UWO) and the United Women's Congress (UWCO)) did 
not enjoy unanimous support. There were women who saw their 
best chances through cooperation with the Men's Cammi ttees. 
But also, as we shall see later in discussing Nomathemba 
Matiwana, there were women, considered to be 'on the left', 
who rejected the Women's Committee and later the alliance with 
the youth, partly because of the involvement of 'progressive' 
organisations. It is likely that a prate-feminist 
consciousness may have evolved during this period; the 
question is to what degree was it articulated and worked into 
concrete action. And furthermore why did women react 
differentially? 
Committees were established soon after the squatters arrived 
at Crossroads with four major tasks: to coordinate a response 
to the threat of removals; to collect monies to pay fines, 
legal costs and to fund welfare projects; to initiate contacts 
with outside organisations thus promoting the plight of the 
squatters; and to create a network of mutual-aid schemes for 
the families of Crossroads. Though divided into Men's and 
Women's Committees they cooperated on a successful counter-
application to the Supreme Court in 1976 to have the 
settlement declared an Emergency Camp with the provision of 
rudimentary services. The victory was made possible because of 
the assistance of outside 'liberal' helpers, and from this 
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point on contact with outside agencies was actively sought. 
Contacts which, Cole argues, served the interests of 
reactionary forces rather than the interests of the community. 
After the Court found in favour of the squatters, additional 
people flooded to Crossroads in the hope of finding security. 
At the time of the Court hearing the population was estimated 
at 10,000; by 1979 the figure had reached 40-45,000. In 
response to this, two men, Johnson Ngxobongwana and Oliver 
Memani, who respectively headed the Noxolo and Sizamile 
Cammi ttees, extended their networks of control beyond normal 
committee functions. Crossroads was zoned and two informal 
bodies were established: 'homeguards' who acted as community 
police concerning themselves with petty-crime; and, 'wardsmen' 
who had the key function of collecting funds and settling 
disputes. 
In April 1979 an agreement was forged between the government 
through its new Minister of Plural Relations, Piet Koornhof 
and the squatters. The crucial issue at stake became the 
building of a new township, to be called New Crossroads, and 
who would be eligible to stay there. The Agreement was 
generally well received although it soon became clear that the 
extent of the building programme would barely scratch the 
surface of the problem and in the course of negotiations 
splits in the community became more pronounced. out of this 
stratification Ngxobongwana siezed the opportunity to change 
the face of Crossroads internal politics and external 
contacts. 
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In August 1979 Ngxobongwana organised elections and was duly 
elected the first leader of the newly-formed Executive 
Committee. His first acts were to dissolve the rival Sizamile 
Committee, and create a 'cabinet' of loyal men who were 
'elected' at large community meetings. Each 'cabinet' member 
had a portfolio (education, welfare, treasury etc.) and their 
major task was to make contact with external bodies - welfare 
agencies, international visitors, press and local authority 
figures - and thus create the external resource base which was 
crucial to Ngxobongwana's leadership. Members of the Executive 
Committee together with the 'wardsmen' - who tended to be more 
conservative and older - liaised with outside agencies in such 
a way that Ngxobongwana was able to pull the strings but 
remain in the background. The Executive Committee, 'wardsmen' 
and 'homeguards' (Ngxobongwana's private army according to 
Glover, 1987:13) provided Ngxobongwana with a rubber stamp 
backed up by comprehensive intelligen?e and coercive force to 
counter dissent. 
Throughout the early 1980s Ngxobongwana fought off challenges 
to his position primarily from Memani to control both Old and 
New Crossroads. During 1983-1984 conflict between the state 
and squatters intensified as local security forces attempted 
to flush out 'illegals'. With the formation of the UDF in 1983 
squatter struggles became more highly politicised and 
Ngxobongwana as a high-profile community-leader received the 
support of affiliated organisations as a genuine and popular 
leader. 
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Crossroads continued to represent the symbolic opposition to 
apartheid yet within the community Ngxobongwana protected by 
Ndima's strongmen consolidated his power in New and Old 
Crossroads through coercion and the imposition of extravagant 
'taxes'. It was believed, Glover (1987:13) states, that 
Ngxobongwana had reached an agreement with the local police 
that they would stay out of Crossroads; and similarly with the 
drug squad who agreed not to interfere with Crossroads 
economic base, the distribution of dagga. 
In April, Ngxobongwana's 'army' was seen on the streets 
recognisable by strips of white cloth attached to their 
clothes. In September the Nationalist Party announced that 
Crossroads "must be cleared up and there must be no doubt 
about that whatsoever" (quoted in Cole, 1987:86). Police raids 
continued and violence broke out between supporters of Memani 
and the ruling Executive. The Sizamile School, Memani's symbol 
of support, was burned to the ground. Irrespective of wide-
scale criticism agains the actions of the Executive Committee, 
Ngxobongwana continued to gain support from external 
organisations including the UDF, and through this he was able 
to ensure compliance from the community and superiority over 
the lesser leaders (Haza, Tutu, Toise, Siphika and Yamile). 
1985 saw the intensification of wide-scale violence throughout 
the country and resistance within the African townships 
escalated. By October the State of Emergency had been declared 
country-wide but prior to that several critical events 
occurred to change the dynamic of Crossroads. Firstly, 
Ngxobongwana was detained for a nine-month period with a 
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strong possibility that prosecution would be successful on a 
charge of incitement to murder. Secondly, there was a growing 
disenchantment towards Ngxobongwana amongst many of his 
external resource agencies which led to the withdrawal of the 
Catholic Welfare Bureau and Compassion who felt they were 
propping-up an unacceptable regime. Other agencies ( such as 
the Red Cross) decided to stay on for humanitarian reasons. 
Thirdly, the Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO} and the UDF-
affiliated groups gained increasing recognition 
Crossroads and became a direct threat to Ngxobongwana. 
within 
By the time Ngxobongwana was released in June 1985 it was 
generally felt that the state was committed to the removal of 
all Crossroads residents to Khayelitsha. It was likely 
therefore that Ngxobongwana had been detained as a community-
leader most likely to organise resistance to removal. However 
his change of attitude towards 'Pr?gressive' organisations 
within Crossroads led some commentators to believe that the 
security forces had bribed Ngxobongwana to agree to 
'cooperate' with them in the forced removal. Opposition to 
Ngxobongwana and by association the Executive Committee grew 
during the latter half of 1985. In retaliation Ngxobongwana 
rebuilt the 'wardsmen' committees and strengthened his 
'homeguard'; he banned CAYCO and uwco from Crossroads, and 
divided the youth by declaring AZAPO the only permissible 
organisation to represent the youth. 
In February 1986 elections were held in which Ngxobongwana was 
elected Chairman of Old and New Crossroads; in effect he had 
become the new local black authority extending his control 
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over neighbouring satellite camps with the assistance of the 
local security forces. Together they were seen threatening 
leaders, like Toise and Yamile, and exposing ANC terrorists. 
Ngxobongwana, now in conjunction with Haza, and the security 
forces shared a common wish to rid the area of the militant 
youth and 'progressive' organisations. On 17 
destruction of satellite squatter camps of 





Glover (1987) describes the tactics: 'A pattern was 
established. An area would be teargassed to get rid of all the 
people. The army and pol ice would then keep these people at 
bay while fewer than a hundred 'witdoeke' looted and torched 
the shacks. Four thousand shacks were destroyed in Crossroads' 
(1987:19-20). The squatter camps, with the exception of the 
heart of Old Crossroads, had been destroyed. 'Law and order' 
had been temporarily maintained thr~ugh the removal of the 
settlements which offered protection to the 'comrades' ( or 
Maqabane). 
The aftermath saw squatters scattered from Nkonyeni to 
Khayelitsha. Many people drifted with the sand to Khayelitsha; 
Site B and Green Town (tent town) are still filled with 
'refugees'. Elsewhere, Millers Camp, Mkhonto Square and 
Brown's Farm have sprung up. Old Crossroads, formerly a focal 
point of resistance, had become, Cole argues, 'the apple in 
the eye of the South African state and a monument to its co-
optive strategies' (1987:163). The events in Crossroads raised 
a number of crucial questions which could not be ignored. Why 
did the 'progressive' forces fail to win the hearts and mind 
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of squatters and squatter leaders? Why were people willing to 
align themselves with the state and take violent retribution 
against fellow squatters? What is the future of development 
intervention in such complex environments? And finally what 
are the legacies of this turbulent decade of South Africa's 
history? 
4. Conclusion 
Understanding the political struggles that occurred and are 
continuing to occur in informal settlements like Crossroads 
is, as Mabin ( 1989) 
country. Violence 
directed solely at, 
has noted, crucial to the future of the 
is not, as it is commonly perceived, 
or manipulated by the state and it's 
agencies. The material circumstances of settlements like 
Crossroads have created struggles over access to resources. 
Small numbers of entrepreneurs or exploiters - depending on 
one's viewpoint - have been able to accumulate weal th: the 
majority have not. 
In Crossroads the "struggle for the city" (to use Cooper's, 
1985 phrase) took place along many cleavages. Ngxobongwana 
manipulated the cleavages in Crossroads to control the 
settlement's political economy. His control was further 
enhanced, Cole (1987) and Glover (1987) argue, through 
extortion and physical repression. 
Crossroads, like other informal settlements, is as Graaff 
(1987) and Tomlinson and Le Grange (quoted in Mabin, 1989) 
found, a relatively cheap place to live. Its relative 
82 
cheapness however, must be seen in the context of a lack of 
services and a state of individual powerlessness in the face 
of autocratic local leaders. Refuge from official harassment, 
which some settlements provide, is replaced by an often more 
violent unofficial harassment. 
It was out this "new urban regime" (Mabin, 1989) dominated by 
political struggles and rooted in the crippling material 
circumsta~ces of Crossroads that Sam Nkonyeni and Nomathemba 
Matiwana emerged as "alternative leaders" determined to 
challenge this new regime. 
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Chapter Six 
Nkonyeni and Matiwana: From Crossroads to Philippi via London, 
Washington ..• 
1. Sam Nkonyeni 
Sam Nkonyeni was a key figure in the Crossroads drama. His 
involvement is partly documented by Glover (1987) and referred 
to by Cole {1987). In conversation Glover talks fondly of him 
as a well-meaning if misled man who has survived largely 
because of personal abilities and prospered through an 
entrepreneurial flair. The details of his involvement included 
in this section are culled from Glover and Cole's work, 
newspaper articles and numerous conversations with Nkonyeni, 
Matiwana and other community leaders involved in the 
Crossroads conflict. 
Nkonyeni has little formal education. He achieved Standerd 6 
at a Queenstown School and at the age of 16 embarked on a two-
year motor-mechanics course in Pietermaritzburg which he was 
unable to complete for "family reasons". In the early 1950s he 
moved to Cape Town and soon after married for the first time. 
Responding to demands of a growing family, Nkonyeni moved 
homes between Nkonyeni and Gugulethu, sometimes renting formal 
houses and other times living in back-yard shacks. He had 
various jobs, most of which were casual and were involved with 
cars: mechanics, panel beating and respraying. 
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In 1975 he married for the second time and established an 
additional home at the newly-settled squatter site which 
became known as Old crossroads. Nkonyeni spent his first years 
in Crossroads acquiring plots of land upon which he planned to 
construct workshops and a retail shop. As his businesses 
flourished he became friends with other senior male figures in 
the settlement including Johnson Ngxobongwana. 
In 1985 N9xobongwana became the leader of the UDP-affiliated 
Western Cape Civic Association, a position which, Nkonyeni 
informed me, gave him great status inside Crossroads. Shortly 
after Ngxobongwana' s appointment, Nkonyeni was selected - a 
selection which Glover points out was not arrived at through 
accepted democratic means (1987: 10) - to become a member of 
the settlement's Executive Committee. Nkonyeni's 
responsibility was to forge links with outside welfare and 
development agencies which were keen ~o provide the essential 
services to the area, services which the government would not 
provide. 
During his period on the Executive Committee Nkonyeni's 
business interests continued to grow. By mid-1986 he had built 
a shop (with, he estimates RS0,000 worth of stock at any one 
time), a motor repair yard and a small construction company 
which benefitted from new construction opportunities in New 
Crossroads. His income was sufficient to support both 
households which now included five children. 
On 4 May 1986, however, Nkonyeni's self-described "good life" .. 
came to an end with his violent expulsion from Crossroads by 
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his former friends and colleagues. He estimates losing Rl4,000 
worth of equipment in addition to his home and its contents. 
For fear of his life he claims he can no longer re-enter 
Crossroads. Langa' s experience is an interesting example of 
the way in which struggles in the "new urban regime" turn 
around bids to control the political economy of informal 
settlements. 
Nkonyeni's involvement in Crossroads arose, he says, out of a 
genuine will to "help the people" and as a result of other 
people's recognition of his entrepreneurial talents. He was 
not, Glover believes, a political leader of the same calibre 
of Ngxobongwana and nor was he a strongman like Ndima 
(personal conversation) . He is sensitive to accusations of 
corruption and intimidation which it is claimed occurred 
during his period on the Executive Committee. 
Having previously established himself as a business-leader 
Nkonyeni rose to political prominence during the period of 
Ngxobongwana's imprisonment on incitement to murder charges in 
1984-1985. He stood-in as Acting Chairman, taking over the 
joint role as chief negotiator between the settlement and 
government representatives, and as community-auditor. 
During Ngxobongwana's internment Nkonyeni found himself in the 
middle of a dispute between the Executive Committee (which he 
temporarily headed) and the 'headman'/'homeguard' alliance. 
The latter's main grievance concerned the way monies were 
being collected and administered by the Executive. Nkonyeni 
had overseen the shift in responsibility for collecting money 
86 
move from the 'traditional' local headmen to the Executive. In 
response the headmen formed an alliance with the youth to 
remove the Executive who, they believed, were using WPCC, 
Urban Foundation and World Vision money to support their own 
"extravagant lifestyles". 
On his release, Glover (1987) argues, Ngxobongwana discovered 
that his lifestyle was exposed to the wider community. 
Realising that his position was threatened by a new and 
potentially powerful alliance he acted swiftly to break that 
alliance. Ngxobongwana coaxed the headmen away from the CAYCO-
affiliated youth by assuring them that his desire was the same 
as theirs; to topple the Executive Committee. At this point, 
Nkonyeni explained, his days in Crossroads were numbered. 
Nkonyeni and Alfred Naphakade (who later partnered Nkonyeni in 
establishing Philippi Enterprises) along with the 
'progressive' organisations became the target for physical 
attacks from Ngxobongwana and his increasingly ruthless 
headmen. In February 1986 Nkonyeni stood against Ngxobongwana 
in crucial elections to decide, what effectively became the 
position of Crossroad's unofficial mayor. Ngxobongwana was 
elected with 3,629 votes, Nkonyeni came second out of eight 
candidates receiving 522 votes. 
During his campaign, Nkonyeni told me, he reminded the 
community of the selfless way in which he had served them. 
Some four years after the events he was able to recall his 
success in raising "Rl from each house until we eventually had 
R2587.80 with which we could build the Noxolo School for 1600 
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children . . . the Urban Foundation and the WPCC also gave us 
money for twenty classrooms; but the government would not 
help" {interview, 25 August 1989). After the election Nkonyeni 
continued, still as a member of the Executive Cammi ttee, to 
oppose Ngxobongwana. He recalls watching the evolving 
partnership between the local security forces and Ngxobongwana 
and calculated that they presented a direct threat to his 
life. 
In April 1986, Nkonyeni, who was at that stage Vice-Chairman 
of the Committee, and Naphakade voiced their concern about the 
alliance and split away from Ngxobongwana because, Nkonyeni 
says, they were not willing to condone the level of violence 
which threatened the squatter community. Nkonyeni' s decision 
resulted in his violent expulsion from Crossroads {he claimed 
to have gunshot wounds in the head and leg) and the seizure of 
his business interests. 
Nkonyeni's former status as an active supporter of the sort of 
leaders which were labelled reactionary and collaboratory by 
the UDF was rapidly overturned. He had, like Toise who also 
removed and cleansed himself from the decidely impure 
Ngxobongwana-Hoza camp, become 'progressive' and 'popular'. 
This new found status proved crucial as Nkonyeni set out on 
his new venture: Philippi Enterprises. 
2. Nomathemba Matiwana 
Nomathemba Matiwana, unlike Nkonyeni during the Crossroads 
crises, was never officially associated with any committee or 
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organisation. Part of the reason for her independence lies in 
her often stated distrust of, and suspicion towards leaders 
and formal bodies which claim to represent the interests of 
the people. She summed-.up the struggle for Crossroads in a 
characteristically pithy way: 
"There were those who were genuinely committed to this 
particular struggle; then there were those who were committed 
to an ideological struggle; an_d finally there were those who 
were out to improve their lot on the back of the struggle" 
(interview, 15 November 1989). 
Matiwana is a shrewd and passionate woman in her fifties. She 
was born in 1932 in Ndabeni, Cape Town's first African 
township. Her parents moved to Langa when formal housing was 
constructed where her mother and aunts began a small 
dressmaking business. During her schooling years Matiwana 
helped her mother with the dressmaking and acquired skills 
which later proved useful. In 1950 she married a 'Ciskeian' 
man who was working on contract in Cape Town. They remained in 
Langa until the mid-1970s during which time she gave birth to 
four sons and two daughters. 
In 1976 however, the Matiwana family became victims of the 
Group Areas Act which was introduced by the newly-elected 
National Party in the year of Nomathemba's marriage. In terms 
of the Act, and by virtue of her marriage to a 'Ciskeian' they 
were no longer permitted to live in the City in which she was 
born and educated. 
The removal of rights and fears of arrest because of pass 
offences led her to "work underground". In 1976 she was 
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finally arrested for an infringement of the pass laws and 
briefly detained. Shortly after her release the family decided 
it would be "safer to leave Langa and lose themselves in the 
recently settled Old Crossroads squatter camp (interview, 16 
November 1989). 
Once established in Old Crossroads Matiwana continued to work 
as a cleaner at a local Golf Club as well as making dresses 
from home ,and selling cooked sheep heads. During this period 
she continued to put pressure on the local Bantu Affairs 
Administration Department offices for permanent resident 
status. This status was finally granted in 1979 and in-line 
with the Koornhof Agreement (see Cole, 1987 for the terms of 
this Agreement) her family was offered a home in New 
Crossroads. 
At first the family refused to move to the new site, as only 
certain people had been chosen a decision which they felt to 
be unfair. They remained in Old Crossroads until late 1981 
when their shack was accidentally destroyed by fire and they 
had no option but to move. In New Crossroads Nomathemba 
Matiwana continued her dressmaking business whilst her husband 
secured a job at the docks refitting boats. The move to New 
Crossroads, however, did not remove Matiwana or her family 
from the struggles which dominated life in Old Crossroads and 
rapidly spread into surrounding satellite settlements and 
which finally erupted so violently in 1985 and 1986. 
Matiwana's decision to become involved in the Crossroad's 
affair was rather thrust upon her. In Old Crossroads she had 
the reputation as a person 
Residents, particularly recent 
seek her advice on a range of 
family disputes. Her role as 
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who could get things done. 
arrivals in Cape Town, would 
issues from form filling to 
an unpaid community worker 
continued in New Crossroads. As the violence between rival 
groups in Old crossroads and 'KTC' claimed victims, groups of 
people came knocking on Matiwana's door asking for her help. 
In 1985 as the tension increased she recalls the pressures 
becoming nearly unbearable. Her home was used as a place of 
refuge for children whose parents had decided should no longer 
remain in Old Crossroads. Unable to provide the material help 
these refugees needed, Matiwana organised a series of 
delegations to local church leaders and welfare organisations 
in a bid to raise money and obtain donations of blankets and 
food parcels. Most of these missions, she recalled, were 
unsuccessful. 
Throughout the crisis and beyond she remained distrustful both 
of external and internal agencies and organisations which 
involved themselves in mediations and negotiations to decide 
the fate of Crossroads. At no stage did she feel the right 
questions were being asked of the right people, or that any 
serious efforts were being made to alleviate hardship and 
suffering. She refused a position with the United Women's 
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van Eck attests to Matiwana's 
during this period" (personal 
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Though non-aligned, her involvement and that of members of her 
family was regarded by certain leaders of the 'witdoeke' as 
sympathetic to the 'comrades'. 
"Because I am a woman" she says 'they thought I was 
dangerous. They knew I looked after the children and could 
give birth to 'comrades'"· 
As the fighting intensified Matiwana and members of her family 
were physi·cally intimidated. She came to the attention of the 
police who regularly visited her house in search of weapons 
and "ANC terrorists". In March 1986 her husband was attacked; 
he received a blow to the head which has had many physical and 
mental health repercussions. 
At her own admission Nomathemba Matiwana was on the point of a 
breakdown when the 'KTC' clearances began. She had no option 
but to escape Cape Town. Her exile ln Swaziland lasted six 
months. Early in 1987 she returned to Cape Town and first 
proceeded to rebuild her home and family. She then considered 
what should be done to address the the wider problems. 
3. Recipient and Donor come Together 
By 1987 Crossroads had become a global media issue. Like the 
Soweto uprising of 1976 the events in Crossroads have come to 
mark a turning point in South Africa's history. Around the 
world despatches of unrest aroused anger at the appalling 
living conditions at Crossroads, the system which made such 
places necessary, and the apparent complicity of the 
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government in the carnage which occurred. The question on 
everyone's lips was, according to Leach, 
"How is it that a country as rich as South Africa can 
allow such insanitary and degrading living conditions to 
continue ... 
For many Crossroads was the ultimate advertisement for 
apartheid, the darkest stain on the government's reputation. 
Its history showed how once again, the fate of ordinary human 
beings had taken second place to the dreams of the apartheid 
masters" (Leach (1989) quoted in McDowell, 1990:6). 
There was wide-spread consensus both within the country and 
internationally that apartheid had to go. 
In 1986 and 1987, Commonwealth countries - with the important 
exception of Britain which has consistently argued that 
sanctions will not bring about a desired change but instead 
would harm the interests of those most affected by apartheid 
itself - sought to strengthen arms embargoes, sports boycotts, 
economic measures, trades sanctions and cultural boycotts 
contained in earlier agreements (see the Gleneagles 
declaration, 1977, CHOGM Measures Nassau, 1985, and the 
Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group Report, 1986). 
Also in 1986 a particularly important set of sanctions, 
contained in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, were passed 
by the US Senate. That placed bans on us bank loans to the 
South African government; banned new investments in South 
Africa; and also prohibited the importation of textiles, 
uranium, iron and coal from South Africa (First Report, UK 
Foreign Affairs Committee Report on South Africa 1991:33-36). 
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Similar measures, designed to increase pressure on the South 
African government, were adopted by the European Communities 
Foreign Ministries at a meeting held in Brussels in September 
1986. 
The international response to the country-wide violence and 
resistance in the mid-1980s and the imposition of the 
strictly-enforced State of Emergency, was accompanied by 
responses within the country. New organisations and alliances 
both local and national developed to force the pace of change. 
As the nation-wide crackdown continued political parties, 
'democratic' alliances, workers movements, human rights 
groups, business pressure groups, welfare, legal and voluntary 
organisations emerged with their own often competing agendas. 
Places of particular conflict, like Crossroads, became the 
arenas within which knowledge and ideas were, in various ways, 
connected to the problems of the people. 
Organisation's attempts to bring pressure to bear, to direct 
social, political and economic change, and to genuinely 
address the needs of the victims of conflict takes place at 
many levels: my concern here is with efforts to do so at the 
local or community level. 
The situation in Crossroads in 1987 brought together many of 
these responses at a particular time and place. There began a 
competition between groups for the urban poor. The question 
being asked was: "Something must be done: what should we do?" 
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As I discuss in Part 4 of this thesis, current development 
thinking advocates development projects that are appropriate 
responses to local conditions. A key to insuring 
appropriateness is to undertake rigorous participatory 
research of the sort recommended by the World Bank (see 
Salmen, 1987). Evidence of such pre-programme research being 
undertaken by funders of community development projects in the 
Crossroads area is not immediately available. 
Community-based intervention requires significant contact with 
a range of people who arguably could be seen to represent the 
views of the majority of the community. In the course of my 
research it has become clear that donors and developers prefer 
to speak to 'community leaders' rather than to the community. 
Nornathernba · Matiwana and Sam Nkonyeni satisfied donor's 
requirements for acceptable communi~y leaders through whom 
development money could be channelled. Both had a track record 
in community involvement. Both had been seen .in opposition to 
the unrepresentative, autocratic leaders who were corning to 
dominate the "new urban regime" of informal settlements on the 
peripheries of major cities. In the absence of government 
assistance in upgrading informal settlements some welfare 
organisations had already been involved in providing help and 
both Matiwana and Nkonyeni had had contact with these 
organisations. Lastly, Matiwana and Nkonyeni had a vision for 
action which with some creative interpretation was 
perceived to be acceptable by the donors. 
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When Matiwana and Nkonyeni met at the Philippi Industrial 
Estate in June 1987 to look at available property they had 
both been offered financial support for their ventures from 
overseas governments, church groups, multinational companies 
and welfare organisations, many of which were embarking on 




Two Community Development Projects 
Chapter seven 
Funding and Performance: Philippi Enterprises 
1. The setting 
During our conversations Nkonyeni and Matiwana often recalled 
their excitement on seeing, for the first time, the 'South 
African Quilt' warehouse and other available buildings on the 
Philippi Industrial Estate. The estate is situated about 15 
kilometres from Cape Town and was built in the 1940s at which 
time it was surrounded by largely ex-patriate-German-owned 
farmlands and bush (conversation with Brian Frost, a local 
architect, December 1990). Since the 1970s informal housing 
has begun to spread closer and closer to the boundary of the 
estate. 
The influx of job-seekers into the area, however, did not 
benefit the estate, partly as a result of earlier policy that 
"all industrial development should occur in and around 
Atlantis", it had been in decline as an industrial area for 
some time (Neville Riley, Deputy City Planner, quoted in Cape 
Times, 8 July 1989). Local major employers such as the 
National Portland Cement Works on the Landsdowne Road ceased 
operations in 1980 with the exhaustion of local limestone 
supplies and at present the owners have no plans to reactivate 
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the site (conversation with Craig Waterson a PPC manager, 
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The future of the estate is under discussion by the Regional 
services Council (RSC) (under whose juris~iction it falls) and 
the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA). Mr Moodley the 
Director of KNS Property Investments, which owns both 
buildings housing the projects, had been inf armed by the 
municipality that parts of the estate are likely to be rezoned 
as black development areas (conversation with Mr Moodley, 
August 1988). This would mean the setting aside of formerly 
industrial land for black residential and industrial use. 
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At present the estate is dominated by a scrap metal 
reprocessing yard which purchases material collected by 
township residents. Each day a stream of people, many of whom 
are women, can be seen carrying, dragging or pushing bundles 
of scrap into the yard where it is sorted, weighed and bought. 
At the time of writing this thesis the going rate was 8 cents 
per kilo of light steel (e.g. tin) and 12 cents per kilo of 
heavy steel (e.g. wire); employees at the yard estimate that 
the average carried load is between 12 and 18 kilos depending 
on the ease of transportation. Some collectors manage two 
loads a day, three is unusual. 
The sorts of business activities undertaken on the estate are 
reiated to the changing demography and conditions in the 
surrounding areas. For example the scrap metal yard draws on 
the vast pool of unemployed labour to secure a constant flow 
of discarded steel. And KNS Property Investments acquired two 
large warehouses as storage and supply points for the Tile 'n' 
Brick Haulage Company to take advantage of the housing boom in 
the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain area. 
Philippi Enterprises and the Spiritual Churches Development 
Centre were, the first African initiatives on the estate. They 
too can be seen, in part, as a reaction to local conditions 
and have been followed by other self-help type initiatives. At 
the time of writing (April 1991) there were four projects in 
addition to the Spiritual Churches Centre operating from 
adjacent buildings. 
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The buildings occupied by Philippi Enterprises and the 
Spiritual Churches Centre members in 1987 had stood empty 
for a number of years and remain in need of renovation. The 
former 'South African Quilt Building' is an L-shaped one-
storey structure (2500 sq.m.) with adjoining ground. It is 
supplied with water and electricity, a supply which in 1989 an 
RSC inspector declared to be "highly dangerous". 
The build~ng occupied by the Spiritual Churches Centre is 
about half the size of the 'Quilt Building' (occupying 
approximately 1100 sq.m.). Shortly after moving in its members 
decided to rewire the building completely and make some 
repairs to the roof which remains dangerous but would cost 
many tens of thousands of rands to replace. The Centre was 
broken into four times during my period of research, each time 
entry was made through loose roof beams. 
Considering the building's poor state of repair, Nkonyeni and 
Matiwana, believed that rental charges were unrealistic but 
they had no choice since other affordable properties were not 
available. During my period of research rent on the 'Quilt 
Building' was increased from R2151 per month in August 1988 to 
R3500 in December 1989. By February 1990 Philippi Enterprises 
was in arrears by R12,000 and a legal notice was issued by the 
owners demanding that project members vacated the premises. 
They did so later that month. 
The Spiritual Churches Centre was placed on a three-month 
renewable lease after which they were expected to sign three-
year leases. The rent charges to project members were Rl750 
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per month rising to R2400 per month. Workers were able to meet 
these payments and mid-way through 1990, Mr Moodley praised 
Matiwana for her business-like approach. 
"I believe these p~ople should be given a chance. There 
is an urgent need for employment in Old Crossroads and now at 
Brown's Farm. 
These black businesses have got to be the way forward. 
But they must learn to pay their bills ... on time! I don't 
know what is happening with Philippi Enterprises but the 
Spiritual Churches women are a good example to others". 
2. Philippi Enterprises: Founding Principles 
In August 1987 a proposal letter sent to prospective funders 
in which Nkonyeni described the purpose of Philippi 
Enterprises as "making a practical contribution towards job 
creation as well as to play an active role in the process of 
community upliftment amongst our black population". In the 
letter he drew funders' attention to one particular problem, 
unemployment: 
"The impact of the recent economic decline upon the 
poorer and more vulnerable communities in South Africa ought 
not to be underestimated. 
The rise in unemployment in the Western Cape has had a 
drastic effect upon many families. Few attempts, if any, have 
been made by the private sector or development agengies to 






benefits are notoriously inadequate. The 
the family of a recently unemployed 
devastating. The rising incidence of 
economic-related crime bear testimony to 
In order to address the problem of community upliftment, the 
letter continues, a group of "artisans" came together to 
"provide skills to community organisations and the community 
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at large". The type of skills to be offered were: "mechanical 
and allied services (panel-beating and spray painting); 
engineering and welding; electrical maintenance; building and 
construction; brick and vibracrete manufacturing; and joinery 
and carpentry" (proposal letter 10 August 1988). 
In conversation Nkonyeni was more forthcoming about the overt 
political aims of the project. During an interview in May 1989 
he stated: 
"By setting-up the cooperative we are fighting apartheid 
by creating jobs for poor blacks thus curbing poverty. In our 
operation of the project we are practicing democracy. We 
oppose capitalism. We identify ourselves with the masses who 
are fighting against racial oppression in South Africa. We are 
affiliated to the Unemployed Workers Movement". 
Democracy, according to Nkonyeni, was to be organised along 
the principle of "equal rights" through which "people plan and 
decide and organise what directly affects them. We aim to 
create a worker-controlled environment where workers are 
managers in a framework of 'collective action' and 'flat 
management'"· 
3. Philippi Enterprises at work 
During my fieldwork I would often arrive at the project 
shortly after sunrise as the Nkonyeni's truck left for a farm 
near Klapmuts to collect apples. The apples were brought back 
to the project where they were off-loaded into large wooden 
crates some of which were stored in the offices. The 
remainder were bagged and taken to street-side traders 
throughout the townships to sell to their customers. During 
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the day other traders would visit the project to buy apples 
directly. 
Nkonyeni explained that the farmer received payment for his 
produce on a monthly basis. The profit margin for Philippi 
Enterprises was 10% and the arrangement continued for six 
months but was eventually discontinued by the farmer because 
of the project's non-payment. 
Once the truck had become available it was used to transport 
labourers, brick-layers and plasterers to various construction 
sites. They would return to the project early in the evening. 
Most of the work was done on a contract basis. Occasionally 
however, the project received one-off commissions to build 
private houses, mainly in the 'coloured' areas, and extensions 
to houses in the African areas. 
Pie charts below show the average distribution of staff by 
section during the period of my research and the approximate 
income received by each section between January and September 
1989. 
PHILLIPI ENTERPRISES 






TOTAL STAFF: -47 
APPROXIMATE INCOME PER FUNCTION 
JANUARY 1989 TO SEPTEMBER 1989 
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Consistently the busiest activity involved the repair of taxis 
which were brought from as far afield as Calvinia and George. 
At any one time there would be between 20 and 35 taxis 
awaiting mechanical or body repairs. Throughout the period of 
my research about one third (15 - 20 men) were employed in 
this section. 
The motor repair section of the project was housed in a space 
occupying .one third of the building. The amount of equipment 
available to the workers was minimal. They had no hoists with 
which to take engines out of the vehicles and such tasks had 
to be performed manually. Fluids drained from the vehicles 
were simply poured down the storm drains or left in rusting 
oil cans. Tools, engine· and body parts littered the floor. 
The noise was often deafening and no ear protection was 
available. 
Vehicle respraying was performed outside again with no 
protective equipment. Painting was done with the aid of a 
fairly crude compressor and a spray attachment. I spoke to 
some customers who complained about the quality of work 
arguing that the colours didn't match, that paint had been 
sprayed on windows and bumpers, and that because the vehicle 
was left to dry outside the paint had become pitted with dust. 
The largest space in the building was given over to 
brickmaking. This task was performed by women and, during 
school holidays, young children. Work was manual and 
backbreaking. It involved the shovelling of coarse sand and 
cement into iron-framed brick moulds which pressed twenty 
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bricks at a time. Once loaded, the whole frame had to be 
pushed down several times to compress the mixture into the 
brick shape. Physically I could not operate the machine on my 
own; it took two women working together to do so. 
Other women were responsible for resupplying the presses with 
sand and cement which was brought in by wheelbarrow from an 
outside store. In addition they would stack dried bricks in 
the sun fo! extra baking and load finished bricks onto a truck 
for delivery. Most of the bricks were bought by outside 
companies though some were used for the project's own building 
works. 
Conditions in the brick-making section of the building were 
Dickensian. sunlight would stream through skylights picking 
out the choking dust which filled the air of the hangar-like 
building. Though one end of the buil~ing was completely open 
there was precious little breeze to cool the workers down. 
Children grubby with cement would work all day loading sand 
into barrows and sweeping the floor clean to allow more bricks 
to be laid down. 
During the period when there was little demand for bricks, 
under-employed women from the brick-making section would join 
others from the township to collect used bricks from 
demolished buildings which they would clean and sell at the 
side of the road (see photograph overleaf). 
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4. Donations and Salaries 
For the period August 1988 - August 1989, Philippi Enterprises 
received financial support from the following sources: 




Western Province Council of Churches 
Unemployed Workers Movement 
British Petroleum 
Small Businesses Development 
Corporation 














Two thirds of the above donations were given as "gifts" which, 
donors stipulate, were not required to be repaid. RB, 000 of 
"gift" money was given as a direct response for help in 
payment of rent and other services. The remaining third was 
given in the form of a "loan" which should, donor's urge, be 
paid back at some later, unspecified date. In practice, 
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representatives of donor organisations have informed me, 
projects were not expected to repay such "loans" - rather the 
aim is "to instill a credit ethos" (interview with an American 
Embassy official, June 1990). 
Between August 1987 and December 1989 there were significant 
fluctuations in the numbers of staff working at the project. 
In May 1989 Nkonyeni estimated employee numbers as follows: 
1987 May, 20 employees; July/August, 80; 
December, 30 
1988 January to December, 30 - 100 
1989 May, 47 
In August 1989, with the help of a research assistant, I 
conducted a questionnaire over a three day period and 
interviewed 42 employees. Thirty-four .employees cooperated in 
completing questionnaires. 
During the period of my research, employee numbers also 
fluctuated from day to day. Nkonyeni explained this by saying 
that demand for their produce was unpredictable, and with no 
income no wages could be paid and, understandably, people left 
to seek work elsewhere. 
As the following graph indicates, wage-levels did not remain 
constant during the period of my research. As the graph shows 
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The project operated different wage-levels within and between 
sections. Mechanics (average R65 per week August 1988 - August 
1989) were consistently paid more than the panel beaters 
(average R45 per week). Bricklayers (average R55 per week) 
were paid more than labourers (average R40 per week). And 
everyone, including the administrative staff (average R30 per 
week) were paid more than the women who made the bricks 
(average R22 per week). 
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During particularly lean weeks certain departments would 
receive no wages at all. Between August 1988 and August 1989, 






NON PAID WEEKS PER DEPARTMENT IN 
PHILIPPI ENTERPRISES (OUT OF 50 WEEKS) 
Each section within the project was self-supporting. If a 
particular section was unable to sell its produce then its 
employees would not be paid. Because the demand for bricks is 
seasonal and unpredictable, the women making the bricks were 
the most vulnerable to such fluctuations. 
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5. Employees Profiles and Attitudes 
Siphino Ntloko was born in Cape Town in 1957. During his stay 
in Crossroads (1976 - 1986) he was a friend and work colleague 
of Nkonyeni but was "forced to leave the area in 1986 11 because 
of his association with Nkonyeni and Naphakade and moved to 
Nyanga East. He was educated in Umtata and later in 
Pietermari tzburg where he qualified as a motor mechanic. At 
the time of the interview his household comprised his wife, 
two children and a brother. Including his salary as a 
"training mechanic" the household income totalled R840 per 
month. 
Siphino described himself as a founding member of the project: 
"I am .one of the people who first came here. I can say it 
was through political motivation because our cause was to curb 
poverty among blacks and to create jobs". His position as a 
semi-skilled trainer automatically entitled him to sit on the 
motor section's Representative Committee which met with the 
Executive Committee. "The cooperative is" he argued "the only 
place where one can share skills with other fellow blacks. 
Where one can prove that one is a human being who decides and 
plans in a worker-managed situation. It is the dualistic 
system which excites me most. When I entered the project I 
took an oath that even when there is no money I will sacrifice 
my time and money". 
Siphino acknowledged however, that there were serious problems 
in the project: "As far as I can see the practicalities of 
democratic management are not easy to materialise. The 
coordinators do sometimes assume leadership and sort of 
imitate bosses. People's complaints and suggestions have often 
been ignored. There is now much conflict in the co-op. People 
are not satisfied and conflicts are never resolved. Many 
members have left, others intend to leave soon. Many do not 
attend meetings; those who do, do not want to voice their 
complaints. They are easily persuaded". 
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He concluded: 
"I want to find work somewhere else. If it is a co-op it 
must have lots of people who are semi-skilled like myself. 
There are very limited chances of seeing this project fully 
developed. In a co-op people must feel involved. We are never 
shown the project's records or receipts for things bought. We 
used to be told about money coming in, but not now". 
I first interviewed siphino in May 1989. In August he 
described how the conf 1 ict within the project was worsening. 
He describ~d the different sections breaking away: "We are no 
longer under the umbrella of Philippi Enterprises," he said. 
"We mechanics find our own business and use our own tools. It 
is not true that we have stolen the co-ops equipment and are 
using it for our own profit. Now Nkonyeni controls the 
builders and the bricks. Soon we will have to move away from 
this building". By December Siphino's prophesy had come true 
and Philippi Enterprises effectively ceased operating. 
Mrs Ellen Qumba arrived in Cape Town in 1963 at the age of 30. 
She was accompanied by her husband and two children. Two 
. 
further children remained in Ngqamakhwe. In 1969 Ellen's 
husband died of tuberculosis (TB) "probably because of the 
kind of job he was doing in the factory, it was very cold and 
heavy". At the time of the interview (May 1989) Ellen was 
living in a shack in Old Crossroads where she was supporting 
herself and one school-aged child on the money she received 
from her work at Philippi Enterprises, "about R30 a week, 
sometimes more, sometimes less". 
She joined the project at the beginning of 1989 in the hope 
"that I could earn a salary and could gain skills to start my 
own business. I have done char work and was only paid R20. I 
would like another job because brick-making is hard and I 
don't always earn a wage. Brick-making is seasonal; people do 
not seem to build in the winter but in the summer there's a 
lot". 
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"I like it here because I have some say in what happens. 
As a woman I have never felt dominated by the men here because 
we do tell them whatever does not satisfy us and we are 
allowed to voice out our complaints". 
I interviewed Ellen again in August 1989 shortly before she 
left the project to take up domestic work with her farmer 
"madam" in Green Point. I reminded her of her comments about 
the project: 
"Things are different today. We no longer work together. 
No one comes to the meetings, people are stealing our things, 
we cannot afford to buy sand and there is no money to pay 
wages. Pa Nkonyeni says no more money is coming in from 
overseas". 
When I interviewed Wali Fatyela in May 1989 he had only been 
in Cape Town since January and admitted to it being "very 
different". Wali was 21 years old with a Standard 1 education. 
11 r·1eft Lady Frere to join my brother who has built a home in 
Old Crossroads. He found me this job. I was looking for a job 
that paid RlOO a week but I was glad to get work here where I 
am training as a mechanic". 
"I haven't been paid much yet but they say I will earn 
RSO a week whilst I am still learning: I like not working for 
a white man who makes us always feel terrified. Here there is 
no boss, it is like being self-employed. We have to work hand-
in-hand to develop the project. I have signed the oath which 
says that if anything goes wrong I will stay and work". 
Three months later Wali appeared to have grown in confidence 
and spoke more freely about the project: 
"As far as I am concerned the project is not practically 
operating according to its defined rules. To my judgement the 
fact that this co-op does not have a boss is a myth. Our 
coordinators are our bosses and Mr Nkonyeni is always the 
Chairman. I have come up with complaints several times, 
suggestions and advices in our meetings but no one, especially 
the coordinators takes notice of what is said. They normally 
say they are not going to be told what to do by a young boy. 
Everything I come up with in the meetings is undermined 
because I am young". 
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"No one listens because the qualified, semi-skilled 
people run the department committees and they talk to the 
coordinators, the managers. Mr Nkonyeni always comes up with a 
proposal and a decision, he influences people who then object 
to his opponent. There are rumours that money is coming in 
from agencies but we don't see the people who give this money, 
it is done over the 'phone. I once asked why we don't see the 
receipts I was told I was a nuisance and asked unnecessary 
things". 
Cautious that no one was listening to our conversation his 
final comments were as follows: 
"The bosses are enjoying themselves at our expense. They 
use the telephone for private calls, then they come to us for 
R400 and at the same time tell us we are not going to be paid. 
We are exploited. It's a myth there are no bosses here. There 
are bosses and they are dictators. They do nothing but sit in 
their office and dictate. When the co-op started we were all 
supposed to be involved but not now". 
The comments, observations and disappointments voiced by 
Siphino, Ellen and Wali were repeated to me many times by 
other members of staff. As these interviews show, the level of 
distrust felt by ordinary workers towards the semi-skilled and 
skilled men who sat on the various management committees grew 
in intensity throughout 1989. In December 1989, Nkonyeni 
claimed that Philippi Enterprises collapsed because of its 
inability to meet "inflated rent demands". Others, like Wali 
Fatyela, believed that the rent issue was not the deciding 
factor. It was known, he argued, that unskilled members of 
certain groups {mechanics, panel beaters and construction 
labourers) were planning to break away from Nkonyeni and his 
Executive Committee soon after Christmas. And once that had 
happened the project was bound to collapse. 
The central issue which precipitated the fragmentation of the 
project concerned the nature of the relationship between the 
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management, which comprised Nkonyeni (and for the first two 
months Naphakade) and a group of skilled and semi-skilled 
"trainers" , and the ordinary workers. Each new member of the 
project was given a copy of the proposal letter which claimed 
that Philippi's Enterprises major aim was to provide a 
training centre to launch unemployed people into the job 
market or to begin their own business. After reading the 
letter employees were expected to pledge an oath which would 
bind them to the project even when no money was available to 
pay wages. 
Fatyela believes that this was the key to their exploitation. 
Ordinary members of the project did not at any stage, he 
argues, receive formal training. They were merely assistants, 
often unpaid employees of the management committee. 
Other issues which led to dissent within the group centred on 
the amount of money received from outside agencies and the use 
to which this money was put. The questionnaire I administered 
in the project asked specific questions about employees' 
knowledge of the funding process. Only three of the forty-two 
respondents (Nkonyeni and Khala, who sat on the Executive 
Committee and Wantyi, a secretary) had any knowledge at all of 
the organisations which had funded the project and the amounts 
they had donated. 
Whilst there was no clear evidence of corruption there were 
rumours to the effect that a number of large donations "never 
got beyond the office" (interview with Fatyela, December 
1989). Respondants spoke of "deals" being arranged over the 
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telephone between Nkonyeni and outside agencies. Few of the 
respondents recall ever talking with donor representatives. 
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Chapter Eight 
Spiritual Churches Development Centre 
1. Ministers and Money 
On her return to Cape Town, Nomathemba Matiwana recalls being 
shocked by the conditions she found. Her own home and personal 
belongings had been destroyed by "squatters" who occupied her 
house. But she described the destruction going far deeper into 
the very fabric of township life: 
"People were just walking around - like izitunzela. They 
didn't know what to do. The leaders had gone into hiding or 
were in prison. The 'Fathers' still controlled Crossroads. 
People whose houses had been burned looked for land to build 
shacks. Toise took some to Brown's Farm but there were so 
many. I was afraid for our children. They suffered most from 
the violence. They weren't going to school, they were drinking 
and fighting. People asked me to help" (interview March 1989). 
Matiwana began by contacting representatives of organisations 
with whom she'd worked during the conflict. PFP Members of 
Parliament and party workers wrote letters to would-be funders 
on her behalf. By August 1987 Matiwana together with Nkonyeni 
had formulated plans for the establishment of self-help 
projects. Nkonyeni went ahead and signed a lease on the 'Quilt 
Building' whilst Matiwana attempted to negotiate a lower rent 
with the owners of a vacant warehouse close to that which 
would house Philippi Enterprises. 
In September 1987 Matiwana presented her ideas to a group of 
Spiritual Church ministers based in New Crossroads. 
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"I needed their help" she later told me "to give the 
centre some direction. I am a church person. I left the 
Congregationalists in 1986 and joined the Independent Church 
because they are closer to the people, they are part of our 
community. The ministers could go back to the township and 
call the people to come here. 
But I also need the name of the church. The police still 
do not trust me. I sell 'South' newspaper and they think I am 
a comrade. I wanted to call this place the Spiritual Churches 
Development Centre so the police would think it a holy place 
and leave me alone" (interview March 1989). 
Matiwana wrote to Archbishop Ngada of the Spiritual Churches 
Research apd Theological Institute (SCRTI) in Johannesburg who 
agreed to recognise the project as a Spiritual Church Centre. 
According to Professor G.C.Oosthuizen, Ngada claims to have a 
following of five million people and is regarded by some as 
instrumental in the development of the 
Independent/Indigenous Church movement 
South African 
(personal 
correspondence 3 July 1989). SCRTI would, Ngada assured 
Matiwana, assist the development centre in any way it could. 
By September 1987 Matiwana had made contact with prospective 
funders and secured the involvement of the church and the PFP. 
With the lease on the building signed she now sought people to 
join her venture. Her husband, who was laid off from the 
docks, with an injury received during the Crossroads fighting 
agreed to become involved in the project. Her two sons also 
joined, one skilled in sewing and dressmaking the other 
trained as a carpenter. In addition two women who had earlier 
worked with Matiwana in her New crossroads home moved to 
Philippi. 
By the end of 1987 a core of people comprising four members of 
the Matiwana family, two former work colleagues, and ten 
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churchmen were based at Philippi. Soon after Christmas people 
began arriving at the project from Old Crossroads, Khayelitsha 
and Gugulethu. Most, Matiwana recalled, were unskilled; all 
were unemployed. The majority were women and many had babies 
and young children. As more people arrived it became clear 
that the centre had to offer practical training and teaching 
and creche facilities with some urgency. 
The centre began with three sewing machines and a few 
carpentry tools. During the first few months the centre 
received no income. At this stage of its development it was, 
according to PFP-worker Val Rose Christie, "unsophisticated 
and informal" but was moving, she believed, towards more 
"formal organisation" (correspondence between PFP and Anglo-
American 22 August 1988). 
At the end of December nine of the ten churchmen left the 
project complaining about the lack of money. 
11 I was glad they left, 11 Nomj ole, a woman from the sewing 
group informed me, "all day they sat on their hands waiting 
for the money to arrive. When people came to visit the centre 
they would say to the visitor 'When there are men around you 
come and talk to us, not the women."' (interview July 1989) 
Progress in the project was slow. Restricted by a lack of 
material and poor equipment the members of the project simply 
produced what they wished without any coherent planning. 
Scraps of material donated by a Salt River factory were made 
into dresses and cushion covers. Wood offcuts were nailed 
together to produce benches and tables for the project's use. 
During the first three months the project received no income 
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from sales or donations. Five months after the project had 
begun it had still not produced a funding proposal letter and 
approaches to donors were made through intermediaries like the 
PFP. However, an interest was building and in December 
Matiwana recalled her surprise at seeing "a group of white 
women who just walked into the project carrying bundles of 
material. We all cried when we saw them. They said they had 
heard about us from Operation Hunger and wanted to help" 
(interview August 1989). 
Mid-way through 1989 a letter written largely by a 
representative from the Unemployed Workers Movement, on behalf 
of the project, was produced and despatched to funders. For 
the first time the project was defined as a cooperative. Donor 
interest increased and between November 1987 and mid-1990 the 
Spiritual Churches Development Centre received financial 
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Donations from the Western Province Council of Churches and 
the American Embassy for R20,000 and $2,000 respectively were 
agreed but never received. 
As a recent 'South' article shows (see Appendix A) members of 
the project have attempted to play down the extent of funding 
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received. This can be seen as a conscious effort on their 
part to promote the project as genuinely self-help and self-
sustaining. 
About half of the above money was given as a direct response 
to requests to assist in the payment of outstanding rent and 
other services. The remainder was given for the purchase of 
specific items. The Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT), for 
example, was insistent that receipts for purchases made with 
their donation must be submitted before any future help could 
be considered (interview with I Korber, SCAT, August 1988). 
2. Spiritual Churches at work, Salaries and Expenditure 
Aid money enabled the project to purchase six heavy-duty 
sewing machines, two wood lathes and additional carpentry 
tools. Material and wood off-cuts were either collected from 
factories in town or delivered to the project free of charge. 
PG Wood gave continued support to the project's carpentry 
section and women from Jews for Justice supplied material, 
cotton, braiding and needles. Other supplies were bought from 
wholesalers in town. As part of my involvement in the work of 
the project I regularly took the women to town to buy their 
material. Some wholesalers gave generous discounts when they 
discovered the sort of work the women were engaged in. 
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During my fieldwork the distribution of staff by the project's 
five sections is as follows: 
SPIRITUAL CHURCHES CENTRE DISTRIBUTION OF 





The largest portion of the project's earned income came from 
the sewing group which produced patchwork quilts (R25-45 for a 
single-size and R75-100 for a double-size) , rag-rugs (R25-
RlOO), knotted shoulder bags, cushions, and occasionally 
clothes. Since the project became productive early in 1988 and 
until the time of writing this thesis the sewing group had 
given employment to between twelve and twenty women and one 
man. 
121 
Women talked favourably about working in the sewing group for 
two main reasons. Firstly they said it enabled them to do the 
sort of work they enjoyed and gave them the freedom to be 
creative. And secondly it gave the women a chance to be 
together in one room where they could talk and sing. 
Since it became productive the carpentry section employed 
between five and twelve men. It produced mainly furniture 
(tables, chairs, cupboards, benches and chests) for the 
township market, also receiving occasional orders from local 
charity groups and organisations such as the Red Cross and the 
South African Christian Leadership Association. It also 
produced toys such as rocking horses, and dog kennels. 
Carpenters told me that often they struggled to sell their 
produce: 
"Our greatest problem," Sidwell told me "is that we don't 
have the skills to make really good things. These things we 
make can not be sold in the city, they are not good enough. 
But they are too expensive for the township people. And we use 
too much wood to make things. We need someone to train us" 
(interview, August 1989). 
During the summer months the project employed two further 
people to make cement bricks on a small piece of land adjacent 
to the building. This, Matiwana informed me, was very 
profitable when there was a demand. For a short period of time 
in 1990 a representative from the Unemployed Workers Movement 
encouraged the project to buy fibreglass moulding equipment to 
make baths. The equipment was bought, but as I later explain, 
was never used. Earlier plans for a school failed to 
materialise when the teacher left after only three weeks 
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explaining that he could not afford to work without being 
paid. 
In the area between the carpentry section and the sewing room 
the project members constructed a small kitchen with creche 
facilities. There were normally four or five very young 
children, who, each day, were brought to the project by their 
mothers. Each member contributed an amount of money to 
purchase bread, soup, tea and milk which provided one meal a 
day and two tea breaks for all the members of staff. 
Unlike Philippi Enterprises, wage-levels were the same for all 
members of the Spiritual Church Centre. The following graph 
shows the fluctuations in average monthly wages over a two-
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The average monthly salary for this period was R65. The sudden 
increase in wages in September 1988 is due to a financial 
injection into the project from a funder. Once that additional 
income had been exhausted wage-levels again dropped until a 
further donation was made. 
As the graph belows shows during particularly lean periods 
when the project received little or no income wages were not 

















WEEKLY SALARIES PAID TO SPIRITUAL CHURCHES CENTRE 
BETWEEN MAY 1988 AND AUGUST 1988 
1 2 3 , 2 3 -4 
"'1AV .JUI_V AUGUST 
124 
Wilfred Wentzel, a fieldworker with SALDRU, spent five weeks 
with the project in 1989 during which time he organised 
seminars for project members on the principles of 
cooperativism, marketing and pricing. He concluded that unless 
the project underwent significant changes it would not survive 
without the continuing support of donors (interview with 
Wentzel, April 1990). 
Having spent extended periods with members of the project and 
having been given full access to their accounts it does not 
appear that funds were misappropriated. Members of the 
project showed a keen awareness of the problems they faced. 
During regular weekly meetings, many of which I attended, they 
discussed the pitfalls that lay in the way of small-scale 
projects attempting to compete as self-help-oriented economic 
units alongside profit-driven businesses. 
The Spiritual Churches Centre, like other community-based 
projects, was set up under very different conditions with 
different objectives from those of conventional business 
enterprises. It was established during a period of crisis, it 
is situated in an area of economic marginality and has limited 
access to capital and markets required to sustain a business. 
It is competing for a share of what is becoming a highly 
competitive township market. Its members had no, or very 
little, experience of, or exposure, to the organisation of an 
enterprise. 
Furthermore, members of the project were largely drawn from 
the unemployed who had low levels of skill and no access to 
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capital. Semi-skilled workers, like Nomathemba Matiwana, were 
constantly required to train new members before they could 
become productive. In its performance the Spritual Churches 
project fitted the ideal-type of cooperative outlined in a 
recent SALDRU Policy Paper (No 5, 1989): it was (1) involved 
in labour intensive activitives; (2) made use of inferior 
quality machinery; (3) seldom made a profit; and (4) survived 
through total reliance on external funding (1989:5). 
Spiritual Churches Development centre: Beyond Dependency 
"Many people have come to this project since we started. 
Some like you come from the University to write about us. Many 
people come from overseas. Some people make us promises about 
money and help which never comes. Many times we have had to 
tell people to go away because they do not want to help us, 
they want to take us over" (interview, December 1989). 
and skills) , actions by donors and corruption 
process of aid giving, and an inability to 
"hostile capitalist market". Explanations 
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in the whole 
compete in a 
for failure 
therefore were projected outwards away from groups themselves. 
Funders on the other hand tended to concentrate on the 
internal workings of the projects. The example of leaders like 
Nkonyeni who, it is widely believed, misused funds, is often 
spoken about within donor circles as a typical reason for 
failure. Other explanations centre on the sheer inefficiency 
and lack of planning that characterise such small-scale 
township-based ventures. 
Management, as this Workteam cartoon implies is a difficult 
issue for self-help, cooperative-type groups and one which 
causes much dissent. 
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There is, as Matiwana and Walters (1986) have noted, an almost 
zealous, ideological commitment within community-based groups 
to forms of organisation which are seen as anti-capitalist and 
'progressive'. One manifestation of this is the denial of 
leaders or managers. Matiwana and Walters place this tendency 
against the backdrop of 'progressive organisations' call for 
participatory democracy. 
The call .for democracy, they argue, has shaped the internal 
practices of organisations in a concrete way (1986:65). Within 
the Spiritual Churches project there was a clear commitment to 
these principles. During my interviews with members of the 
project there was a continuous and conscious effort on the 
part of the interviewees to play down outsiders' inference 
that Matiwana was the project's leader or manager. Matiwana 
would make considerable efforts to ensure that as a 
researcher, I did not single her out for special attention. 
On a number of occasions I made arrangements to meet her 
alone, often at the weekend, only to find that she had asked 
six or more people to accompany her. 
It is my impression however, that the effect of this adherence 
to 'democratic principles' had the unintended consequence of 
investing all leadership responsibility in the hands of the 
coordinator. Ordinary members showed, as Matiwana repeated to 
me on many occasions, no inclination to take over 
responsibilities. By denying the existence of management 
positions, project members ignored the necessity of management 
structures in ensuring efficient administration. 
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The resulting inefficiency and vulnerability was exposed on 
many occasions during the period of my research. It took one 
major set of events which almost resulted in the project's 
disintegration to effectively jolt the members out of their 
complacency. 
2. unemployed workers Movement (UWM) and the Spiritual 
Churches centre 
Community-based groups like the Spiritual Churches Centre and 
Philippi Enterprises are caught in a web of interest which 
sees organisations competing for influence over them. Since 
1976 this competition has, according to Ruiters, intensified 
with the state-led systematic crackdown on progressive 
organisations. In a bid to extend their political activity, 
left-wing groups have, he argues, focussed on cooperativism 
and self-help as areas of organisatio~ in which long-term and 
more substantial involvement could maintain their members' 
interest. Trade Unions too, Ruiters argues, are addressing the 
issue of cooperatives as part of their mobilisation strategy 
as they grapple with the problem of organising the unemployed 
(Ruiters 1989:4). 
During December 1988, and January and February 1989 the 
Spiritual Churches Centre became the focus of attention of one 
such organisation, the Unemployed Workers Movement - a COSATU 
project which "aims to bring the unemployed together in one 
union" - which was seeking to become politically recognised 
through its involvement in community groups as a service 
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organisation. Its self-appointed role was to pass on skills to 
the township's unemployed. 
At this time Matiwana was absent from the project on a Roman 
catholic Church/Dutch sponspored visit to the Simukai rural 
cooperative near Harare, Zimbabwe. In her absence a series of 
events occurred which, according to Mzayiya, "almost destroyed 
the project". 
In mid-December 1988 'Faisal' (a pseudonym) introduced himself 
to the project members as a "trained employee of the 
Unemployed Workers Movement" who had been sent by the 
Government's Department of Manpower to train the unemployed 
and unskilled. Mzayiya explains the feelings of the women in 
the sewing group: 
"He said he had come to train the unemployed. But we told 
him we were not unemployed. If he went outside into the 
township he would see lots of people ~ho were without work. We 
were not sure about the Government getting involved in our 
work. We said who is paying you? He said the Unemployed 
Workers Movement but later we knew he was being paid R2000 a 
month by Manpower. 
"Faisal stayed and spoke to us about what we should be 
doing. He said the women should not do women's work like 
sewing. They should do carpentry and work with fibreglass. He 
promised to send trained people in to look after our accounts 
with computers. We didn't tell him not to come. We should have 
done." (interview, August 1989) 
Mzayiya telephoned me and asked if I would come to the project 
the following day when Faisal was due to return. 
Faisal arrived at the Spiritual Churches project early the 
following day accompanied by two white UWM employees whom he 
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introduced as accountants. Faisal called a meeting and told 
the group which numbered only twelve people, since many had 
already "left for the Transkei", that he was there to help 
them and he held up a , cheque for Rl, 049 "to pay wages and 
rent". He explained that cooperatives like the Spiritual 
Churches could not expect to get something for nothing and 
would have to pay him R800 for the months of January and 
February. 
"We were not sure what to do" Mzayiya recalled later. 
"Without Ma Matiwana we could not make a decision. So we let 
him stay" (interview, August 1989) 
Over the next few days the accountants sifted boxes of 
reoeipts and organised the details with the help of a lap-top 
computer. Faisal remained in the office, often talking on the 
telephone, as the women remained in the sewing room and the 
two carpenters worked outside. I discussed with him his plans 
for the project. 
"This place has great potential but they have to be 
organised" he said. "Nearly all of these women's groups in the 
townships are making quilts and rugs. There are too many of 
them. It is because they don't have any other skills. But 
there are so many things which people want in the township. 
Baths, for example. In Khayeli tsha people want cheap, small 
and light baths. All these people need to do is to learn how 
to use fibreglass" (interview, January 1989). 
In January Faisal attempted to instigate three changes in the 
running of the project which met with immediate resistance. 
First he instructed the women to leave the sewing room and to 
join the men in the main part of the building where they would 
be taught to laminate. He had bought over R3000 worth of 
fibreglass moulding equipment towards the cost of which the 
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UWM contributed a little over RlOOO. The remaining costs were 
met from the project's saving account. 
The women refused to leave the sewing room. At the time 
Mzayiya spoke for the women by saying that they had orders to 
complete and could not disappoint loyal customers. Privately, 
Agreenet told me, the women would not give up their sewing 
because it was work that they were good at and enj eyed. A 
stalemate was reached during which time Faisal became agitated 
and demanded of me, "Why aren't these people willing to be 
trained. We go to all this trouble but these people will not 
look to the future". 
Faisal made two further demands. He insisted that the project 
should no longer allow outside visitors other than those from 
the UWM. And further that the project would no longer accept 
money from outside agencies. Mzayiya again represented the 
group by saying that such a decision would have to be taken by 
all members of the project. Privately she told me that the 
women in the group were upset by his demands. They enj eyed 
seeing visitors. Whilst many made unfulfilled promises some 
did help the group and they would always be welcome. 
Throughout January and into the beginning of February the 
women continued to refuse to cooperate with Faisal. As workers 
began returning to the project after their holiday Faisal 
admitted to me that he was feeling increasingly unwelcome. On 
February 12, I visited the project and the women confronted 
Faisal and insisted that he left. Mzayiya told him, 
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"You didn't come here to help the people. You only came 
to tell us what to do, who to see and what to make. You are 
living off us. But we thank you because you have shown us not 
to trust the UWM". 
Faisal left and later told a SALDRU worker "I was sick and 
tired of those lazy kaffirs. The women always tried to 
undermine me and the carpenters never worked" (interview with 
SALDRU researcher, August 1989). 





after Faisal was forced to leave the 
the project received a "Letter of 
from the UWM. The text of the letter is 




LETTER OF SUSPENSION 
It is with great shock that the UWM discovered a 
contract that was signed between· yourselves and the 
government of the United States. 
Comrades, progressives cannot take money from this 
government. The history of the U.S.A. government is 
written in the blood of workers the world over 
The U.S.A. government invaded vietnam and killed 
hundreds of thousands of vietnamese in an attempt to 
save capitalism. It is the U.S.A. government that 
is donating arms and billions of dollars to Onita to 
fight against the people of Nicaragua and to the 
Afghan rebels to fight against the people of 
Afghanistan. Comrades, I am only mentioning a very, 
very small part of the bloodthirsty,barbaric,anti-
worker activities of the U.S.A. government. This is 
the main reason why we do not accept their money, or 
why we cannot accept a co-operative that does. 
Secondly comrades, the Americans never donate 
anything for nothing. We note the contract that 
whatever their money buys, belongs to them. It is 
aslo clear comrades, that if they disagree with your 
direction, they have the right to take back their 
equipment. Comrades, with out equipment, there can 
be no Buthisizwe. This means that effectively the 
government of the U.S.A. controls Buthisizwe. 
Furthermore comrades, the Executive was shocked 
that, you kept this information away from the U.W.M. 
We do not know what else you are keeping away from 
the U.W.M. This means that we cannot trust the 
project anymore. 
Finally, comrades, you agreed to sell equipment to 
the U.W.M. which does not belong to you. This is 
dishonestly of the highest order. 
In conclusion, comrades, we set out above the 
reasons why we, the Executive Committee of the 
u.w.M. decided to suspend you from the U.W.M. until 
the P.C. meeting on 23 and 24 February 1989. We are 
in fact asking you to choose between the U.W.M. and 
the government which has more blood of workers on 
its hands than even Hitler had. With immediate 
effect we withdraw all U.W.M. officials, advisors, 
and the trainer from the project." 
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The letter was read aloud to all the members of the project 
who expressed their anger at its intimidatory tone - and the 
threats it contained. A response was typed by Mzayiya and 
immediately despatched to the UWM. The letter read as follows: 
11 20 February 1989 
Dear Comrade 
We are dismayed 
manner in which 
movement. 
and surprised 





We feel it is totally contrary to the democratic 
spirit that you have passed judgment without having 
had the opportunity to hear both sides of the 
situation. We feel that it is grossly unfair that 
you have judged us according to the words of your 
worker without our knowledge, especially as our Co-
ordinator, is away at present in Harare. 
We would therefore request that the suspension not 
be discussed until such time as we are able to be 
fully represented at any meeting. 
Yours in the struggle 
MEMBERS OF THE SPIRITUAL CHURCHES CO-OP." 
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I later learned from a diplomat who was responsible for 
administering the Canadian Government's aid budget in South 
Africa that the project was caught in an ongoing war of words 
between on the one hand COSATU and the UWM and on the other 
the American Government. 
In 1987, the UWM's Secretary General claimed to have uncovered 
what it called a "CIA plot" which involved an attempt by 
American agents to infiltrate left-wing township-based 
organisations under cover of community development programmes. 
One of the organisations apparently targeted by the American 
Embassy was the UWM. Whatever the truth of the accusations, 
the diplomat commented, relations between the American Embassy 
anci township groups became so strained that a diplomat was 
recalled to Washington and the then Ambassador, Edward J 
Perkins, was called in to "mend fences". The affair lead to 
the temporary suspension of the American aid programme in the 
Western Cape. 
Whilst at the project Faisal had not mentioned the fact that 
he was aware that the Spiritual Churches project members had 
received money from American and other overseas governments. 
The members of the project rejected the UWM's claim that they 
had tried to conceal this fact. 
On her return to Cape Town on 22 February, Matiwana recalls 
finding the project members anxious but resolute in their 
determination not to bow down to pressure from the UWM. I was 
present at the project when she returned. Matiwana read the 
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letters and addressed what turned out to be an emotional 
meeting. 
"Whilst I have been away I have learned how important it 
is" she said "that we have our independence. In Zimbabwe the 
government is helping cooperatives and groups like ours. In 
South Africa they do not want us to succeed so we must work 
harder. It is important that we find people with the money and 
the skills to help us achieve our goals but we must control 
what we do and how we do it. In Simukai people get up very 
early and work in all parts of the farm. Everyone learns to do 
lots of jobs that way if someone is ill someone else can take 
over their work. By doing this they aren't vulnerable like we 
are. 
When I was away you couldn't decide what to do. You can 
see that it is wrong to rely on me. But you knew that Faisal 
was wrong and you were right to tell him to go. 
At Simukai I learned we must show people with our 
language, we must love our language. We blacks are scared of 
people who speak English. But we can learn not to be nervous. 
I have spoken to Archbishop Ngada; he has told me that we 
must stay together because we are an example to others around. 
I have also 
causing trouble. 
They know COSATU 
Americans that is 
spoken to Masifundise who say the UWM are 
They are trying to get noticed by COSATU. 
do not like groups accepting money from the 
why they spied on us. 
It is wise that we come together. But not to come 
together at the same time. COSATU and the National Unemployed 
Workers Coordinating Committee tried to direct coops under one 
roof but we are not strong enough. our people are afraid that 
they are being used. 
I have also spoken with Pa Nkonyeni and we have decided 
to bring all the groups, together to discuss what we can do 
about funders and service organisations. If we come together 
and share ideas we will be strong and outsiders will not be 
able to take us over". 
A two-day weekend conference was organised to take place at 
the University of the Western Cape at the end of June. On the 
opening Saturday it was arranged that cooperative-type groups 
from the Cape Flats would come together to discuss their 
problems and tactics for the Sunday joint meeting between the 
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projects and service organisations. By the close of Saturday, 
however, the project members - encouraged, a SALDRU researcher 
recalled, by Matiwana and supported by community leaders 
(which included representatives from the Montagu-Ashton 
Community Centre, MAG) voted not to participate in the 
following day's joint meeting. 
Matiwana recalls this as being a crucial decision for township 
groups. For the first time, she argued, a significant number 
of groups had come together and had in effect said to the 
service organisations "we need your help but on our terms". 
Out of the Saturday meeting emerged a coordinating committee 
comprising a representative from Masifundise and MAG and 
Nkonyeni and Matiwana. At the time of writing this thesis 
(April 1991) the committee still exists but, according to a 
British Consulate representative, "has no real teeth" 
(interview, April 1991). 
3. Conclusion 
The events early in 1989 marked a watershed for the members of 
the Spiritual Churches project. From that point on they began 
to formulate a greater understanding of the context within 
which they were operating. They began to discuss the poor 
performance of the project in terms of dependency. As I have 
already said small-scale projects like the Spiritual Churches 
Centre have always tended to seek explanations for poor 
performance outside of their own circumstances: i.e. in the 
actions of donors, service organisations and other intrusive 
organisations. This attitude has, in part, led to a continuous 
138 
state of distrust felt by the project members - the recipients 
of aid towards donors. Such distrust culminated in the 
decision taken at the UWC meeting. 
This greater understanding however, prompted the project 
members to begin looking inwards in search of explanations for 
ineffectiveness. There evolved a realisation that they had 
become far too dependent upon Matiwana as the project's leader 
and coordinator. As it happened her motivations for beginning 
the project were, in my estimation, genuine. I could find no 
evidence of corrupt practices in the running of the Centre. 
However, it is shown in the history of Philippi Enterprises 
that this tendency to reject authority can, as D'Souza (1991) 
has noted in another context, result, paradoxically, in an 
embrace of authoritarianism. 
Small-scale self-help type projects like the Spiritual 
Churches centre and Philippi Enterprises collapse or barely 
survive for a whole range of reasons. It was clear from my 
research that both projects were poorly administered and 
organised. They were under-skilled and chronically under-
resourced in terms of appropriate machinery and materials. The 
aid-giving and receiving process is riddled with corruption. 
Donors are often ill-informed about development and its pit-
falls, donor organisations tend not to cooperate and often 
pursue independent and incompatible strategies for reasons of 
short-term political gain. 
But, elsewhere in the world, there are examples of small-scale 
community development projects, succeeding in their bid to 
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increase opportunities for the disadvantaged ( see McDowell, 
1990). The Panos Institute (1989) has written about successful 
credit schemes, the World Bank (Salmen, 1987) about 
participatory development. 
But what seems significant about the sort of small-scale 
projects represented in this thesis by Philippi Enterprises 
and the Spiritual Churches Centre are the attitudes into which 
the project members have been socialised. Firstly, I have 
earlier described the corrupted-headman-style of traditional 
leadership which dominated Old Crossroads and to which the 
majority of the members of both projects were subjected for so 
many years. Cole (1987) and Glover {1987) have described they 
way in which Ngxobongwana and other leaders built a 
traditional-leadership structure through the use of metaphors 
and allegories. Residents of informal settlements turned to, 
and actively sought out, this kind of strong authority thus 
giving it a legitimacy which was siezed upon by the State and 
local security forces. 
Similarly undemocratic structures characterised 'progressive 
organisations' which emerged as political, church and welfare 
groups. African's historical experience, therefore, of the 
State, of local leadership and of supposedly representative 
organisations has been one of non-participation. The members 
of the project were socialised into an attitude of non-
participation which allowed leaders like Nkonyeni to prosper 
and to take advantage of opportunities provided by donor 
agencies which did nothing, and were perhaps powerless, to 
address this situation. 
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Amongst members of the Spiritual Churches project, notions of 
leadership and management were denied in line with 
'progressive discourse', .but authority was vested in the hands 
of Matiwana. Intervention by the UWM, which may have led to 
the collapse of the project, exposed the weakness of the 
organisation as a result of this attitude, but also exposed 
the need for the membership to re-evaluate their own position. 
Such re-evaluation demanded a far more complex understanding 
of the context within which the project was operating. Members 
began to look closely at the motivations of funders, the 
misuse of funds by service organisations, but also at their 
own responsibility to be answerable for resources and the uses 
to which they are put. The realisation was about the need for 
initiative and self-reliance in the development process. 
Just how successful this new approach ~ill be requires further 
study and is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a 
crucial element determining future success or failure of 
small-scale community-based projects like 





involvement of overseas and local donors in the development 
process. In the following section I examine the extent of 
funding for community development projects in South Africa 
(but particularly in the Western Cape) , the administrative 
practices and motivations which lay behind funder's 
involvement. 
Trevor Manuel has recently argued that funder-policy has been 
instrumental in creating a culture of dependency. Foreign 
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funding in particular, he argues, has produced a never-ending 
supply of money which goes to those who write the best 
proposal letters, supports privileged students; enables people 
to sit in unproductive coops; corrupts entire layers of 
people; demands little accountability; and provides sheltered 
employment for political activists. In essence, Manuel argues, 
easy money may be destroying "the struggle" ('South', March 14 
- March 20). 
Part Four 
Funders ot community Development 
Chapter Ten 
Community Development as a component ot 
Official Foreign Development Aid in south Africa 
1. Introduction 
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In Chapter Two of this thesis I used, with some 
circumspection, a United Nations definition of community 
development as a 'process by which the efforts of the people 
are united with those of the government to improve the 
economic, social and cultural condition of communities, and 
their integration into a framework of national development' 
(UN Report, 1986: 100). It is common practice that the link 
between 'the people' (recipients of aid) and funders (the 
state and other agencies) is achieved partly through the 
participation of charities, trusts and voluntary agencies 
known collectively as non-governmental development 
organisations (NGOs) (Twose, 1985:10). 
NGOs, de Silva (1989) has recently argued, have a crucial role 
to play in the process of local-level and people-centred 
community development. Where NGOs are invited by a government 
to assist in community development programmes they can be a 
valuable source of expertise and financial and technical 
assistance. Furthermore, state-led development initiatives are 
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Chapter Nine 
Spiritual Churches Development centre: Beyond Dependency 
"Many people have 6ome to this project since we started. 
Some like you come from the University to write about us. Many 
people come from overseas. Some people make us promises about 
money and help which never comes. Many times we have had to 
tell people to go away because they do not want to help us, 
they want to take us over" {interview, December 1989). 
1. Introduction 
There has been, as Ruiters {1989) has pointed out, a tendency 
to romanticise the work of community-based, cooperative-
oriented projects. They are often seen as or construed as 
being, peaceful, harmonious organisations conf arming to 
idealised conceptions implied by the notion of self-management 
{1989:6). ·My own fieldwork has shown this image to be 
misleading. 
Discord within self-help projects emerges largely as a result 
of poor performance. It is my impression, however, that 
project members perceive or at least assert quite different 
explanations for failure of projects than those perceived by 
funders or researchers. In the course of my fieldwork I spoke 
to coordinators and members of about twelve community-based 
self-help type groups and sought their reasoning for poor 
performance of such groups. 
It was most commonly argued by project members that projects 
failed because of factors which were thought beyond their 
control. These factors included a lack of resources {financial 
Photograph 3. British Foreign Secretary and No:mathemba 
)[atiwana in the Spiritual Churches project. 
Photograph 2. Township diplomacy in action. British Foreign 
Secretary and the international media in 
Brown's Farm. 
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often perceived to be top-down impositions and NGOs have been 
seen to play a crucial negotiating role by promoting the 
active participation of 'the people' themselves as integral 
partners in the development process (De Silva, 1989 (see 
Panos, 1989):xii; see also Drabek, 1987 and Bratton, 1990). 
Development in any country is often determined, Robertson 
(1984) has noted, by the interests of the state, and is 
frequently. an important mechanism by which the state attempts 
to exert control over its people (1984:154). This is certainly 
the case in South Africa where state-led community development 
has not been characterised by an exchange between the 
government and the targets of aid (see AFRA Newsletter ( 1), 
1988: 8) . Instead most development initiatives have, Fischer 
(1988) argues, been centrally planned and dominated by state 
ideology (1988:125). 
Unlike in India or Latin America, from where de Silva 
catalogues successful cooperation between funder, recipient 
and NGO, South Africa's international isolation over the past 
three decades has seen the virtual complete refusal of NGOs to 
cooperate with South African government development 
programmes. Although, as I later explain, this position is 
now changing. 
A small number of international welfare organisations in 
addition to domestic organisations have maintained a presence 
in South Africa but their intervention has been relatively 
low-key and independent of the state. Their involvement has 
tended largely to be project-aid directed at community-level 
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nutrition, health, education, small-scale shack-upgrading, 
income-generation and emergency relief. Large-scale, multi-
million dollar, IMF-type infrastructural projects have not 
thus far been undertaken in South Africa (although there has 
been some regional cooperation) but again with the 
international community giving support to increased Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 
cooperation this is likely to change (see Whiteside, 1990). 
The profile of development aid in South Africa has been 
changing over the past decade, and with the opening-up of 
political dialogue, the release of political prisoners and 
very real steps towards the dismantling of the full apparatus 
of apartheid, South Africa's status as a donor or funder, and 
as a recipient of aid, will undoubtedly undergo further 
changes. 
International organisations and their various agencies and 
World Bank, International 
European Community, Lome 
ins ti tut ions (United Nations, 
Monetary Fund, the Commonwealth, 
Convention countries), as well as independent charity and 
development agencies (Oxfam, Medecin Sans Frontieres, Save the 
Children) are beginning to open new, mostly informal channels 
of communication both with the South African government and 
with other non-governmental organisations. 
My immediate concern in this thesis, however, is with the 
increased interest shown, since the mid-1980s, in community 
development programmes by international and local funders. In 
this chapter I enquire into the sources of official overseas 
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funding for community development projects as part of foreign 
government's overall aid programmes in South Africa. I 
examine the extent of aid given, apparent motivations behind 
donor's actions, and the administration of their programmes. 
2. Foreign Government's Aid Programmes 
It is, as Ramphele (1991) has written, difficult to find a 
credible estimate of the level of inflow of funds into South 
Africa for development work but it is likely to run into 
hundreds of millions of rands a year. I estimate official aid 
at R625m this figure includes Scandinavian government money 
which is administered outside of South Africa. 
Extent of Official Foreign Funding - Britain, Canada and USA. 
British Aid 
Date Aid Started: 
Amounts Donated: 
Number of Projects 
Sponsored 
Amount Donated to 
Community Development 
Donations to S~!tors 





















79( 2 ) 
34( 2 ) 
R 1 480. 000 (3) 
R 2 000. 000 (3) 
R 2 100.000<3> 
R 4 275.000< 4 > 
R 4 165.000 
Education (Scholarships 





R 1 965.000 
R 500.000 
R 1 500.000 
R 100.000 
R 100.000 
(1) Britain's Voice in South Africa (1988:19) 
(2) Confidential Source 
(3) British Aid statistics, 1985-1989 Table 18 pp. 24-25 
(4) British Parliamentary Report 1991:44 
Canadian Aid(l) 
Date Aid started 
Amounts Donated 
Number of Projects 
Sponsored 
Amount Donated to 
Community Development 
Donations to Sectors 






























R 6 100.000 
R 400.000 
R 2 000.000 
R 2 800.000 
R 4 900.000 
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(1) Private Correspondence with Canadian Government, August 
1989 
United States Aid 
Date Aid started (1) 






R 42 000.000 
R 60 000.000 
R 80 000.000 
RlOO 000 0000 
Number of fjfject 1987/88 47 
Sponsored 1988/89 62 
1989/90 81 
1990/91 90 
Amounts Donated to 1987/88 R 875.000 
Community Development 1988/89 R 1 125.000 
. 1989/90 ~ r §88:888 1990/91 
(1) USAID Report 1990 
(2) Private Correspondence (US Embassy) 
(3) Private Correspondence (USAID) 
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The paucity of records of in-coming donations is partly, 
Ramphele believes, a result of the secrecy bred by years of 
repressive laws by the state to discourage funding for 
resistance groups inside the country I would also add that 
amongst donors there is a good deal of self-censorship which 
leads to a reluctance to talk about their funding practices: 
Simon Barber has called them 'shy bureaucracies' ('Sunday 
Times', 22 October 1990). 
Foreign funding enters South Africa from a wide variety of 
sources including foreign governments, international 
organisations, multinational corporations, charity and welfare 
groups, unions and political parties. Successive South African 
governments have attempted, through various Bills - the most 
recent of which is the Disclosure of Foreign Funding Bill 
(1989) to exert control over foreign funding and, some 
commentators believe, by extension to 'disrupt the activities 
of opposition groups' (private correspondence EC governments, 
July 1989). Western governments have been vocal opponents of 
such restrictions. Significant and increasing amounts of money 
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have been devoted in recent years to projects and programmes 
in South Africa by foreign governments. 
The most significant donor governments to development 
programmes in South Africa are the representatives of those 
countries with whom South Africa has the longest established 
cultural, financial, trade and military 1 inks. Aid committed 
by foreign governments is, as Mosley (1987) has written, 'an 
expenditure designed to further objectives of foreign and 
commercial policy' (1987:85). Foreign government's first and 
foremost aim in devising foreign policy is to protect their 
own interests and opportunities in world regions (Northedge, 
19~4:250). This aim is pursued through diplomatic and cultural 
ties, aid and trade. 
During the past decade western government's diplomacy, aid and 
trade policy towards South Africa has to be seen against the 
backdrop of sanctions which have been the main external method 
of exerting pressure for the dismantling of apartheid ( for a 
discussion of the sanctions/disinvestment debate, see Orkin, 
1989 and Adler, 1989; for Britain's view, see 'Sowetan', 19 
November 1987). Britain, and to a lesser extent former West 
Germany and Japan, consistently refused to join other 
countries in tightening restrictive measures on South Africa, 
arguing that sanctions harmed the interests of those who were 
most harmed by apartheid. 
At a European Council meeting in Rome in December 1990 
European countries agreed to lift their bans on new investment 
which effectively began the process which, led to the removal 
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of sanctions. At the same time as announcing their decision to 
ease restrictions on trade with South Africa, European 
Community countries and in mid-1991 the US government 
recommitted themselves to support "the victims of apartheid" 
through a strengthened aid programme of "positive measures" 
(Foreign Affairs Committee Report, 1991: 36). These measures 
have recently been described in a UK Parliamentary Report as 
'a practical demonstration of our (British Government's) 
commitment to the creation of a just, democratic and non-
racial society in south Africa' (1991:44). 
The lifting of sanctions therefore is accompanied by an 
increase in aid donations. "Positive measures" designed to 
assist South Africans who have been cast as "victims" fall 





Aid, Emergency Relief, Housing 
Development. Funds for overseas 
government aid programmes are drawn either from the sending 
government's development department (eg. the British overseas 
Development Administration (ODA), US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA)) or from overseas diplomatic funds which are set aside 
for specific geographic purposes (eg. the British Head of 
Missions Gift Scheme, us Ambassador's Scheme under authority 
of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Canada Fund for 
Local-Initiatives). 
Political Aid is by far the most contentious category of 
foreign funding (see Ramphele, 1991). Simon Barber, for 
example, recently highlighted a discrepancy in USAID's 1988 
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Report on South Africa which left more than half of their 
budget unaccounted for. He concluded, 'In short, the grants 
and contracts do not show up in the books because AID's south 
African hands have be.en running a slush fund for the 
revolution' ('Sunday Times', 22 October 1990). 
Sinclair (1986) has also exposed the way in which American 
money has been 'misdirected' and he concludes, 'there is a 
deep susp~cion among important sectors of the black community 
that the United States has imperialist designs on South 
Africa. The fear is that the United States will attempt to 
subvert (through the use of Political Aid) the liberation 
struggle and coopt the black leaders that best represent black 
interests' (1986:72). 
suspicion and hostility towards foreign governments who are 
seen to give unaccountable support to, for example, political 
parties, leading political figures or 'labour union training' 
is likely to increase as the demands on foreign governments to 
give becomes greater. 
Education Aid takes the lion's share of foreign government's 
bilateral aid programmes in South Africa. Such aid can be 
categorised as follows: scholarships for undergraduates 
attending South African higher education institutes; provision 
of funds for local education initiatives (pre-school to adult 
literacy and 'alternative education'); support for South 
African labour education initiatives; scholarships for 
undergraduates attending overseas universities; and 
contributions to education NGOs operating in south Africa. 
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The British Government allocates approximately 80% of its 
bilateral aid programme to Education Aid: in 1990 it supported 
about 1000 black South Africans in higher education, both in 
South Africa and in Britain; it also committed a large part of 
available funds to technical cooperation projects in non-state 
primary and secondary black schools (UK Parliamentary Report 
1991:44). 
Remaining funds are given as a response to specific Emergency 
Relief demands (eg. rehousing flood victims, refugees from 
conflict or forced removals); in Housing Aid, for example, to 
underwrite the Urban Foundation's recent scheme to provide 
low-cost owner-occupied homes and in Community Development 
which I discuss below. 
such monies are distributed through several channels, but in 
all cases, embassy officials were quick to inform me, none of 
the monies provided by foreign governments were given to, or 
received by the South African Government. 
The largest portion of 
administered directly 
scattered throughout 
overseas government aid money is 
by staff of diplomatic missions 
South Africa. Other monies are 
distributed indirectly in partnership with sending-country or 
South African non-governmental organisations and institutions 
or through international institutions linked, for example, to 
the United Nations or the European Community. Embassy or 
consular officials who administer 




I have been 
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informed by representatives of various diplomatic missions in 
South Africa however, that this position is likely to change 
and, in the near future, aid specialists will be brought in to 
oversee their expanding development programmes. 
Representatives of some diplomatic missions showed a 
reluctance to disclose to me the amount of bilateral aid their 
government have committed to assistance in South Africa (Alan 
Whiteside, (forthcoming) experienced similar problems). 
USAID's annual report (the "yellow book") is, for example, 
classified as a 'confidential' document not available to the 
general public. 
Some governments, however, most notably the British Government 
whose bilateral programme started in 1979 and has expanded 
rapidly since, and the Canadian Government, have publicised 
their involvement quite widely (see 'Britain Voice in South 
Africa', 1988). 
3. Diplomatic Aid Aiding Diplomacy 
A recent report drafted by a British House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee contained a number of observations and 
recommendations about future British Government policy towards 
South Africa. Aid policy dominated their recommendations. 
Currently there is much debate about the linking of foreign 
aid to political questions and the issue of "good governance". 
Douglas Hurd the British Foreign Secretary spelled out British 
Government policy at a recent conference: 
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"Countries which tend towards pluralism, public 
accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights, 
market principles, should be encouraged. Governments which 
persist with repressive policies, corrupt management, wasteful 
discredited economic systems should not expect us to support 
their folly with scarce aid resources which could be better 
used elsewhere' (address to overseas Development Institute 
Conference, London, June 1990). 
Government-to-government aid has long been linked to political 
and economic conditionality (Twose, 1985:10) but in the future 
it is likely that conditions will be more strictly adhered to. 
It would seem likely that this need for "value for money" in 
aid expenditure at the macro-level will be reflected in micro-
level, or what is sometimes called "sectoral aid" (Sandbrook, 
1982: 8), of which community development programmes in South 
Africa are a part. In South Africa, however, this is not the 
case. Whilst there is ample evidence of community development 
projects failing to achieve their objectives, foreign 
government funders are increasing rather than decreasing their 
donations to such projects. 
Indeed the 1991 British House of Commons Report on that 
country's relations with South Africa recommends the extension 
of sponsored community development for the following reasons. 
First, because community development 'is used as a deliberate 
counterpart of the UK's diplomatic efforts to promote 
political change in South Africa' (1991:44). Second, community 
development, though labour-intensive, 'has not only brought 
credit to Britain but has at least partially redeemed the UK 
in the eyes of some black South Africans' (p.37). And finally, 
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community development in South Africa 'has been highly and 
very visibly effective' (p.44). 
Sinclair (1986) writing ,about American government and private 
involvement in community development in South Africa is rather 
more forthright than the British Parliamentarians. Sinclair 
argues that the 'unconventional' development approach (the 
British Report calls it 'unorthodox'): 
'Can · make a significant impact on the "process of 
empowerment". Through carefully planned and well directed 
initiatives, it is possible to contribute to the development 
of institutions, leadership groups and processes that may be 
instrumental in preparing the ground for a stable majority 
government' (1986:73). 
In.discussions.with representatives of foreign governments it 
is clear to me that major political benefits accrue to their 
governments through involvement in community development. 
Diplomats I have discussed this issue with have shown a keen 
awareness of the problems associated ·with their intervention 
(i.e their inability to prove its effectiveness in alleviating 
poverty or promoting opportunity) but justify their continued 
and extended involvement on the basis of "value for money" and 
"broad canvas" considerations. 
Through my research in the Spiritual Churches Centre and at 
' 
Philippi Enterprises and more widely in the development 
industry, problems with such intervention strategies have 
become quite evident. In the conclusion to this thesis I 
consider the many factors which together affect the ability of 
community development programmes to help resolve the problems 
of poverty. But below I look specifically at the problems 
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which arise out of the nature and administration of schemes 
run by representatives of foreign governments. 
Foreign governments' aid. to community development projects is 
administered through a self-contained scheme which, for 
practical purposes, operates quite independently from other 
aspects of a government's aid programme. Significant overseas 
donor governments have chosen to administer their schemes 
through their diplomatic respresentatives (ie. career . 
diplomats) rather than representatives of aid and development 
departments. 
There are significant consequences of this. Government 
departments (eg. USAID, British ODA) which are charged solely 
with development work have strict policy guidelines for the 
funding, implementation and assessment of development 
programmes (see Riddell, 1987). Thes.e guidelines constantly 
change through the exchange of ideas with fieldwork-hardened 
development workers and development theoreticians. Community 
development schemes administered through diplomatic off ices, 
however, do not adhere strictly to such professional aid-
giving guidelines. 
It is my impression that the sort of "unorthodox" or 
"unconventional" schemes described in this thesis are more 
directly extensions of the political work of the diplomatic 
missions and by extension foreign governments rather than the 
development work of an aid office. For this reason schemes 
which are described as, for example, the Head of Mission's 
Gift Scheme - through which community development funds are 
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given - are often seen as Ambassadorial largesse rather than a 
serious development commitment. 
Rossouw has recently written that 'Funds for projects and 
community-based organisations were generally available on 
request and were given to those who wrote the best proposals 
and not to those who meet the needs of the communities' 
('South', March 14 to March 20, 1991). From my experience 
those able, to write the best letters tend to be members of an 
educated and politically active elite rather than ordinary 
township residents who could make use of a new sewing machine 
or school blackboard. 
A major role of diplomatic missions in any country is to 
gather and assess information which is relevant to their 
sending-government for the formulation of foreign policy. 
Diplomacy involves the constant accumulation of "useful 
contacts" which enable diplomats to keep abreast of events. 
There is evidence to suggest that a portion of urban community 
development funds are directed at local political figures as a 
form of patronage or client's support. 
Whilst some recipients of aid may be involved in a township 
project (credit league, sewing group, craft centre) it is most 
likely that their association with a project will be one of 
convenience. Development projects provide office-space, 
telephones and back-up staff as well as some status. For the 
funder the short-term benefits of this, in terms of contact-
building, are quite clear; the longer-term benefits accruing 
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to Western governments who are being seen to support 
'progressive leaders', however, is open to speculation. 
The procedure for granting payments to projects usually takes 
the form of a response to a proposal letter. Either a cheque 
is immediately despatched to the project or a diplomat will 
visit the project and assess its needs. Involvement by 
missions is not long-term and is mostly characterised by one-
off payme~ts to projects for the purchase of specific items or 
for the payment of services. Only very rarely are follow-up 
assessments made. 
Pre- and post-implementation studies (such as needs 
assessments, base-line studies, ex-post evaluation of 
effectiveness, bi-annual or annual progress reports and 
reviews plus an end-of-term review) which involve the active 
participation of the recipients of. aid are seen by aid 
agencies to be central to the development process. Without 
such continued involvement very basic errors are likely to be 
made. Such errors, as I show in just one example, have been 
made in foreign governments' donations to the projects, with 
which I have been involved. 
In mid-1989 the British Consulate responded to a request from 
the members of the Spiritual Churches Centre to supply them 
with a combi which would enable the project to market their 
produce more effectively. It is not normally the policy of the 
British Government, a diplomat informed me, to purchase 
vehicles for projects: firstly, because such a purchase would 
exceed their budgetary limit (approximately RlS,000) on single 
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payments to projects; and secondly because it would demand a 
long-term commitment in covering running, insurance and 
registration costs. In this instance, however, the Consulate 
agreed to provide R16,000 necessary to purchase a second-hand 
combi. 
In order to assist two projects the Consulate decided to give 
the money to Nkonyeni at Philippi Enterprises with 
instructions to buy the vehicle on behalf of the Spiritual 
Churches Centre, and to make any necessary repairs. Six weeks 
after the money was given, Nkonyeni presented a vehicle to the 
centre's members. I examined it with the help of a mechanic 
who owned a motor repair workshop on the industrial estate. He 
declared the vehicle to be a "death trap". The engine required 
a total rebuild, the brakes would have needed complete 
replacing, · new floor panels fitted throughout and extensive 
bodywork repairs undertaken to make the combi safe. The 
vehicle was unlicensed, it had no roadworthy certificate or 
insurance. The mechanic estimated its value at R4,000. 
A representative from the Consulate insisted that Nkonyeni 
take the vehicle back and use the money he'd been given to 
make the vehicle roadworthy. For four months the combi stood 
on an area of ground between the buildings housing the two 
projects. The repairs were never made. Eventually it was 
pushed into the Philippi Enterprises building, where according 
to one of the mechanics, it was stripped and parts were used 
to repair other vehicles. The Consulate was forced to write-
off R16,000 and had still to fulfill its promise to the 
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members of the Spiritual Churches project to supply them with 
a useable vehicle. 
A closer analysis of both projects would have revealed to the 
Consulate official that his scheme stood little chance of 
success. At no time did he consult with the members of the 
Spiritual Churches project to confirm that the arrangement 
suited them; rather it was presented as a fait accompli. 
First, the official had entrusted Nkonyeni with a sum of money 
attached to which were only vague conditions and no mechanisms 
ensuring accountability. The scope for misuse was clear. 
Second, during this period relations between certain members 
of the Nkonyeni's project and members of the Spiritual 
Churches project were poor. The Spiritual Churches members 
were still angry about the involvement of the UWM in their 
project and their anger increased when they discovered that 
Faisal was working with Nkonyeni and was demanding the return 
from their project of "his" fibreglass equipment. Matiwana 
insisted that Nkonyeni would never have done the work for 
their project because "he is our enemy". 
Third, a closer analysis of Philippi Enterprises would have 
revealed the simmering discontent felt by ordinary workers 
towards Nkonyeni and his management committee. By mid-1988 the 
mechanics section was working more or less independently of 
Nkonyeni and certainly would not have followed his 
instructions to repair a combi which effectively he owned. 
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The members of the Spiritual Churches project finally received 
a second combi (also second-hand) in December 1990; the keys 
for which were handed over to Nomathemba Matiwana in the full 
glare of publicity during an official visit by the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (see photo). 
4. conclusion 
In 1986, ,Michael Sinclair a researcher for the Washington-
based Investor Responsibility Research Unit (IRRU), undertook 
research in South Africa to gauge the perceptions of people 
about American governmental and non-governmental involvement 
in community development. He discovered a general perception 
that community development programmes 'were seen to perpetuate 
dependency by failing to address the basic causes of the 
poverty cycle' (1986:22). 
His mainly black respondents criticised American attempts at 
community development in the following ways: community 
development schemes were seen to operate without a clear 
insight into the nature of black underdevelopment; such 
schemes adopted a piecemeal approach; the nature of assistance 
was directed at palliative efforts rather than fundamental 
change; commitment was short-term and did not ensure community 
initiative; and funder's interest in South Africa was driven 
by an 'attempt to absolve international moral guilt' rather 
than a genuine interest (1986:23-24). 
Five years on very similar objections to community development 
programmes operated by foreign governments were expressed to 
.. ' 
Photogrpah 1. British Foreign Secretary presents a second 




me by individuals involved at all levels of aid giving and 
receiving. Such reactions to community development programmes 
are the outcome of a number factors. 
In a sense any development 
foreign governments will be 
strategies pursued by certain 
met by howls of disapproval. 
'Progressive organisations' have constantly singled out the 
American and British Governments as being friends of Pretoria. 
International diplomacy is an imprecise science. Lipton (1986) 
has described how in the mid-1980s the 'interaction of 
external and interal pressures generated a complex chain-
reaction of effects, intensifying both reformist and 
authoritarian pressures' within South Africa. External 
pressures can, she argues, 'harden attitudes, complicate or 
impede negotiations, and even intensify violence' (1986:378, 
398) . It is perhaps impossible therefore for foreign 
governments, particularly governments of powerful nations 
which are seen to be ideologically opposed to "the struggle", 
to adopt a policy towards South Africa which will be 
positively received. 
Community development, diplomats from western missions have 
informed me, is perceived by embassy staff to be a highly 
visible and effective counter-measure to such criticism. A 
diplomatic presence in the townships, particularly at the time 
of conflict is, they have argued, appreciated by black 
leaders, both at the national and community level. Embassy 
funding policies, which are generally perceived to favour ANC 
associated organisations, are widely known and demands for 
funding far exceeds supply. 
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Assistance through community development programmes provides, 
as I have already said, an opportunity for foreign embassies 
to broaden their range of contacts within political circles in 
South Africa. Western governments support for the "victims of 
apartheid" has been central to their anti-sanctions stance. 
Representatives of foreign governments talk both in South 
Africa and "at home" about their commitment to remaining in 
South Africa to bring about changes from within. A former 
British Ambassador has often stressed his Government's 
commitment "to fight against apartheid. We have no intention 
of disengaging; we will go on providing practical help and 
whatever the difficulties we will go on working for positive 
change" (Sowetan, 27 April 1988). 
Influential visitors from western countries (both in 
government, and opposition, journalist~ and academics) who are 
seen as opinion moulders are taken into the townships to see 
first-hand the sort of work undertaken by embassy staff. 
I have conducted some of these tours on behalf of the British 
Embassy and can confirm that visitors are impressed, firstly 
to be in the township at all, secondly by access enjoyed by 
embassy staff, and lastly by the unexpectedly practical nature 
of community diplomacy. In the case of Britain, favourable 
responses to the embassy's work in South Africa has been 
translated in an all-Party Report recommending the 
continuation of present policy. In a bid to oppose the call 
for sanctions and disengagement, therefore, community 
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development as a component of overall aid to the "victims of 
apartheid" has been highly effective. 
My research however, would suggest that in purely development 
terms, community development strategies do not achieve the 
objectives of development as outlined in the United Nations 
Report. Through the examples of Philippi Enterprises and the 
Spiritual Churches Centre it is difficult to argue that the 
British Government, for example, has achieved its stated aims 
of "assisting black economic advancement" ('Argus', 28 April 
1988), "helping blacks to help themselves" ('Citizen', 27 
April 1988) or "helping people today and creating hope for the 
future" ('Argus', 18 August 1988) . Foreign governments 
attempts at community development in South Africa are unlikely 
to succeed for a whole range of complex reasons, many of which 
are beyond the immediate control of the programme 
administrators. However, diplomatic mission-funded community 
development programmes are to a large extent hindered by the 
fact that they involve the scattering of small amounts of aid, 
which is notoriously difficult to monitor. Schemes are 
administered by non-development trained staff and without the 
input of NGOs are designed to secure often short-term 
political goals rather than long-term development objectives. 
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Chapter Eleven 
corporate social Responsibility 
1. Introduction 
The largest groups of donors to community development projects 
in black townships are foreign governments and national and 
multinational companies. During the period of my research 
fund managers of corporate social responsibility programmes 
were closely involved in both Philippi Enterprises and the 
Spiritual Churches Development Centre. In this chapter I 
examine the reasons for the business sector to become involved 
in community development and fund manager's changing attitudes 
towards such sponsorship. Through the experiences of members 
of the Spiritual Churches Centre it would appear that fund 
managers are increasingly less willing to allocate money to 
schemes which have traditionally performed badly. As the 
demands on business to become more involved in social 
upliftment increase, small-scale, co-operative-type ventures 
will discover this avenue of funding being blocked. 
2. Business and community Development 
The role of business in the evolution of apartheid policies, 
the continuing relationship between business and the state, 
and the role of business in the reform process are complex 
issues (see Lipton, 1986, Greenberg, 1987b, and Welsh, 1988). 
And it is in this context that business involvement in social 
responsibility including community development - must be 
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seen. The debate thus far, Lipton has argued, has centred on 
'whether capitalists in South Africa wanted to retain, 
strengthen or destroy apartheid and whether they had the power 
to secure their aims?' (1986:2). And latterly as the 
scaffolding of apartheid is being removed how is the business 
world facing up to the socio-economic problems which beset the 
country? 
In 1964 Q'Dowd proposed a thesis that has recently been 
popularised by economists like Caldwell ( 1988) that business 
people are opposed to apartheid and that they have the power 
to get rid of a system which is incompatible with capitalism: 
particularly in its free market form. Liberals like Horwitz 
(1967) later agreed with O'Dowd that capitalists were opposed 
to apartheid but that they were powerless in the face of 
National Party hegemony to eradicate it (Lipton, 1986:3-4). 
Bromberger (1974) and Lipton (1974) Gombined elements of the 
O'Dowd and Horwitz theses arguing that apartheid suited 
certain sectors of the economy but was imposed upon them and 
would eventually prove too costly to maintain. 
Marxists like Legassick (1973) and Wolpe (1970) and non-
Marxists like Welsh ( 1988) have emphasised the interests of 
certain business sectors in sustaining an apartheid system 
from which they benefitted in terms of, for example, the 
'reserves' and tied labour. Industrial capital, Welsh has 
argued, 'adapted itself to the available structures, utilised 
what was useful to its interests, objected to what was not 
( such as job ratios and job reservation) but until fairly 
recent times substantially acquiesced in the racial ordering 
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of society. South African business elites, Welsh believes, 
'were whites before they were entrepreneurs' (1988:162). 
It is misleading though, as Lipton has noted, to see 
capitalists in South Africa as an homogenous group which has 
been either unanimously opposed to, or wholeheartedly in 
favour of, apartheid (1986:6-7). Business in South Africa, as 
in other countries, has applied pressure on the government to 
secure reforms particularly on issues like the migrant 
labour system - which have, it is argued, presented obstacles 
to economic growth in general, and in certain sectors. 
Business pressure has been influential in securing change, but 
as Lipton has said there were important respects in which 
apartheid was not eroded. 
The 1970s, marked by the strikes of 1973 and the Soweto 
uprising of 1976, were a watershed for business in South 
Africa. During this decade the private sector, Welsh has 
argued, realised its limitations to change the environment as 
it, like the government, had to face the force of urbanisation 
and organised black labour (1988:165). Out of the violence of 
1976-77 emerged the Urban Foundation, a coalition of business 
people representing 60% of the country's business assets 
(Welsh, 1988:164). The Foundation, which Rich has described as 
a 'vaguely liberal pressure group' (1984:135) centred its 
activities on quality of life issues in urban areas and 
successfully campaigned for the toppling of influx control and 
pass laws, and prohibitions on urban property rights for 
Africans. 
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The early 1980s saw a warming in relations between business 
sectors and the state. But in the mid-'80s, as township 
violence intensified and international pressure for reform 
increased, business stepped-up its political demands and began 
talks with the ANC (1988:166-67). In the late 1980s and into 











Business is aware, Welsh believes, 'of the perception that the 
private sector and apartheid are in a symbiotic relationship' 
( 1988: 168) , and in order to overcome this perception it must 
promote a commitment to black advancement and general 
environmental improvements. Greenberg sees this reformist 
trend led by 'progressive capitalists' as part of a global 
reinvigoration and reassertion of liberalism (or neo-
liberalism) through capitalism's acceptable face. 
Brice and Wegner (1989) have seen in this reassertion a new 
relationship evolving throughout the 1980s between South 
African business, government and society. Brice and Wegner 
argue that the greatest challenge facing South African 
business over the next decade is to develop broad-based social 
partnerships which balance various public demands for social 
goals with their objective to remain economically viable 
(1989:163-64). This, they argue, can be achieved through 
expanded corporate social responsibility programmes. 
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According to Sommer, corporate social responsibility means 
that a corporation 'voluntarily expends its resources to do 
something not required by law and without immediate economic 
benefit' (quoted in Optima Supplement, 1982:3). There are two 
main strategies to social responsibility: the first involves 
the linking of trade with aid and development in the broad 
society; and the second involves the encouragement and 
development of business practices, including industrial 
relations, which offer a better deal for black workers. 
The principle that business had a responsibility to assist in 
social welfare was established in Victorian England by 
companies which were invariably owned by Quaker families and 
situated in depressed areas. In 1975, however, Harry 
Oppenheimer arged that what was required in South Africa was 
something quite different from Victorian-style charitable 
donations. Oppenheimer preferred to think of social 
responsibility programmes as 'environmental investments' 
which, he believes, marked a fundamental shift in business 
ethics since such programmes included the formulation and 
funding of projects (what is now termed proactive funding) 
rather than merely the reactive giving of aid (1975:50). 
In 1982 Gavin Relly justified Anglo American and De Beers 
social responsibility involvement, first on the basis that the 
long-term benefit to society and the country would also 
benefit the company, and secondly that private businesses are 
less rigid and imposing than the state and are therefore more 
able to be sensitive to the communities' own priorities. And 
lastly, if one believes in private enterprise, one must 
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believe that private initiative has a part to play in the 
welfare, education and culture of society (1982:4-5). 
Anglo American and De Beers through their Chairman's Fund has 
provided a model for corporate social responsibility which 
other companies have followed. And in recent years, as a 1989 
Wits Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) Report, and research by 
Lucas (1987) indicates, the percentage of major South African 
corporations post-tax profits apportioned to social 
responsibility has steadily increased (CPS Research Report No. 
5, April 1989, Lucas, 1987:13). 
The CPS surveyed 52 leading companies which showed that in 
1988 in excess of R130m was donated to non-profit activities. 
Of the 16 companies which provided a detailed breakdown of 
their expenditure, approximately 60% of their budgets were 
devoted to education (pre-school, school and university), 5% 
to business development and 13% to community development. 
Many of the companies surveyed first established their social 
responsibility programmes in the 1980s. The most recent 
substantial corporate programme was announced by Liberty Life 
in April 1990. Its Chairman, Donald Gordon, described the 
formation of the Liberty Life Foundation with a five year 
budget of RlOO million as a 'major initiative'. Its objective 
he said 'is to provide a financial base to enable 
disadvantaged communities to achieve significant and 
meaningful upliftment in the quality of their lives, by the 
provision, inter alia, of improved educational facilities and 
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housing and the alleviation of poverty' (Sunday Times, 15 
April 1990). 
Pressure on major corporations to beef-up their commitment to 
'environmental investments' has come not only from within 
South Africa but also from overseas. The ideals of, and goals 
for, social responsibility involvement by American-owned 
companies operating in South Africa were first laid down by 
Leon Sull~van in 1970s (Whisson, 1980:17). Sullivan's initial 
response to American companies operating in South Africa was 
that they should withdraw immediately thus serving notice on 
the Pretoria Government that it is more profitable to change 
than to resist. During the mid-70s however, his attitude 
changed an in 1977 instead of recommending disengagement he, 
like the British Government in 1974, proposed a number of 
principles · to 
should adhere 
which companies with South Africa interests 
(Sinclair, 1986:61, . Foreign Policy Study 
Foundation Report, 1981:96). 
Sullivan's ideals were very similar to those proposed by 
Oppenheimer in 1975 and Gordon in 1990. His vision was of a 
capitalist society in which the 'vast majority of the people 
had sufficient stake in the wealth of the country to make an 
alternative form of political economy unattractive 
particularly if the transformation to the alternative can be 
attained only by violence' (1980:18). 
The British Government over the past decade has also 
encouraged British-owned companies with investments in South 
Africa to recognise their responsibilities to social 
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upliftment. In his address to the Get Ahead Foundation in 
April 1988, the British Ambassador pointed out that "British 
companies operating in South Africa had contributed over R130 
million in black housing, education and welfare in a single 
year" ( 'Sowetan', 27 April 1988). The role of business must 
be, the Ambassador later said, to assist in the "preservation 
of the economy whilst changing the politics - not to destroy 
the economy while reinforcing the worst features of the 
political system . . . what matters most at this stage is to 
develop self-help structures which increase the confidence and 
organisational strength of the communities" ('Argus', 18 
August 1988). 
It· is in this context that foreign and South African-owned 
corporations have donated money to the Spiritual Churches 
Centre and. Philippi project in line with their rhetorical 
commitment to build social partnerships and strengthen self-
help community structures. As Brice and Wegner have shown the 
development strategies adopted by business which target the 
largest amounts of aid to education and lesser amounts to 
community development, business development, emergency relief 
and general welfare ( 1989: 165-68) are very similar to those 
adopted by foreign governments. 
It is significant however that corporate social responsibility 
programmes differ in their administration from foreign 
government schemes which tend, with one or two exceptions, to 
be administered in-house. Business environmental investment 
(rather than workplace improvements) are administered in 
either of the following ways. 
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It is most often the case that a company will employ full-time 
trained fieldworkers who will be based in company offices and 
will report directly to a senior public affairs manager or the 
company Chairman (e.g. Shell, BP, Cadbury's). Alternatively a 
company will establish a foundation which may or may not be 
situated in company offices but is considered to be a separate 
entity from the funding ins ti tut ion (Mobil, Gencor, Liberty 
Life). Fieldworkers employed by the foundation will be 
supported by a board of trustees which in the case of the 
Mobil Foundation, for example, are drawn from universities, 
the business world and include community workers. 
During interviews, administrators of social responsibility 
programmes expressed to me a keen awareness of the need to 
monitor and become actively involved in the projects they 
support. Most companies demand some visibility from their aid 
giving, which one senior executive described to me as 
"sponsorship in another form". The manager of Shell's social 
responsibility programme has recently commented that as such 
programmes gain a higher profile, and because companies are 
beginning to tie their name and image to the recipient 
project, companies are far more anxious to ensure 
effectiveness and accountability. "No business" he added 
"wants to be associated with a corrupt and inefficient 
organisation" (interview, April 12, 1991). 
It is for this reason that many corporate social 
responsibility managers are, they have informed me, reducing 
their involvement in small-scale community-based projects like 
the Spiritual Churches Centre and Philippi Enterprises. 
Increasingly 
achieves the 
fund managers are insisting that 




Assistance to education, for example in the area of teacher 
upgrading, has tangible · multiplier effects where a grant of 
RJ0,000 can be seen to benefit 100 or 200 school pupils. 
The administration required to assist community-based, often 
co-operative-type ventures is substantial and labour-
intensive .. The emergence of such projects is, as Davies (1989) 
has said, a relatively recent urban phenomenon and whilst 
literally hundreds of ventures have been initiated very few 
have survived to become growing concerns. In fact, Davies has 
written, 'success has been the exception; and failure the 
rule. Little has emerged in terms of finding real solutions to 
the problem of their apparently inevitable failure' (1989:15). 
In 1989 the Mobil Foundation arranged ·a seminar to discuss the 
problems facing funders of small-scale community-based 
projects. The general feeling was that co-operative type 
ventures would continue to 'assume increasing importance 
within the Foundation' (Manuel, 1989:58). By the beginning of 
1990, however, the Foundation's trustees were urging a move 
away from such a policy. 
Their decision to shift priorities was hastened by their 
"disappointing" involvement with the Spiritual Churches 
project in 1990. A Foundation manager expressed his concern to 
me about the organisation of the project. The Centre, he 
believed, was an example of the saddest consequences of such 
community development initiatives. Its members had been 
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targets of so much conflicting advice and little genuinely 
constructive assistance. The project had become, he believed, 
the creation of outside interference. Money had been given 
with no foresight or planning, the members of the project had 
lost direction and were now unable to change. 
Unlike foreign governments, commercial concerns are concerned 
about the effectiveness of their aid-giving particularly where 
it adversely the company image. For this reason, it is likely 
that less and less corporate responsibility money will be made 




1. The Background 
Galtung (1979) has written that 'an analysis without policy 
implications of a strategic nature is no good analysis' 
(1979:13). This dictum, Sandbrook (1982) has argued, has 
especial application to studies of poverty and poverty-
directed development ( 1982: 228) . Whilst this thesis does not 
propose an action programme for future development work in 
South Africa's urban settings it does attempt to recognise 
what is wrong with a current development practice and provide 
some pointers for the future. 
Through a study of the creation and performance of two 
community-based projects in an African urban area I have tried 
to place in context the actions and consequences of major 
protagonists in community development. 
Because so much of the experience of urban life for Africans 
in South Africa has been determined by the actions of the 
state, my analysis began by cataloguing the continuing 
attempts by the state to control the urbanward movement, 
settlement and activities of Africans. In so doing I was able 
to build up a picture of the experiences of urban living out 
of which emerged material deprivation, forms of political 
activity and actions by individuals from within and outside 
urban communities to tackle poverty. 
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In my analysis, the projects are seen, at least in part, as a 
reaction to the consequences of the government's use of the 
rhetoric and practice of community development in the 
crossroads area. Community development was used as a means (in 
conjunction with many other local and national strategies) to 
further the state's objectives. In order, for example, to 
assist the state in its bid to reorder the local political and 
demographic terrain, a group of men were co-opted and given 
the means to control Old Crossroads and its satellite informal 
settlements. 
Nomathemba Matiwana and (eventually) Sam Nkonyeni emerged out 
of·the Crossroads crisis as community leaders opposed to such 
authoritarian rule. Both had suffered financial loss and 
personal hardship during the worst of the fighting, and both 
sought ways of addressing the many social problems they 
witnessed. 
Throughout their involvement in the events of Crossroads, from 
the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, Matiwana and Nkonyeni learned 
something about the "development industry". Nkonyeni, as a 
member of Ngxobongwana's Executive Committee, was charged with 
forging relations between members of the Committee and outside 
agencies including the government to discuss the settlement's 
future. As a politician and businessman he soon realised the 
sorts of opportunities presented by development organisations. 
After his expulsion from Old Crossroads he made use of this 
knowledge. 
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Matiwana' s involvement was less formal. Her role during the 
crisis was both as a social worker and as a point of contact 
between outside agencies and the victims of the conflict. 
Through this work she gained a realistic understanding of how 
agencies perceive and respond to situations. Like Nkonyeni, 
Matiwana retained her contact with representatives of 
political groups, embassies and consulates, and church bodies 
and was later successful in obtaining their support for her 
project. 
Nkonyeni and Matiwana' s involvement in the events of 
Crossroads placed them at the centre of local political 
activity. It was during the early to mid-1980s that the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) and allied 'progressive organisations' 
sought to become more closely involved in 'squatter' affairs. 
'Squatter' politics are notoriously complex and unpredictable. 
Ngxobongwana and other male leaders c;::apitalised on divisions 
within the community and partly through an appeal to 
'tradition' built-up a power-base from which they controlled 
the settlement's political economy. 'Progressive 
organisations' and other outside organisations, quite 
unintentionally, assisted these leaders ( and by association 
the state) in their bid to gain control. 
Aware of the consequences of their involvement in the events 
leading up to 1985 and 1986, the UDF and other organisations 
sought, in the post-crisis era, to repair the damage without 
replicating past mistakes. A strategy was adopted which 
involved the promotion and active support of a range of 
community development projects. 
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It has been a constant feature of development intervention 
that local-level aid is chanelled through local leaders. 
Nkonyeni and Matiwana by virtue of their opposition to the Old 
Crossroads leadership became seen as 'progressive', 'popular' 
or 'genuine' leaders and therefore as ideal recipients of such 
assistance. 
Their suitability was further enhanced by virtue of the fact 
that they sought assistance for initiatives which were 
favoured in 'progressive' circles: co-operative, self-help, 
and community-based productive projects, which fell in the 
same category as civic organisations, advice offices and 
creches. Funding organisations which, for a range of reasons, 
sought to become actively involved in township affairs, were 
anxious to work though acceptable channels and therefore made 
money available to approved projects such as the Spiritual 
Churches Centre and Philippi Enterprises. 
These events provided the background to the discussion 
contained in this thesis about the consequences of community 
development intervention, the errors of community development 
intervention, and the motivations of major protagonists 
involved in such intervention. 
2. The Evidence 
The Spiritual Churches Centre and Philippi 
ventures, like so many similar ventures before 





planned, managed and funded projects. The sort of assistance 
provided made this situation worse. The policy of major donors 
was driven by motivations other than genuine development 
concerns. Foreign governments disbursed money hapharzardly and 
ineffectively. Businesses took a little more care but for 
years poured money into ventures which, if they were offered 
as financial investments, would not have been given a second 
look. Service organisations, comprising unions, political 
pressure groups, university organisations and welfare bodies 
largely prolonged the confusion by failing to see the problems 
inherent in such intervention. The process was further 
complicated by ideological confusion and often corruption. 
The outcome of this complex situation is that groups of people 
who had a genuine desire and the energy to confront the 
problems caused by material deprivation and political 
powerlessness were to be found sitting, despondent a~d often 
angry, in funder-dependent projects which had little prospect 
of satisfying their goals. In other places disingenuous men 
and women were tapping the aid pool for their own gain. 
And the beneficiaries of such intervention have tended to be 
not the recipients of aid but the donors. Only a tiny fraction 
of the hundreds of millions of Rand that enters South Africa 
each year for aid purposes is used to support community-based 
projects like the Spiritual Churches Centre and Philippi 
projects, but the returns on such investment for the funders 
are great. 
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These projects are just two examples of the thousands of 
similar projects up and down the country which constitute the 
'alternative sector' • Accounting for the ineffectiveness of 
these projects and to devise future strategies demands one to 
look at many things. 
There are clear practical reasons for failure. As Davies 
( 1989) has noted in the many analyses of community self-help 
and co-operative type ventures in South Africa, the same kinds 
of problems and constraints are usually identified. These 
include 'a lack of managerial or organisational expertise' 
(Thomas, 1987); 'poor financial management abilities and 
insufficient management competence' (Thaver, 1988) ; the 
'absence of adequate literacy skills' and a lack of 
'understanding of the importance of efficient book-keeping' 
(Barratt, 1989); the critical 'need for training' (van 
Heerden, 1988); and a lack of suitable finance (Thaver, 1988). 
Another set of reasons has to do with the unrealistic 
expectations of people involved in community-based projects. · 
According to Alexander 'there is no 
within the black working class in 
co-operativist tradition 
spite of the romantic 
delusions of 'African Socialism' cherished by some activists 
and theorists' ( 1989: 24) . Organising people into some 
collective, he believes, requires a transformation of the 
'survival reflex of the unemployed' which is not necessarily 
based on solidarity. Community-based projects, therefore, 
rarely fulfill their destinies as 'a fighting organisation in 
the broader struggle for socialism' (Etkind, 1989:61). 
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As part of the ideal of co-operativism such projects have been 
charged with the task of confronting the facets of urban 
poverty such as disease, illiteracy, unemployment and 
powerlessness. And moreover, they have been placed at the 
forefront of transformation in South Africa. Etkind, in an 
article in 'Transformation', sees community-based projects 
performing the sort of tasks which co-operatives performed in 
Yugoslavia, Cuba and Nicaragua ( 1989: 58-59) . In so doing he 
ignores the fact that the economic and political situation 
prevailing in Eastern Europe or post-revolution Cuba or 
Nicaragua were far removed from the political and economic 
situation in contemporary South Africa. 
There is as Jaffe has remarked 'rampant idealism and much 
confusion about the potential for co-operatives to contribute 
to social and economic transformation' (1989:32). As such 
ideals pass by unfulfilled, members of projects become 
disheartened, enthusiasm wanes, organisation collapses and 
projects close. 
One must also consider the nature and consequences of funding 
received by community-based projects. 
Throughout this thesis I have shown that money is available 
for community ventures like the Spiritual Churches Centre and 
Philippi Enterprises. For the two major funders, foreign 
governments and corporate social responsibility departments, 
it was the giving of money to the projects was important 
rather than the consequences of the giving. All too often 
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funding programmes result in a dependency trap from which it 
is extremely difficult for small community organisations to 
extricate themselves. 
Offering development aid to township groups provided foreign 
governments with a means to pursue "community diplomacy". It 
helped to warm relations between governments which were seen 
as hostile to the "struggle" and "struggle organisations". 
Political ,activists, according to Pieterse, were paid off, 
'people were employed in certain projects because they were 
activists, not because of the skills they possessed' . As a 
consequence of this projects failed to achieve their aims. 
'People' Pieterse has argued, 'are corrupted by the ease with 
which finance is available, and the idea that they need to 
work hard for that money is taboo' ('Pieterse' quoted in 
'South', March 1991). Easy money, Manuel argued in the same 
article has 'corrupted an entire layer of people' it is 
'destroying the struggle'. 
Development aid disbursed through diplomatic offices, as 
opposed to aid disbursed through official government 
development departments, was administered without the tight 
controls normally demanded by the holders of the public purse. 
Non-aid specialist diplomats representing major western 
governments in South Africa operated according to a brief 
which demanded the greatest return from a modest outlay. 
Consequently aid was both scattered thinly and often 
inappropriately. At the same time it was strategically 
targetted at groups and individuals which best understood the 
process of giving and/or provided an opening into black 
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politics through which the foreign government could claim to 
have been received. 
The approach of funders was often one of paternalism and 
double-standards in tolerating shoddy work as the "people's 
approach". 
Community development assistance has provided something of a 
diplomatic coup for 
publicity accrues 
representatives are 
certain western governments. 
to foreign 







practical help they are 
representatives have used the 
giving to ameliorate the worst 
excesses of apartheid to support their anti-sanctions stance 
by arguing that it is always better to work for change from 
within rather than leaving the field. 
Corporate social responsibility funds provided similar 
advantages for the business sector. Environmental investment 
may well, as Oppenheimer argued in 1975, represent a shift in 
business ethics towards greater social awareness. Social 
responsibility, however, also acted as the torch-bearer for 
businesses' attempts to show its liberal, acceptable face and 
to distance itself from apartheid. 
Initially social responsibility schemes were managed in much 
the same way as foreign governments' schemes. Small amounts of 
money were given with only a cursory assessment of a project's 
likely effectiveness. Once again it was the giving that 
featured in the end of the year reports, not the consequences 
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of the giving. My research indicates, however, that such an 
attitude is now changing. As businesses concern themselves 
more with value-for-money in environmental investment they are 
withdrawing their support for community-based projects like 
the Spiritual Churches Centre which are troublesome to 
administer and project a poor company image. 
As part of funding one must also consider the actions of 
service o~ganisations and other groups which become involved 
in community development and how those actions effect the 
performance of projects. 
My research has shown that service ·organisations 
(organisations which act as filters between funders and 
recipient projects) are funded from the same sources as 
township projects and often exhibit the same tendencies to 
inefficiency, corruption and ideological confusion. 
Organisations struggling to carve out a niche for themselves 
in community development in which they can be seen to 
represent the interests of the unemployed, unskilled, women or 
co-operatives often pursue 
strategies which lead to 
development process. 
inconsistent and antagonistic 
tension at all levels of the 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in accounting for the 
ineffectiveness of community-based projects like the Spiritual 
Churches Centre and Philippi Enterprises one must consider the 
socio-political environment into which people have been 
socialised. 
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In order for community-based projects to operate effectively 
there is a need, Wilson and Ramphele have argued, 'to succeed 
in making people believe in themselves in an environment where 
everything negates their very humanity' (1989:289). This 
condition, Davies believes, lies at the very core of projects' 
failure to achieve their objectives, and it is 'attributable 
to a socio-political dispensation which has deliberately 
sought to exclude and marginalise the black majority in south 
Africa' (1989:16). 
One consequence of this condition is 'the ease with which 
people fall back into despair whenever the going gets tough' 
(Wilson and Ramphele, 1989:290). This is frequently 
interpreted as 'community apathy' or a 'lack of motivation'; 
and results in perceptions that disadvantaged people are 
incapable of looking after their own affairs. It is important, 
however, Davies believes, to look at the reasons why people 
appear demotivated. 'For many decades, the role and status to 
which they have been consigned by oppressive legislation and 
custom have been such that they have little reason to believe 
that their life prospects are anything other than dismal' 
(Davies, 1989:16). 
3. Looking to the Future 
In the Introduction to this thesis I argued that South Africa 
was at the early stages of a period of transition from its 
effective isolation, to the beginning of its reincorporation 
into the world "development system". The 1990s will see a 
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change in South Africa's role both as a donor and recipient of 
development aid. 
As I have previously discussed, major western governments are 
already involved in South Africa. At present their development 
involvement is dominated by bilateral aid which is disbursed 
without any mediation by the South African government. Western 
governments' aid is given with the stated aim of bringing an 
end to apartheid and helping those groups disadvantaged or 
discriminated against because of apartheid. This sort of 
involvement has 
'unconventional' 
been described as 
and, it is unlikely to 
role in a post-apartheid south Africa. 
'political' and 
have a significant 
A recent Business International Publication has suggested that 
'Bilateral aid will decline in importance as donors channel 
their funds through multinational (agencies) and donors will 
increasingly target NGOs for aid as a way of ensuring money 
gets to the poorest sections of the community where it is most 
needed' (quoted in Whiteside, 1990:9). Diplomats have 
expressed to me their view that such a rechanneling of aid is 
unlikely to occur at least until the transition period reaches 
its final stages. Bilateral aid, it seems, will continue to be 
disbursed through diplomatic offices and will be designed to 
ease the transition with an emphasis on 
upliftment (which may involve giving 
government's Independent Development 







If the transition to a democratically-elected government is 
achieved, however, the form of bilateral aid, which is often 
characterised as conscience money, will no longer flow into 
the country. Some bilateral donors (notably Britain and 
America) will, Whiteside believes, continue to maintain a 
bilateral aid programme but of a different direction and type 
to that described in this thesis (Whiteside, 1990:11). A 
possible direction for new aid could be support to an 
initiative for regional development in which South Africa is 
the powerhouse. 
Certainly in the new development era in a post-apartheid South 
Africa, multilateral agencies which were previously prevented 
from operating would do so. The following donors are likely to 
become involved: The World Bank; the African Development Bank; 
UN agencies; the European Community; and Arab Funds. 
Future development strategies in South Africa will have to 
deal with national issues about investment, economic growth, 
land and other assets, national income, education, health and 
so on. But there are problems which need to be tackled 
immediately. These are problems associated with poverty. South 
Africa desperately needs an anti-poverty programme. Such a 
programme would entail what Sandbrook ( 1982) has called non-
structural reform. Any new government in South Africa will be 
in search of legitimacy and must, therefore, be 'concerned to 
mitigate the daily hardships of ordinary people' (1982:240). 
There seems to be a realisation in the country that socio-
economic upliftment is crucial if democracy is to be given a 
chance. The government have pledged to commit further 
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government revenues to development programmes designed to 
tackle social issues. 
There are of course problems with state-led poverty-directed 
development programmes which are criticised for failing to 
reach the poorest of the poor. There are alternative basic-
needs strategies of change, however, which aim at grassroots 
liberation. Such strategies which can emanate from government 
or NGOs are forms of community development which promote the 
notion of participatory development. 
It is hoped that in a post-apartheid South Africa a less rigid 
and repressive regime will allow the development of autonomous 
organisations of poor people. Out of local organisation can 
develop local self-reliance, self-confidence and above all, in 
this immediate period of transition, a feeling that something 
is being done, and can be done to tackle the problems of 
poverty. 
Black communities in South Africa are forced to confront the 
effects of what Davies (1989) has called 'cumulative 
deprivation', and solving the problem means having to break 
the cycle of deprivation ( 1989: 18) . Grassroots participatory 
development can, Goulet (1979) has argued, prove liberating in 
two senses. 
First, such projects can help liberate small communities from 
something. Insofar as the poor share the benefits of projects 
designed to improve health, educational or housing facilities 
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or production techniques and facilities, they achieve some 
relief from material deprivation. 
Development participation may also be liberating in a broader 
sense. Through the process of defining their own needs and 
designing and implementing their own projects, 
educate themselves in organisational dynamics 
urban poor 
and self-
government. This, it is hoped, will give rise to empowerment 
which entails the 'shifting of the perceptions of subordinate 
people, enabling them to assume greater control over their 
lives' (Ramphele, forthcoming) (Goulet, 1979:556-564). 
This is not simply an argument in support of the sorts of 
community development interventions that I have described 
throughout this thesis. Far from it, I have shown how 
government-directed experiments were used largely to promote 
national development along apartheid lines and by extension to 
exert control over black South Africans. I have also shown 
that the sort of second-rate community development programmes 
implemented by foreign governments and other donors have not 
proved liberating for poor communities. 
Old-style community development as I describe it in this 
thesis has not taken the issue of participatory development 
seriously. Community development will undoubtedly be a feature 
of future development strategies in South Africa and what is 
now essential is that the mechanisms are put in place to 
ensure that external aid is used positively and 
constructively. A network of responsible and well-funded NGOs, 
staffed by trained personnel who understand and respect local 
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institutions, must be established. Relationships of trust must 
also be established between strengthened and representative 
community organisations, NGOs, funders and the state. If 
foreign governments are serious about committing themselves 
to programmes of social upliftment then they must be seen to 
disentangle genuine development involvement from the practice 
of manipulative politics 
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Doing it for themselves 
T 
IIF. n1m11s17.WE co-opcra-
1ivc in Crossroads ce l-
ebrated ils fourth anniver-
sary las t month - a mile-
stone forthc workers, since 
they have not received a 
ent in our~ide finfflcial assis1ancc 
! the co-operative's inception. 
Unlike many co-opera1iv'cs in South 
frica, Buthisi1.wc was siartcd by 
oney collc.:1cd from the participams 
emselvc.s; their salaries arc paid 
. >m whaJever money they earn from 
e goods they produce. 
8uthisi1;we - which means "col-
.., our nation" - was formed by 
• omahlubi Benge in response to 
1e violence which swept through 
'rossroads in 1986. 
After witdock vigilantes destroyed 
1e KTC squatter camp, Benge's 
ouse in New Crossroads became a 
:fuge for homeless victims. 
Beca.use of police harassment, 
~~oe went into hiding and, when 
turned to her home six months 
,tcr, found it was sti ll occupied by 
,c refugees. 
"I started thinking about what to do 
ith these homeless people; I couldn't 
st leave them sitting there or beg-
ng in the streets," Benge said. 
'I was not in the struggle; I was just 
n•• ling to help my people." 
c was also concerned about the 
nsions between people. 
iquatters who were driven out of 
·ossroads by the vigilantes could 
1t return for fear of death and fami -
s were being tom apart by the vio-
,cc. 
:he approached church leaders in 
, rnmmunity and asked them about 
, .ts which could assist in build-
~ bridges between the factions in 
ossroads. 
,!though she had no money, she 
nted to start a project which could 
>Vicic employment for her group of 
ugccs. 
At first it was difficult for people 
lr"erstand what l was saying, what 
project I wanted," Benge said. 
he found a disused factory near 
ossroads which had been aban-
'ICd by its white owner during the 
.lcncc, and held the first meeting 
he co-operative. 
'CSent at the first meeti ng were 
ims of the violence - including 
,ho had been blinded by police 
• and another in a wheelchair. 
:y all donated R50 each for the 
t two months' rent. 
he building was in a shoddy state 
en they moved in, Benge said. It 
1 covered in spiderwebs, flooded 
1 rainwater and filthy . 
1c co-operative workers restored 
' e carpentry project made the 
ne u 1n1 
When the Buthisizwe co-operative was established, many people scoffed. 
But the workers' perseverance has earned them the respect of the 
community-and financial independence. REH ANA ROSSOUW reports : 
PERSEVERANCE: These workers at the Buthisizwe Co-operative have reaped the respect 
of the community PIC: YUNUS MOHAMED 
refurbishment of the premises their 
first task, building partitions, adding 
new wooden floors and making chairs 
and benches for the workers. 
Because the co-operative did not 
make profits irnmedia1cly and there 
wa.s no money to pay salaries, most 
of the participants pulled out by the 
second month. 
Buthisi1.we became a target of scorn 
in the community. Many people felt 
that Benge was wasting her time, 
misleading the unemployed workers. 
"We had to take dra.stic action be-
cause people were beginning to feel 
very disheartened, so we pooled the 
little extra money we had and bought 
groceries for just two staff members 
each week," Benge said. 
"So the two workers went home with 
the grocery parcels and the commu-
nity could sec that Buthisi1.we gave 
its people enough money to support 
its workers." 
Four years later, money is sti ll in 
short supp ly a t Ruth isi1.wc. The 
project has no outside financial as-
sistance, except for sewing machines 
bought by the British embassy. 
The project first started paying sala-
ries in January 19RR. Each workc 
received R 1,50 a week, which late 
grew to R4,80 a week. 
However, the project was not with 
out its prohlcrns. When condit ion 
improved at Buthi si1.wc and 1h1 
community heard that it wa.s payini 
salaries, many or those who hac 
abandoned the project earlier came 
rushing back. 
"We also had people from organi -
sations coming in here, telling u.s that 
we did not know how to run things, 
that we needed to employ them to 
show us how ," said Benge. 
"We told them that we did not need 
them. Now that the potato wa.s peeled, 
they all had teeth to cat, but none of 
them would help us peel it in the fir st 
place." 
B
tmllSI7.Wl! DEUTIERAml.Y docs not 
accept outside funding. Staff arc 
told that if they want to make 
money, they have lo work hard. 
The project is built on the under-
standing that the workers are produc-
ing goods for themselves and their 
communitic.s, not to impress funders 
or political organisa tions. 
They se ll their shirts, jackets , 
drosses, jerseys, b:l'gs, mats, pillows, 
duvets and woodwork at fleamarkcts 
all over Cape Town. 
The most succesfol project is the 
brick-making project, which was 
started with one bag of cement and 
now orders more than I 00 a month. 
The co-operative is managed by a 
committee of eight people, represent-
ing the four projects - sewing, 
weaving, brick-making and carpentry. 
They also ruu a training programme, 
teaching people from the community 
designing skills to assist them with 
their sewing projects at home. 
Despite all its problems, Buthisi1.we 
workers are proud of the fact that 
they have made it on their own, even 
if they still occasionally go home at 
the end of the week with barely 
enough money to survive. 
"I'd rather be left here alone than 
take outside funding," said Benge. 
"l want to teach my people that they 
must stop waiting for other people to 
walk through the door with money to 
help them, instead of helping them-
selves. 
"Nothing in this world is given to 
you free of charge; you have to 
struggle for everything that you've 
got. 
" Even if we aren't sure that there 
will be a salary, one thing we arc sure 
of is that we have work. 
"Buthisizwc will survive, and we 
will show South Africa that ifit wants 
to survive the future, our people ~ill 
have to work very hard." · 
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4-/v,1.A SU:\J:\IARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMl\lENDATIONS 
PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOI\IJC CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
l. lt is highly unlikely that the current reforms in South Africa will be reversed under the 
rrescnt administration, allhough there arc still many obstacles on the way to a post-arartheiJ 
South Africa. (para 3.1) 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
lluilding Democracy and "Good Governance·· 
2. The olJ argument that tribal a11d rcgio11al divisions in Africa make it irnrossible to 
construct a workable multi-p:1rty democracy seems no longer to be a bar to the introduction or 
preservation uf democracy in Southern Africa. (para. 4.16) 
3. African peorle themselves demand that go\'crnmcnt be more answerable to the 
governed. Democracy is in itself not enough to create stable societies in which economic 
dcvclorment can occur. There needs also to be good. efficient and incorrupt government-
'"good governance". (para. 4.16) 
4. There is no single model of democracy which may he simply adopted in each country. All 
the countries of Southern Africa have their own traditions and conditions, and western models 
may he worse than useless. Certain principles, however. arc essential. They arc a multi-party 
Jcmocracy. with free elections anJ freedom uf the press; the rule of law; an independent 
juJiciary. an efficient and uncorrupt government and civil service; and a separation between 
the state :111d the party in power. IL should be brought home to the countries of Southern Africa 
that these principles arc not options. liut essential for economic development. If they arc 
permanently to emerge from poverty. they will 11i:cd to create WL':dth for all of their people. not 
only a section of them; and they will need to do so with the consent and co-operation of their 
people. (rara 4.16) · 
Economic Problems and Solutions 
5. Tile help of the dcn:loped world will he cssc111i;tl in the process of economic reform: hut 
the main hurJen of change will lie upo11 the countries themselves. ( para 4.17) 
6. The recognition that the efforts of aid donors should be 11101-c fully co-ordinated, more 
long-term. and more concerned with the final benefits of their aid promises better results for 
the future. It will of course always be essential to monitor aiJ closely to ensure that it rursucs 
the goal of effectiveness and sustainability. (para -LJ5) 
7. We believe that further research and considcratiun should he given to the b:isic economic 
choices facing Southern Africa. and recornmcml that the government promote such research 
anJ new thinking. (para 4.36) 
THE UK'S POLICY OPTIONS 
Diplomacy 
8. If apartheid is swept away in South Africa. and a new Southern Africa emerges in which 
regional cooperation could provide a stimulus to real economic growth. much of the UK's 
approach to the region will need to be rethought. Our diplomacy will no longer be Jominated 
by the issues of ;1parthcid. This moment has not yet arrivcJ. and realistically. our diplomacy. 
aid and trade will need to deal with the situation as it is al the present time. We must. however, 
look forward. to tile new dirlomatic, aid and trade opportunities and problems which will 
emerge in the future. (para 6.2) 
Sanctions 
9. It is clear lo us that President de Klcrk is gcnuinelv committed to the abandunment of 
apartheid and the creation of a multi-racial dc;nocracy: Sanctions were imrosed on South 
Africa not just because of its rejection of universal suffrage and its imposition of authoritarian 
rule but because apartheid imposed by law segregation and discrimination on the basis of race 
anJ colour. When the legal foundations of ararthcid arc uprooted, sanctions which were 
inteth.lcd to achieve precisely that result. will no longer he required while South Africa badly 
FIRST' REPORT FRO~! 
needs new investment and greater trade links. Britain, having maintained strong connections 
with, and a positive role in tl1e country, is now in a good positi~lll to move beyonithc sanctions 
dehate, and become more closely invol\'ed qiJI \Vith the process in South Africa. We believe 
that the time is fast approaching for the UK to remove all of the economic against South Africa. 
They include not only those which remain from those agreed by the EC in 1986-a ban on 
imports of certain South African iron and steel, and of certain South African gold coins -but 
also all of those agreed in other fora-which would include the bans on the sale and export of 
oil to South Africa. They should be lifted as soon JS legislation for the repeal of the Group 
Areas Act. Land ,\cts :ind Population Registration Act has been enacted by the South African 
parliament. Access for South Africa to the IMF will require the consent of the US Government 
and Congress. The UK should enter into discussions with the US to achieve this result. (para 
6.8) 
10. During our visit in South Africa we discovered that many South Africans regard sporting 
sanctions as particularly important. We hciicve that it is time now for the international 
community to begin lo revive sporting links with South Africa. Nevertheless, it is important 
that the UK should do this in conjunction with the other signatories to the Glencaglcs 
Agreement. \Ve recommend that the UK back 1110\·es to remove the inhihition on sporting links 
with South Afric:1. at the next meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government for those 
sports conJucteJ on genuinely non-racial lines. (para 6.9) 
11. We believe however that those sanctions which relate to the import aml export of arms 
and related material. and to militarv contacts with South Africa should remain for the time 
being. They sh\HilJ not be removed ~ntil all South Africans of an appropriate age are given the 
right to vote under a new democratic constitution within the state of South Africa. (para 6.10) 
12. _Whatever the merits of the cultural and academic boycotts of South Africa in the past 
(and we believe that they have closed an important channel through which the UK might 
encourage and influence the process of reform in South Africa) we believe that they arc now 
out of date. Now is the time for Britain to increase its contacts at all levels with South Africa. 
(para 6.11) 
The Commonwcalt!J 
13. We believe that 1t 1s important that the Cornmonwe;,ilth should re<lcfine its role to 
concentrate on mure functional activities, such as fostering cooperation in the economic, 
technical and Jcvelopment spheres. Such a redefinition of its activities may ensure the 
continued vitality of the Commonwealth in a post-aparthciJ world. (para 6.12) 
1-+. Britain should support the return of South Africa to the Commonwealth once a 
post-apartheid constitution is in place. (para 6.12) 
The British Missions in South Africa 
15. During our visit to South Africa we found the work uf the British Ambassador, Sir 
Robin Renwick, and his immensely able and sympathetic staff to be a model for the operations 
of any embassy in politically difficult circumstances akin to those in South Africa. We pay 
tribute to their essential work and hope that it will not only continue in as impressive a fashion 
under his successor, hut also continue to grow. Indeed, we believe that "community 
diplomacy" has possibie applications in other situations and countries. We recommend that the 
FCO assess such pos;sibilities. (para 6.13) 
Political Aid 
16. While we believ~ that it is important for the UK to help along the process of democratic 
discussion and development, we woulJ lay down a number of rules to govern the use of any 
funds laid out for this purpose. (para 6.15) 
17. We recommend that British financial and technical support be given for any multi-party 
elections held in Angola or Mozambique. The llK should also send observers to monitor that 
any such elections arc carried out in a free and fair manner. (para 6.16) 
T!IE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE Ii 
British Council 
18. We recommend that the British Council should open a centre in C1pc town as soon as 
possible, and that its programmes in South Africa should seek to meet the challenge now posed 
by the pace of change. (para 6.19) 
Objectives 
19. The FCO's objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa should include support for democratic 
reform as well as stability. (para 6.22) 
The Aid Programme 
20. The weight given to Southern Africa in the aid budget we believe to be justified. We 
believe that the UK should intensify its aid efforts within the region. (para 6.24) 
Aid and Conditionality 
21. We welcome the Foreign Secretary's warning to governments in receipt of aid that with 
the growing dcm:rnds on aid budgets everywhere, those countries that prove unable to 
distribute aid because of the ineffectiveness of their administrations or the nature of their 
regimes may find donors reluctant to use scarce resources to support them. We also support the 
staged approach to the encouragement of "good governance" outlined in evidence by the 
Foreign Secretary although. if the final stage of reducing aid to a government is reached, we 
would prefer to sec that aid transferred to a non-governmental organisation, wherever 
possible. That does not mean, of course, that humanitarian aid or emergency aid programmes 
should be interrupted. (para 6.26) 
Projtect Aid and Technicai Assistance 
22. We believe that the Limpopo railway line could provide an important boost to the 
economic prospects of Mozambique and Zimbabwe and in principle we recommend that ODA 
should continue to support the project. (para 6.28) 
23. The British Govt>rnment should press for the creation of a land resettlement programme 
in Zimbabwe which is workable and which will prevent investors losing confidence in the 
country and agricultural production falling into decline. If it is satisfied on these counts the UK 
government should aid the programme with fresh money. In any case. it should continue to 
support the infrastructure and services projects which it has already aided. (para 6.30) 
Deht Relief 
24. The "Trinidad Terms" provide an excellent opportunjty for relieving some of the worst 
effects of debt on some of the poorest countries and we believe that they should be agreed at 
the forthcoming London summit of the Group of Seven and begin to be implemented urgently. 
The UK should also continue to press for f urthcr action on the cancelling of debt owed to the 
European Development Fund. (para 6.32) 
We recommend that the British Government adopt certain policy aims when negotiating the 
new Trinidad Terms, as set out in para. 6.33. 
Emergency Aid 
25. We believe that the UK should expand its emergency relief commitments this year to 
meet the threat of drought coming on top of the conflicts of the region. (para 6.34) 
26. \Ve rccommeml that the "community diplomacy" programmes be modestly extended. In 
keeping with our earlier recommendation (paragraph 6.13 above) we recommend that the 
experience of our embassy in South Africa in disbursing aid should be assessed with a view to 
extending such an approach to other countries. (para 6.36) 
Aid in South Africa 
27. We believe that the British aid programmes in South Africa should continue their steady 
growth. (para 6.37) 
We endorse the current primacy of the education sector in the British aid effort. We would 
recommend that a greater proportion of educational aid be directed towards education at 
technician level as well as at the universities. (para 6.37) 
28. We welcome Mrs Chalker's statement that the ODA wants to do more work in the 
"development of small enterprise projects in South Africa." (para 6.37) 
Iii FIRST REPORf rROM 
29. We believe that ODA anJ FC:O in conjunction with the British embassy in Pretoria 
should giv_e urgent attention to the possibility of assistance in dealing with returning exiles and 
former prisoners and their rehabilitation and integration within South African society. (para 
6.38) 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
30. We recornmend that the ODA assesses its current programme of assistance to NGOs in 
Southern Africa with a view to extending the successful programme. (para 6.39) 
Trade Policy 
31. We bclie\·e that encouraging the development of small and medium-sized private sector 
businesses should become a priority for the aid pr11gramme throughout Southern Africa. (p;ua 
h.4-1) 
Conclusion 
32. A new ·'wind of change'" is blowing through Southern Africa. The first led to the rapid 
decolonisation and transformation of colonial territories into independent nation states. This 
second wind of change is blowing through the political and economic structures of those states. 
(para 6.46) 
33. The UK. which has been deeply involved by history and interests in the region, must 
now he prepared to adapt its policies to these new conditions and developments. There is first 
the task of ensuring that. with radical political and economic change now going on in so many 
parts of the glohe. the needs and potential of Southern Africa arc not forgotten. The UK's 
position in the EC and in the Commonwealth make her well placed for this role. The process of 
negotiation a11d reform in South Africa has to he further supported and encouraged, and tics 
with all. the parties and peopics truly committed to reform strengthened and thickened. (para 
6.47) . 
34. The economy of South Africa has to he given every opportunity to grow ::ind develop. 
High standards of democracy and good governance have to he demanded and monitored-
although without undue in"istence on models or blueprints of particular systems of 
go\'ernment. ;\id and technical assistance progran1111es have to be re-fashioned to assist the new 
situation. both in South Africa and in the neighbouring states. (para 6.48) 
35. Our report has also identified the other enormous ..::hange, the change in the external 
context in which Southern Africa issues will be worked out. The region had become the centre 
of internal competition between the superpmvers. part and parcel of the Cold War. Many 
Southern African leaders had turned lo the Soviet Union. the East and communist world for 
support for "the armed struggle .. and haJ adopted Eastern Uloc political anJ economic 
structures. The collapse of these structures in Eastern Europe anJ the change in Soviet foreign 
policy has fundamentally altered the international context in which Southern Africa issues may 
now be resolved. It is not likely to lead to a new "western .. domination of the region; nor 
should it. ft could lead to a new freedom for Southern African states to search for rolitical and 
economic solutions which arc "home grown" r:1ther than imposed or fashioned from outside. 
The UK can and must he closely invul\'eJ in this unfolding process. both to its own advantage 
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